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Abstract 
 
 
My thesis tackles two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent 
literature on concepts: 
 
• What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a 
concept C1 the same concept as a concept C2? 
 
• What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied 
for a thinker to have a concept C? 
 
I will develop a pluralist and contextualist theory of concept individuation and 
possession: different concepts have different individuation and possession conditions, 
and contextual factors play a crucial role in determining what concepts we attribute to 
other subjects when we ascribe propositional attitudes to them.  
 
In chapters 1-3, I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude 
ascriptions. Then, I suggest contextualist theories of ascriptions can be applied to the 
problem of concept individuation/possession. In particular, I use contextualism to 
provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor’s “publicity principle”, according to 
which concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological 
generalizations to be possible. 
 
Publicity has important implications: in particular, it is inconsistent with existing 
versions of holism, on which concepts cannot be shared by ordinary thinkers. 
Nonetheless, in chapters 4-5 I show how holism can still play an important role in our 
best theory of concepts. More specifically, I argue that the tradition of appealing to 
modes of presentation in order to give an account of “Frege cases” is in fact committed 
to holism. To develop a version of holism that will give a successful account of Frege 
cases without violating publicity, I suggest we should adopt my pluralist-contextualist 
picture: on that picture, the concepts involved in a Frege case will be holistically 
individuated and not public, while other concepts will be more coarsely individuated 
and widely shared. In chapter 6, I will develop this view further by contrasting it with 
other pluralist theories (Weiskopf) and with rival theories of concepts, such as the 
localist views defended by Peacocke, Rey and Jackson. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Two problems loom large in the recent literature on concepts. The first one concerns 
their individuation conditions: 
 
Individuation problem: What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under 
what conditions is a concept C1 the same concept as a concept C2?  
 
To give the reader just one very recent example, here is how Sainsbury and Tye present 
their “originalist” theory of concept individuation2: 
 
Originalism answers the question: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept C1 
to be the same concept as the concept C2? According to originalism, every concept has exactly one 
originating use, and every originating use of a concept is an originating use of just one concept. 
Hence we can offer the following necessary and sufficient condition for concepts to be the same: 
 
(O) Concept C1 = concept C2 iff the originating use of C1 = the originating use of C2. 
 
In this picture, each use U of a concept is a use of the unique concept that lies at the origin of the R-
linked chain of uses to which U belongs (Sainsbury and Tye 2011, p. 105). 
 
A second problem concerns the possession conditions of concepts: 
 
Possession problem: What are the possession conditions of concepts? What 
conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? 
 
Here, for instance, is how Peacocke describes the possession conditions of the concept 
CONJUNCTION3 on his “inferentialist” account (Peacocke 1992, p. 6. I slightly modified 
Peacocke’s notation to conform to my own notation for concepts): 
 
CONJUNCTION is that concept C to possess which a thinker must find transitions that are instances of 
the following forms primitively compelling, and must do so because they are of these forms: 
 
p                p C q         p C q   
q                p               q   
p C q 
 
 
                                                
2 Several other theories of concept individuation and possession will be discussed later (v. especially ch. 2 
(sect. 2.3) and ch. 4 (sect. 3.1)).     
3 I will refer to concepts by using expressions in small capitals. 
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(Simplifying: CONJUNCTION is that concept C to possess which a thinker must accept as 
valid all instances of the rules of conjunction introduction and elimination). 
 
Let’s say a bit more about our two questions. First, notice that there might not be a 
single answer to the interrogatives above. Different concepts might have different 
individuation conditions: it might be that, for a concept C to be the concept 
CONJUNCTION, C must satisfy certain necessary/sufficient conditions, where these 
conditions are different from those C must satisfy in order to be the concept BACHELOR 
or SUPERMAN. Even if concepts did have heterogeneous individuation conditions, 
however, the individuation problem would still arise. We would just have to state our 
question at the level of specific concepts, as in: 
 
Individuation problem (CONJUNCTION): What are the individuation conditions of 
the concept CONJUNCTION? Under what conditions is a concept C the same concept 
as CONJUNCTION?  
 
And so on for every other concept (BACHELOR, SUPERMAN…). The same holds for the 
possession problem. Different concepts might have different possession conditions: the 
conditions a thinker must satisfy in order to have the concept CONJUNCTION might be 
different from those he must satisfy to have BACHELOR or SUPERMAN. Again, this would 
not rid us of the possession problem, which will now arise at the level of specific 
concepts: 
 
Possession problem (CONJUNCTION): What are the possession conditions of the 
concept CONJUNCTION? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have 
CONJUNCTION?  
 
(Indeed, I will argue later that there isn’t a single answer to our two questions: concepts 
do have different individuation and possession conditions. V. especially ch. 5, sect. 4.3). 
A second point to note is that our two problems seem to be closely related. As Fodor 
puts it: 
 
It's a general truth that if you know what an x is, then you also know what it is to have an x. And ditto 
the other way around. This applies to concepts in particular: the question what they are and the 
question what it is to have them are logically linked; if you commit yourself on one, you are thereby 
committed, willy nilly, on the other. Suppose, for example, that your theory is that concepts are 
pumpkins. Very well then, it will have to be a part of your theory that having a concept is having a 
pumpkin. And, conversely: if your theory is that having a concept is having a pumpkin, then it will 
have to be a part of your theory that pumpkins are what concepts are (Fodor 1998, p. 2). 
 
Fodor takes this to show that we can derive possession conditions for concepts from 
their individuation conditions: 
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Until quite recently (until this century, anyhow) practically everybody took it practically for granted 
that the explanation of concept possession should be parasitic on the explanation of concept 
individuation. First you say what it is for something to be the concept x - you give the concept's 
‘identity conditions’ - and then having the concept x is just having whatever the concept x turns out to 
be (ibid.).  
 
Conversely, Peacocke has argued that a theory of concept individuation should be 
grounded in a theory of concept possession: 
 
Principle of Dependence: there can be nothing more to the nature of a concept than is determined by 
a correct account of the capacity of a thinker who has mastered the concept to have propositional 
attitudes to contents containing that concept (a correct account of “grasping the concept”) (Peacocke 
1992, p. 5). 
 
The individuation conditions for a particular concept can then be straightforwardly 
derived from its possession conditions (ibid., p. 6): 
 
Accepting the Principle of Dependence opens up the possibility that we can simultaneously say in a 
single account what individuates a particular concept and also what it is to possess that concept. The 
general form that could be taken by such an account is this: 
 
Simple Formulation: Concept F is that unique concept C to possess which a thinker must meet 
condition A(C)  
 
(V. for instance his account of CONJUNCTION). Simplifying, we might describe the 
relation between individuation and possession conditions as follows. Suppose a concept 
C1 is “partially individuated” by its being F; that is, suppose it’s true that, in order for a 
concept C2 to be the same concept as C1, C2 must also have F. (For instance: if o is C1’s 
origin, it follows from Sainsbury and Tye’s account that a concept C2 will be the same as 
C1 only if C2 also has o as its origin). We can then infer that a subject will have C1 only if 
one of his concepts has F: if not, none of his concepts will be the same as C1 and our 
subject will lack the concept in question. (On Sainsbury and Tye’s account, for instance, 
you have the concept BACHELOR only if one of your concepts has the same origin as 
BACHELOR).   
Conversely: suppose condition k is part of the possession conditions of concept C1, 
so that a thinker will have C1 only if he also satisfies k. (For instance: on Peacocke’s 
account, one has the concept CONJUNCTION only if he is disposed to follow the rules of 
conjunction introduction/elimination). We can then infer that concept C1 is partially 
individuated by its possession condition k: for a concept C2 to be the same as C1, C2 must 
also be such that, to have C2, a thinker must meet k. (On Peacocke’s account, for 
instance, a concept C cannot be the concept CONJUNCTION unless it’s true that, to have C, 
a thinker must be disposed to follow conjunction introduction/elimination). Given the 
tight connection between individuation and possession conditions, then, we can expect a 
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theory of concept individuation to have direct consequences for the problem of concept 
possession, and vice versa: this will be a constant theme in our discussion.  
A third important aspect of the individuation problem is that it should not be 
confused with a different issue, which we might call “the ontological problem”4. This 
amounts to the following question: what kind of entity is a concept? For instance: is it 
an abstract object? Or is it a concrete mental representation, e.g. a token symbol in our 
“Language of Thought”5? Clearly, the two problems are potentially related. An object’s 
individuation conditions might vary depending on its ontological domain: the conditions 
under which person P1 is the same person as P2 are presumably different from the 
conditions under which electron E1 is the same electron as E2. So an ontological theory 
might have consequences for a theory of concept individuation, and vice versa. Still, the 
individuation problem is clearly distinct from the ontological one, and it will be 
important to keep the distinction in mind throughout our discussion. (In fact, as we will 
see later, most theories of concept individuation can be formulated in terms that would 
be acceptable on any ontology of concepts. This will enable us to develop a theory of 
concept individuation/possession without taking a stance on whether concepts are 
abstract objects or mental representations). 
 
Why has the problem of concept individuation and possession played such a major 
role in the recent literature on concepts? A first obvious reason is that a theory of 
concepts would seem lacking unless it could provide an account of their identity 
conditions and, relatedly, of the conditions that must be satisfied in order to have them. 
In turn, a theory of concepts can play a central role in a more general theory of 
intentionality. According to a major tradition in the philosophy of mind and language, 
concepts are the basic constituents of thoughts. In turn, thoughts are structured 
representations endowed with truth-conditions and acting as relata of propositional 
attitudes: the thought DOGS BARK is true just in case dogs bark, and to believe (rather 
than, say, desire or hope) that dogs bark is to stand in a certain relation to that thought6. 
On this approach, a theory of concepts will be an essential component of an account of 
propositional attitudes and intentional representations in general. For instance, to 
explain how people can have propositional attitudes about dogs we will first need to 
explain how they can have the concept DOG, since that will be a basic constituent of all 
their dog-directed thoughts.  
But the ramifications of the problem of concept individuation/possession extend 
beyond the theory of intentionality, touching on several other areas of philosophy and 
                                                
4 V. Laurence and Margolis (2007, 2011) for an overview. We will go back to this in ch. 2 (sects. 2.1-
2.2).   
5 Further options are available: for instance, one might identify concepts with abilities (Evans 1982, 
Millikan 2000). Our discussion will focus on the two options in the main text, although much of what I’ll 
say would also apply to other ontologies of concepts. 
6 V. ch. 2 (sect. 2.1) for more details. This is by no means the only approach to the problem of 
intentionality: v. for instance Stalnaker (1984, 2008) for a radically different account. 
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on the methodology of philosophy itself. Suppose we are convinced by Peacocke’s 
“inferentialist” account of CONJUNCTION, on which specific inferential dispositions are 
required for possession of the concept. We might then decide to extend the account to 
other concepts, e.g. the concept BACHELOR: for instance, we might hold that a subject 
doesn’t have BACHELOR unless he is disposed to infer from X IS A BACHELOR to X IS AN 
UNMARRIED MAN, and vice versa. (Simplifying: unless he believes that something is a 
bachelor iff it is an unmarried man). On this account, BACHELOR would then be 
individuated by its inferential connections to the concepts UNMARRIED and MAN: to put 
it a bit roughly, a concept C would not be the concept BACHELOR unless C’s owner was 
disposed to infer from X IS C to X IS AN UNMARRIED MAN (and vice versa).  
The idea that certain inferential links are part of the individuation and possession 
conditions of concepts will be one of the main foci of our discussion. This venerable 
idea has played a crucial role in a number of philosophical debates. Here are just two of 
its possible consequences: 
 
Epistemological consequences: Suppose the concept BACHELOR is indeed individuated 
by its connection to UNMARRIED and MAN; and suppose it’s true that a thinker will not 
have BACHELOR unless he is disposed to infer from X IS A BACHELOR to X IS AN 
UNMARRIED MAN (and vice versa). Many have taken this to show that inferences like X 
IS A BACHELOR → X IS UNMARRIED are analytic (analytically valid), and that the 
corresponding thought EVERY BACHELOR IS UNMARRIED is analytically true7. In turn, the 
alleged analyticity of such inferences/thoughts has led many to ascribe a special 
epistemological status to them. Suppose the inference X IS A BACHELOR → X IS 
UNMARRIED is indeed a constitutive component of the concept’s identity. Then, it seems 
we could come to know that inference to be valid (and the corresponding thought to be 
true) without having to investigate empirically whether bachelors are in fact unmarried; 
on the contrary, we could come to know that bachelors are unmarried in a purely a 
priori way, by simply reflecting on the “structure” of the concept BACHELOR. 
 
Methodological consequences: Suppose philosophically interesting concepts such as 
TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE, JUSTICE are also individuated by inferential connections which are 
required for their possession (e.g. X KNOWS THAT P → X BELIEVES THAT P). The above 
considerations would then show such inferences to be analytic and a priori. In turn, 
defenders of “conceptual analysis” have taken this to support their favored 
methodology8. Philosophical inquiry, they claim, is at least in part an inquiry into the 
structure of our concepts: our standard “armchair” methodology consists in using 
intuitions about whether concept C applies to case x and then reconstructing the 
                                                
7 Of course, there are several ways to spell out the notion of analyticity (v. Williamson 2007, chs. 3-4 for 
a critical overview). The literature on the topic is huge: for a recent defense of the view, v. for instance 
Bealer (1998), Boghossian (2001, 2003), Jackson (1998), Peacocke (2007), Rey (2005).   
8 Besides the authors quoted in fn. 7 supra, v. for instance Goldman and Pust (1998), Goldman (2007). 
For an overview, v. DePaul and Ramsey (1998). 
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inferential dispositions which must have produced that intuition. When conducted 
properly on a sufficient range of cases, this methodology will enable us to identify those 
fundamental inferential dispositions which are constitutive of our concepts and required 
for their possession. (For instance, Gettier cases show that the inference X HAS A 
JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF THAT P →  X KNOWS THAT P is not part of our concept 
KNOWLEDGE).  
 
This very crude overview of inferentialist theories shows how far-reaching the 
implications of a theory of concept individuation/possession can be. The possibility of 
employing inferentialism to provide an account of the a priori and ground conceptual 
analysis is obviously one of the most appealing features of the view. But the view also 
has other far-reaching consequences, ones that can be used against it. A famous case 
recently proposed by Williamson (2007) will illustrate the point9. Peter is a leading 
logician with “deviant” views. He rejects the sentence: 
 
(1) Every vixen is a female fox 
 
for the following reasons. First, he takes universally quantified statements to be 
existentially committing, so he thinks the claim is false unless there is at least one vixen. 
(Suppose he has developed a sophisticated semantic theory in support of his view). In 
addition, Peter believes there are no foxes, and thus no vixens, our credence to the 
contrary being induced by mass hallucinations provoked by the government.  
Now, when we assert (1) we express the thought EVERY VIXEN IS A FEMALE FOX. 
Does Peter reject that very same thought when he asserts the negation of (1)? If so, 
Peter has the concept VIXEN (since he rejects a thought constituted by it) without being 
disposed to accept X IS A VIXEN → X IS A FEMALE FOX. This is incompatible with an 
inferentialist theory of concept individuation/possession, on which (presumably) one 
must be disposed to make that inference in order to have VIXEN (cf. our previous 
example involving BACHELOR).  
The inferentialist must therefore deny that Peter expresses the same thought as us 
with his utterance: he expresses (and rejects) a different thought constituted by a 
different concept VIXEN* (something like: EVERY VIXEN* IS A FEMALE FOX) But: 
 
[…] the linguistic understanding of (1) we share with Peter […] already suffices for [him] and us to 
articulate our disagreements in rational discourse; we are not merely talking past one another. In its 
small way, (1) determines a piece of the common intellectual heritage of mankind, something we 
share with Peter […] in our very capacity to disagree over it. To insist that the thought we associate 
with (1) nevertheless differs from [the thought Peter associates] with (1) is to undermine Frege’s 
requirement of the publicity of senses, and in particular thoughts (Williamson 2007, p. 114). 
                                                
9 V. Williamson 2007, pp. 73-121. Williamson’s original case is slightly different from the one I use in 
the main text. (In fact, Williamson’s case is more radical. Williamson also employs my version of the 
case on pp. 116-117). 
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On an inferentialist theory, deviant subjects who reject those fundamental inferences 
which are allegedly required for concept possession will turn out to have different 
concepts from us (VIXEN* instead of VIXEN). Consequently, they will also express 
different thoughts when using the relevant linguistic expressions. According to anti-
inferentialists like Williamson, this makes it hard to account for the fact that we can still 
agree, disagree and communicate with them when using such expressions, since this 
seems to require sameness of expressed thought10. In this way, the debate on concept 
individuation and possession connects with a number of further issues, such as the 
conditions for communication and agreement/disagreement in philosophy of language, 
or the nature of theory change in philosophy of science11.  
 
Determining whether there are any inferential conditions on concept 
individuation/possession, and whether this would preclude the “shareability” or 
“publicity” of concepts, will be one of the main goals of our discussion. As our 
introductory remarks show, any theory of concept individuation and possession will 
face the following questions: 
 
• Is it the case that every concept is individuated by a set of inferential 
connections which are required for its possession?  
 
• If so, which of the connections in which a concept actually stands are part of its 
individuation conditions and are required in order to have the concept? 
 
Three main positions on the issue have been occupied in the literature. All of them will 
be extensively discussed in the following chapters, but a general overview will be 
useful. As we have seen, “inferentialist” or “Inferential Role Semantics” (IRS) views12 
answer the first question affirmatively. Concepts are inferentially individuated: for 
every concept C, there is a set of inferential dispositions which are required in order for 
someone to have C. For instance, one doesn’t have BACHELOR unless he is disposed to 
infer from X IS A BACHELOR to X IS AN UNMARRIED MAN, and vice versa. 
This raises our second question for IRS. Any given concept will stand in many 
different inferential connections. For instance, I might think all bachelors are sad, in 
which case I will be disposed to infer from X IS A BACHELOR to X IS SAD. Is my concept 
BACHELOR also individuated by the inference BACHELOR → SAD? More generally: is a 
concept individuated by all the inferential connections in which it stands, or by only 
some of them? Depending on how they answer this question, we can distinguish two 
main varieties of IRS views. According to holistic versions of IRS, a concept is 
                                                
10 Again, the literature on the topic is extremely vast: v. e.g. Sainsbury and Tye 2012 (p. 21) and Laurence 
and Margolis 2003 (p. 262) for a similar line. (We will go back to this in ch. 6). 
11 Cf. e.g. the remarks of Fodor and Lepore (1992, pp. 11-13) on Kuhn (1962). 
12 This is the most common label for the view (v. e.g. Fodor 1998) and the one I will usually employ in 
what follows.    
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individuated by all of its inferential connections13. It follows that, in order for you to 
have my concept BACHELOR, you must not only be disposed to infer X IS A BACHELOR → 
X IS AN UNMARRIED MAN (and vice versa), but also X IS A BACHELOR → X IS SAD. 
(Indeed, you will need to share all of my bachelor-related beliefs, so it will be very hard 
for you to have my concept BACHELOR!).  
According to non-holistic (or localist) versions of IRS, only some of a concept’s 
inferential connections will be included in its individuation conditions14. For instance, 
the inferences X IS A BACHELOR → X IS AN UNMARRIED MAN and X IS AN UNMARRIED 
MAN → X IS A BACHELOR do individuate the concept, while X IS A BACHELOR → X IS SAD 
does not; consequently, only the former inferential dispositions are required for you to 
have the same concept BACHELOR as me.  
Another important family of views will just answer our first question in the 
negative: according to atomistic theories, concepts are not individuated inferentially, 
and no specific inferential dispositions are required for their possession15. For instance, 
one could have the concept BACHELOR even if he was not disposed to infer X IS A 
BACHELOR → X IS AN UNMARRIED MAN. Similarly, Williamson’s “deviant logician” can 
have the concept VIXEN even though he does not accept X IS A VIXEN → X IS A FEMALE 
FOX because of his bizarre views16. 
 
The following chapters will be, to a large extent, a discussion of these three 
positions regarding the role of inferences in concept individuation/possession. Indeed, 
the main goal of my work can be summarized as follows: 
                                                
13 V. ch. 2 (sect. 2.3) for more details about holistic IRS.  
14 Ch. 6 will focus almost entirely on localist views, which will also be discussed in chs. 4-5.  
15 In itself, atomism is a purely negative position: it simply tells us that concepts are not individuated by 
their inferential connections. Defenders of the view have then supplemented their main claim with a 
positive account of concept individuation (v. for instance Fodor’s “Informational Atomism”, which will 
be discussed in chs. 4-5).  
16 Many atomists restrict their claims to lexical concepts, i.e. concepts expressed by single morphemes in 
natural language. For instance, Fodor holds that FEMALE FOX is a complex concept constituted by FEMALE 
and FOX (v. e.g. Fodor 2008, p. 59). Therefore, he grants that someone has FEMALE FOX only if he is 
disposed to infer from X IS A FEMALE FOX to X IS A FOX. (This has to do with his views on 
compositionality: v. Fodor and Lepore 2002). At the same time, he thinks someone could have VIXEN 
without being disposed to infer from X IS A VIXEN to X IS A FOX, since VIXEN is a lexical, non-complex 
concept. 
This is a tricky issue. The notion of “lexical concept” is not easy to define (“mailman” is a single word, 
but the concept it expresses is arguably complex (Weiskopf 2009a, fn. 2)). Moreover, a concept might be 
expressed by a single morpheme in a language and by a complex phrase in another. This makes the 
restriction to lexical concepts hard to spell out. Finally, some atomists (Williamson) would deny that, in 
order to have FEMALE FOX, one must be disposed to infer from X IS A FEMALE FOX to X IS A FOX (v. 
Williamson 2007, pp. 73-116). So the restriction to lexical concepts is controversial. For these reasons, I 
will simply take atomism to apply to concepts in general rather than lexical concepts: nothing will turn on 
this, and the reader should feel free to restrict the claims of atomists like Fodor to lexical concepts if 
needed. 
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• Determining whether there are any inferential constraints on concept individuation 
and possession. 
 
• Developing the foundations for a substantive theory of concept 
individuation/possession. 
 
Both my approach to the problem and my solution to it present several distinctive 
features. It will then be useful for the reader to have a general idea of the view I am 
going to develop, and of how I will argue for it throughout the following chapters.  
Within contemporary debates on concepts, it has become a somewhat standard 
methodology to list a set of independently plausible “constraints” or “desiderata” that 
we want a good theory of concepts to satisfy; this is then used to show that a certain 
view is superior to its competitors in its ability to satisfy most or all of these 
constraints17. Chapters 1-3 will be aimed at discussing one of these constraints, the so-
called “publicity” principle. According to this principle, concepts are public entities 
which are routinely shared by ordinary thinkers. In particular, I will focus on a version 
of the principle (defended by Fodor and others) on which concepts must be shared in 
order for interpersonally applicable psychological generalizations to be possible. The 
principle has played a crucial role in recent debates on concepts; in particular, it has 
been frequently used by anti-inferentialists like Fodor to argue against holistic versions 
of IRS. This makes it crucial for anyone interested in issues of concept 
individuation/possession to establish whether publicity is true, and whether it is indeed 
incompatible with holism.  
I will suggest a new approach to the problem of publicity18. My driving hypothesis 
is that we should look at intentional generalizations (e.g. “If someone wants water, then 
he will look for water other things being equal”) as sentences in a language. Such 
sentences embed propositional attitude ascriptions (“If someone wants water…”): the 
conditions for them to apply to a group of subjects will therefore depend on the content 
of those ascriptions. We cannot establish whether a generalization requires the subjects 
it covers to share certain specific concepts (e.g. the concept WATER) until we get clearer 
on its semantics. For this reason, our discussion of concept individuation and possession 
will have an unusual starting point. Chapter 1 will be an in-depth examination of so-
called “Millian” views about the semantics of reports. First, I will present a set of 
arguments against the “non-pragmatic” Millian approach recently developed by David 
Braun. Then, I will review some of the standard objections against classic “pragmatic 
Millian” accounts (Salmon, Soames). Finally, I will offer some reasons to think that the 
truth conditions of attitude reporting sentences vary with context. My conclusion will be 
that a satisfactory theory of ascriptions must be contextualist and non-Millian, two 
desiderata that will play a key role in our later discussion. 
                                                
17 V. e.g. Fodor (1998), Prinz (2002). 
18 My approach was influenced by Schneider (2005, 2011): v. ch. 3 (sect. 4.2) for more details. 
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In chapter 2, I will present the standard arguments for publicity and the anti-holistic 
objections that have been based on them. I will reject two popular holistic responses to 
such objections: the appeal to fundamental intentional generalizations and the appeal to 
concept similarity. Then, I will try to state the standard arguments for publicity in a 
more precise, rigorous form. This will make it easier to show that such arguments are 
affected by a previously unnoticed problem, and that we can only make them valid by 
supplementing them with some highly controversial additional premises.  
Having highlighted the problems with standard arguments, I will present a new 
argument for publicity and a new version of the principle in chapter 3. There, I will 
discuss those contextualist theories of attitude reports (Crimmins and Perry, Richard, 
Forbes) that have been specifically designed to meet the two desiderata laid out in ch. 1. 
Such theories have immediate consequences for the semantics of intentional 
generalizations. Once we accept contextualism, such generalizations will encode 
information about the concepts under which intentional agents relate to the relevant 
propositions, and not only about the propositions themselves (as on Millian views). In 
turn, this establishes a contextualist version of publicity: the new principle requires the 
subjects to which a generalization applies (in a given context) to share the specific 
concepts that were “selected” by the speaker (in that context) for the purpose of his 
generalization. 
I will then argue that the principle is still incompatible with existing holistic theories 
(Block, Schneider). However, I will also sketch a new, more moderate holistic position 
which would satisfy publicity. On that view, some concepts are holistically individuated 
and not shared, while others are individuated more coarsely and possessed by multiple 
thinkers. This revised holistic view will then be the core of the broader “pluralist” 
picture of concept individuation/possession which I will defend in the following 
chapters.   
In chapters 4-5, I turn to examine the relationship between publicity and a second 
widely endorsed constraint on a theory of concepts, the so-called “Fregean Constraint” 
(FC). (FC) claims that subjects who find themselves in a “Frege case” and mistakenly 
ascribe contradictory properties to the same object must have distinct concepts for that 
object. I will argue that there is a tension between (FC) and publicity, and that none of 
the theories of concepts currently on the market seems to satisfy both constraints: all 
those theories that individuate concepts finely enough to satisfy (FC) also appear unable 
to account for their shareability. While some issues in the vicinity have been noted, no 
one in the literature has (to my knowledge) stated the tension between our two 
constraints in these terms. This is unfortunate, for that tension can teach us a lot about 
how to develop a theory of concept individuation and possession.  
I will discuss some possible ways to satisfy both of our constraints at the same time. 
I will not so much try to argue for a specific solution to our problem, but rather to show 
that, on all possible solutions, a certain theory of concept individuation/possession 
becomes overwhelmingly plausible. First, I will argue that the moderate holistic view 
sketched at the end of ch. 3 should be part of our theory of concepts if we want to 
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satisfy (FC). Then, I will integrate that view in a more general picture of concept 
individuation/possession. This is the picture of concepts that appears most plausible in 
light of our two constraints, since it’s the one that does the best job at solving the 
tension between them19.  
Here is a brief overview. On my picture, there isn’t a single answer to questions of 
concept individuation and possession: different concepts are individuated in different 
ways and have different possession conditions. My approach is thus very different from 
that of atomist, localist and holistic theories. I take each of these views to provide a 
correct account of the individuation/possession conditions of some, but not all concepts. 
My picture integrates all three views, without fully endorsing any of them. I take some 
concepts to be holistically individuated: holism gives us the fine-grained individuation 
conditions we need to satisfy (FC) in all the relevant Frege cases. At the same time, 
some other concepts must be individuated non-holistically: this is required if we want to 
account for concept sharing and satisfy the publicity principle established in chapter 3. 
For this reason, I take some concepts to be individuated by a small set of their 
inferential connections (localism), and I am open to the possibility of individuating 
some concepts without appealing to their inferential connections at all (atomism). 
My pluralist theory of concepts has some features in common with pluralist views 
such as Weiskopf (2009 a,b), but it also bears some crucial differences with them20. 
First, my view is significantly more radical in its pluralism. Weiskopf still takes all 
concepts to be locally individuated, while I think we should allow for holistically 
individuated concepts and, quite possibly, for concepts that are not individuated 
inferentially at all. Second, Weiskopf’s only argument for pluralism is based on its 
ability to account for recent findings in cognitive psychology. My argument is very 
different: I think fit with empirical data is an important bonus for pluralist pictures, but 
their main strength lies elsewhere. Concepts must be individuated in multiple ways 
because this is the only way for them to play two of their roles: on the one hand, 
accounting for the interpersonal applicability of intentional generalizations (= 
publicity); on the other, explaining how subjects involved in Frege cases can be rational 
while ascribing contradictory properties to the same object (= FC). Finally, a further 
distinctive feature of my view is that it brings out for the first time the role of context in 
a theory of concepts. If concepts are individuated in a variety of different ways, it will 
be speakers’ intentions to determine which specific concepts are involved in our 
intentional generalizations and explanations: in accordance with the theory of 
ascriptions defended in chapter 3, speakers will “select” more coarsely individuated 
concepts in certain contexts, and more finely individuated concepts in others (v. ch. 5, 
sect. 4.3 for more details). 
                                                
19 I will not discuss certain other constraints that have also played an important role in the debate on 
concepts, such as compositionality (Fodor 1998, 2008; Fodor and Lepore 1992, 1996, 2002). I believe my 
theory would also meet these constraints, but here I prefer to focus on publicity and (FC). 
20 I compare the two views in ch. 6 (sect. 2.3). 
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In chapter 6, I conduct an in-depth discussion of various forms of localism about 
concepts. This is not only interesting in itself; it also serves the purpose of spelling out 
my view further by contrasting it with a family of rival theories. I present a set of 
dilemmas for localism and consider various localist responses to each of them. The 
main focus is on the pluralist-localist position defended by Weiskopf (v. supra) and the 
descriptivist-localist position defended by Jackson (1998). On Jackson’s view, the 
inferences which individuate a concept and are required for its possession fix the 
reference of that concept. First, I will argue that most localists are in fact committed to 
Jackson’s descriptivism. Then, I will develop an objection by Schroeter (2004) to show 
how the view makes wrong predictions about the reference of natural kind concepts. If 
reference is fixed by our inferential dispositions, subjects whose dispositions are 
sufficiently “deviant” will turn out to refer to different natural kinds from us; in turn, 
this will have deeply counterintuitive consequences in all those cases where deviant 
subjects appear to be theorizing about the very same natural kinds as us. 
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 Chapter 1 
 
Two Varieties Of Millianism 
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1. Introduction 
 
As anticipated, our discussion has a slightly unexpected starting point. This chapter 
will critically assess a family of views about the semantics of propositional attitude 
ascriptions, which goes under the name of “Millianism”21. While interesting in itself, 
my discussion of Millianism will also have crucial implications for the problem of 
concept individuation and possession, for reasons that will become apparent in chapter 
3.  
Millianism is one of the main theories of attitude reports currently on the market. 
Millian views have been developed by (among others) Nathan Salmon (1986, 1989, 
2006), Scott Soames (1987, 1995, 2002) and David Braun (1998, 2000, 2001a,b). While 
sharing a core set of assumptions, these theories also present some crucial differences. 
In particular, we can distinguish between “pragmatic” (Salmon, Soames) and “non-
pragmatic” (Braun) versions of Millianism. While pragmatic accounts have been far 
more popular, they also seem to be affected by several problems, which have pushed 
authors like Braun to develop their non-pragmatic alternative.  
Having described the basic principles of Millianism (sect. 2), I will move on to 
examine Braun’s non-pragmatic view (sects. 3-4). I will try to determine whether the 
view can deal with two classic objections that all Millians have to face. The first 
objection is that, if Millianism is true, then speakers who are clearly rational will often 
have contradictory beliefs because of their intuitions about belief reports; the Millian 
must then explain how these speakers can be rational even though they believe a 
contradiction. Against Braun, I will argue that Non-Pragmatic Millianism is unable to 
explain the rationality of ordinary speakers who are aware of certain identity facts. A 
similar objection has been raised by Stephen Schiffer (1987, 1990, 2006); I will first 
argue that Braun’s response to the objection doesn’t work, and then that there is no way 
for Non-Pragmatic Millianism to offer an alternative solution to the problem while 
holding on to its basic commitments.  
A second classic objection against Millianism is that the view cannot account for the 
role that certain intentional generalizations play in the explanation and prediction of 
behavior. Braun (2000, 2001a,b) has proposed a non-pragmatic solution to the problem; 
in reply, I will show that his strategy still fails to account for a large number of powerful 
psychological generalizations, and that, again, the only way in which the Millian can 
hope to account for such generalizations is to appeal to what they pragmatically convey.   
                                                
21 The view sometimes goes by other names: “Russellianism” (Braun 1998, Richard 1990), “Naive 
Russellianism”, “The ‘Fido’-Fido theory” (Schiffer 1987) or “The Direct Reference Theory”. I find 
“Millianism” to be the least misleading one and I will stick to it in what follows. Also, note that 
Millianism is sometimes identified with a theory about the content of proper names: the view I call 
“Millianism” includes a Millian theory of names and supplements it with further assumptions regarding 
the semantics of proper names within attitude contexts (v. sect. 2.1 infra). 
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In light of these two objections, my conclusion will be that Non-Pragmatic 
Millianism should be rejected. The only way for the Millian to explain speakers’ 
rationality and account for intentional generalizations is to adopt a pragmatic view: if 
Millianism is true, then Pragmatic Millianism is. This, of course, has a further important 
consequence: if Pragmatic Millianism also fails, then Millianism must be rejected 
altogether. And, indeed, pragmatic accounts do have to face some extremely powerful 
objections, which I will review in section 5: from this, I will conclude that a successful 
theory of ascriptions must be non-Millian.  
I will then end the chapter by discussing a second feature that a theory of ascriptions 
should take into account: the truth conditions of attitude-reporting sentences seem to 
vary with context. In chapter 3, we will see how these two desiderata have 
consequences that extend far beyond the problem of ascriptions, touching directly on 
issues of concept individuation and possession.  
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2. Millianism: An Overview  
 
2.1 . Millian Theories And The Substitution Objection 
 
What is a Millian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions? Following Braun (1998, 
pp. 557-558), we can summarize the fundamental principles of Millianism as follows: 
 
a) Propositions: 
 
• Propositions are the semantic contents of sentences and are expressed by them.  
• A proposition is a structured entity whose constituents are the contents of the 
parts of the sentence expressing the proposition in question.  
• The content of a predicate is a property or relation; the content of a proper name 
or indexical is the individual to which the name or indexical refers.  
 
It follows from this set of Millian principles that the sentences: 
 
1) Superman can fly. 
2) Clark Kent can fly22. 
 
express the same proposition, whose constituents are the individual Superman/Clark 
Kent and the property of being able to fly. This proposition can be represented thus: 
 
<Superman, being able to fly> 
 
Alternatively, it can be represented thus: 
 
 <Clark Kent, being able to fly> 
 
(Following standard usage, I will refer to propositions having individuals and properties 
as their constituents as “Russellian propositions”). 
 
b) Belief reports: 
 
• The content of the predicate “believes” is a binary relation which is said to 
obtain between a subject and a proposition.  
• The content of a “that”-clause “that S” is the proposition normally expressed by 
S.   
 
                                                
22 V. Appendix A for a list of numbered sentences for ch. 1. 
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It follows from our two sets of Millian principles that the sentences:  
 
3) Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly. 
4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly. 
 
express the same proposition (whose constituents are Lois Lane, the proposition that 
Superman/Clark Kent can fly, and the belief relation) and must therefore have same 
truth value. This Russellian proposition can be represented thus: 
 
<Lois Lane, <Superman, being able to fly>, believing>  
 
Alternatively, it can be represented thus: 
 
 <Lois Lane, <Clark Kent, being able to fly>, believing> 
 
Millianism faces an obvious worry; following Braun (1998), I will call it “the 
Substitution objection”. Competent speakers who are familiar with the Superman story 
and reflect carefully on the belief reports (3)-(4) will mostly take them to have different 
truth values; in particular, they will take (3) to be true and (4) to be false. If asked to 
justify their judgments, they will point out that according to the story Lois would assent 
to “Superman can fly” but dissent from “Clark Kent can fly”. Therefore, they will 
conclude, Lois believes that Superman can fly but does not believe that Clark Kent can 
fly23. 
Let’s call “anti-substitution intuitions” the judgments that (3)-(4) have different truth 
values. Such intuitions pose a problem for the Millian. It seems that ordinary speakers 
are not being irrational in thinking (falsely, according to Millianism) that (3) is true and 
(4) false. But, presumably, if someone believes that a certain sentence is true then he 
believes whatever proposition is expressed by that sentence. Conversely, if someone 
believes that a certain sentence is false then he believes the negation of whatever 
proposition is expressed by that sentence. So a speaker who thinks that (3) is true and 
(4) false thereby believes the proposition expressed by (3) and the negation of the 
proposition expressed by (4). But if Millianism is true (3) and (4) express the same 
proposition. Therefore, if Millianism is true most ordinary speakers rationally believe a 
proposition and its negation, i.e. they rationally believe a contradiction. But how can 
someone believe a contradiction and yet be rational? The Millian must explain how 
competent and reflective speakers who understand (3)-(4) can rationally take them to 
have different truth values; he must specify what makes such speakers rational despite 
their contradictory beliefs.  
 
                                                
23 In his (1998), Braun uses a Hesperus/Phosphorus case; I prefer to employ a Superman/Clark Kent case 
to avoid various complications. 
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2.2 . A Millian Metaphysics Of Belief 
 
Speakers don’t have anti-substitution intuitions about attitude reports only; in fact, 
the Millian seems to have exactly the same problem with simple sentences. Suppose 
Lois is a competent speaker who reflects carefully on the simple sentences (1)-(2). Like 
most speakers in the Superman story, Lois thinks (1) is true and (2) false, and it seems 
she is not irrational in making this (false) judgment. Assuming Millianism, however, it 
follows by the same argument considered in the last section that Lois believes a 
proposition and its negation, i.e. a contradiction. How, then, can she be rational in her 
judgments about (1)-(2)?  
Millians generally deal with anti-substitution intuitions about simple sentences by 
appealing to a certain “metaphysics of belief”, originally developed by Salmon (1986). 
This metaphysics relies on the notion of a “way” or “guise” under which a certain 
proposition is believed or disbelieved24. On a Millian metaphysics, Lois believes the 
proposition expressed by (1)-(2) while taking it in one way and believes the negation of 
that very same proposition while taking it in a suitably different way. In particular, she 
believes the proposition expressed by (1)-(2) when it’s “presented to her” under the 
“guise” of (1), but believes its negation when the same proposition is presented to her 
under the guise of (2). Since she thinks that the referent of “Superman” is different from 
the referent of “Clark Kent”, she is not aware that (1)-(2) are in fact guises of one and 
the same proposition. Therefore, given her evidence about Superman/Clark, she judges 
the two sentences to have different truth values, thus ending up with a contradictory 
belief. Because she doesn’t know that (1)-(2) are guises of the same proposition, 
however, the ways in which she believes and disbelieves that proposition are “suitably 
different” and she is not irrational. 
Summarizing: on the Millian metaphysics developed by Salmon, a subject S 
believes a proposition P just in case S stands in an appropriate “acceptance” relation 
(which Salmon calls “BEL”) to a way w expressing P. The truth conditions of a belief 
report will then be as follows (where BEL is a three-place relation holding between a 
subject, a proposition and a way of believing that proposition, and “w” is a variable 
ranging over ways of believing)25: 
 
S believes that P iff (Ǝw) (BEL (S, P, w))26 
 
                                                
24 A subject “disbelieves” a proposition just in case he believes its negation. 
25 Adapted from Salmon (1986, p. 111). 
26 Notice that no reference is being made to a specific way under which the proposition in question is 
believed by the subject. This marks the difference between “true” Millian theories and views such as 
Crimmins and Perry (1989) or Richard (1990), which also take “that”-clauses to express Russellian 
propositions. (We will discuss these views in ch. 3 infra). 
 35 
 
For instance, Lois believes the proposition that Superman/Clark can fly in a way 
corresponding to the natural language sentence (1), while believing its negation in a way 
corresponding to the negation of the natural language sentence (2)27. 
 
2.3 . Pragmatic Millianism 
 
Millians like Salmon, Soames and Braun all endorse the metaphysics of belief just 
described and generally agree that it provides a satisfactory account of intuitions about 
simple sentences like (1)-(2). However, Non-Pragmatic Millians (NPM) also think that 
metaphysics is enough to explain the rationality of anti-substitution intuitions about 
reports like (3)-(4), while Pragmatic Millians (PM) invoke a pragmatic mechanism to 
account for the latter set of judgments28. According to the Pragmatic Millian, utterances 
of (3)-(4), while semantically expressing the same proposition, pragmatically convey 
different propositions which do have different truth values. These propositions can be 
construed in different ways. According to Salmon, utterances of (3)-(4) might 
systematically convey propositions concerning the guises under which Lois believes a 
certain proposition (Salmon 1986, pp. 115-118; Salmon 1989, pp. 248-250): 
 
5) Lois Lane believes the proposition that Superman/Clark Kent can fly under the 
guise of the sentence “Superman can fly”. 
6) Lois Lane believes the proposition that Superman/Clark Kent can fly under the 
guise of the sentence “Clark Kent can fly”. 
 
Soames (2002) proposes a different account, on which speakers systematically convey 
“descriptively enriched” propositions through their utterances of (3)-(4). For instance, 
speakers might use (3)-(4) to convey propositions like: 
 
7) Lois Lane believes that Superman, the mighty superhero, can fly. 
8) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent, the milquetoast reporter, can fly. 
 
On both accounts, utterances of (3) pragmatically convey a true proposition (the one 
expressed by (5) or (7)), while utterances of (4) pragmatically convey a false 
proposition (the one expressed by (6) or (8)). Pragmatic Millians will then explain 
speakers’ anti-substitution intuitions in (roughly) the following way: 
 
a) Speakers mistakenly take the propositions conveyed by utterances of (3)-(4) to 
constitute the semantic content of (3)-(4). 
b) Speakers believe the (true) proposition conveyed by utterances of (3) and 
disbelieve the (false) proposition conveyed by utterances of (4). 
                                                
27 Later on, we will consider some alternative construals of ways of believing.  
28 I borrow this taxonomy from Braun (1998), who uses a different terminology. 
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c) Therefore, they conclude that (3) is true and (4) false, i.e. that (3)-(4) have 
different truth values. 
 
2.4 . Non-Pragmatic Millianism 
 
Pragmatic accounts of anti-substitution intuitions have been extremely popular 
among Millians, but they also have to face several objections (v. sect. 5 infra for an 
overview). This has pushed Millians like Braun to reject pragmatic responses to the 
Substitution objection and argue for a form of “Non-Pragmatic Millianism” (NPM). As 
we have seen, all Millians agree that the rationality of intuitions about simple sentences 
can be explained by simply appealing to a certain metaphysics of belief and without 
invoking any pragmatic mechanisms; Braun thinks that the Millian should extend this 
account to attitude reports. More specifically: according to NPM, we can offer a 
psychological explanation of why speakers are rational in their intuitions about (3)-(4); 
unlike non-Millian views, this explanation will not assume that (3)-(4) have different 
semantic contents, and unlike Pragmatic Millian views it will also not assume that 
utterances of (3)-(4) pragmatically convey different propositions (Braun 1998, p. 579). 
Braun’s response to the Substitution objection is supposed to rely entirely on the 
Millian metaphysics of belief developed by Salmon (1986), with one important 
difference. Braun identifies the “ways” or “guises” through which a subject believes a 
proposition with sentences in the Language of Thought (LoT)29: a subject S believes a 
proposition P just in case he has a mental representation (a “mental sentence”) 
expressing P and playing the functional role appropriate for belief. In this case, we say 
that S has the mental sentence in question in his “belief-box” and that he thereby 
believes that P.  
We have already seen (sect. 2.2) how a Millian metaphysics of belief can be used to 
account for intuitions about simple sentences. Lois assents to (1) and dissents from (2), 
thus believing a proposition and its negation. On Braun’s account, she believes that 
proposition by having the mental sentence SUPERMAN CAN FLY – which corresponds to 
(1) – in her belief-box; and she disbelieves that proposition by having the mental 
sentence CLARK KENT CANNOT FLY – which corresponds to the negation of (2) (call it 
(2n)) – in her belief-box30. Since she has (1) and (2n) in her belief-box, she is disposed 
to assent to (1) and dissent from (2). She thus believes and disbelieves the very same 
proposition, but she is not irrational because she does so in suitably different ways, i.e. 
by having suitably different LoT sentences in her belief-box. 
                                                
29 More precisely: although Braun does think (for Paderewski-related reasons) that we should identify 
ways with mental, non-linguistic representations, he is open to non-LoT construals of the mental 
representations in question.  
30 Following Braun, I assume for the sake of simplicity that natural language sentences can work as 
mental sentences in LoT.  
 37 
 
According to Braun, this psychological account of anti-substitution intuitions about 
simple sentences can be straightforwardly extended to intuitions about reports. Suppose 
Peter, a colleague of Lois, has seen her sincerely assent to (1) and dissent from (2); as a 
result, he ends up accepting (3) and denying (4), i.e. accepting the negation of (4) (call it 
(4n)). If Millianism is true, Peter believes a contradiction; still, we can account for his 
rationality just like we did for Lois. Peter has the equivalent of (3) and (4n) in his belief-
box: he is therefore disposed to assent to (3) and dissent from (4). Moreover, the ways 
(i.e. the LoT sentences) through which he believes and disbelieves the proposition 
expressed by (3)-(4) are suitably different and he is therefore not irrational.  
NPM thus offers a unified psychological explanation for the rationality of anti-
substitution intuitions about simple sentences and reports. I will summarize this 
explanation through the following schema, which applies (mutatis mutandis) to both 
Lois and Peter31: 
 
(Sch): If a competent, reflective speaker S judges that a sentence (α) is true and a 
sentence (β) is false, and:  
 
(i) (α)-(β) express the same proposition P; 
(ii) S believes the proposition P expressed by (α)-(β) by having the LoT equivalent 
of (α) in his belief-box; 
(iii) S disbelieves the proposition P expressed by (α)-(β) by having the LoT 
equivalent of not-(β) in his belief-box; 
(iv) The LoT equivalents of (α) and not-(β) are suitably different ways in which S 
believes and disbelieves P; 
 
Then, other things being equal32, S is rational33.  
 
What is it for two LoT sentences to be suitably different ways of taking a certain 
proposition? There are at least two possible construals of the notion: 
 
Option A: This is the option Braun seems to favor: 
 
[Lois] would not be able to deduce any contradiction from [the propositions expressed by (1) and 
(2n)], given the ways in which she believes them, for no contradictory sentence can be validly 
derived (in the syntactic sense) from sentences (1) and (2n) alone. Thus it may be no more irrational 
for her to have (1) and (2n) in her belief-box than for her to have ‘Gingrich is a Republican’ and 
                                                
31 The schema is inspired to Schiffer’s “Frege’s Constraint” (Schiffer 2006, p. 362). 
32 This rules out clearly irrational subjects who do satisfy (i)-(iv), but who (say) also believe that (α) and 
not-(α) are both true, or who believe that (α) is true and (β) false for no reason, etc... Thanks to the 
“ceteris paribus” clause, (Sch) will not count these subjects as rational. Notice that neither Lois nor Peter 
is obviously irrational in any of these ways, so (Sch) applies to both of them. 
33 More precisely: S’s judgment (that (α) is true and (β) false) is rational. I will leave this qualification 
implicit in what follows. 
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‘Clinton is not a Republican’ in her belief-box (Braun 1998, pp. 575-576. In this quote and the 
following ones I made some changes from Braun’s original text, in order to conform to my own 
choice of examples). 
 
On this construal, two LoT sentences are suitably different for S just in case S cannot 
“syntactically” derive a contradictory sentence from them. 
 
Option B: Alternatively, the NPM theorist might hold that two LoT sentences are 
suitably different for S just in case S takes the corresponding natural language sentences 
to express different propositions. Like the first option, this would also enable us to 
explain Lois’ rationality trough (Sch), for Lois takes “Superman” and “Clark Kent” to 
refer to different individuals and therefore also takes (1) and (2) to express different 
propositions.  
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3. NPM And Enlightenment: When Psychology Is Not 
Enough 
 
3.1 . The Asymmetry Objection 
 
In this section, I will argue that Braun’s psychological, non-pragmatic account of 
anti-substitution intuitions fails. More specifically, I will argue that his appeal to ways 
of believing, far from making PM’s pragmatic explanation useless, will in fact require 
invoking pragmatic mechanisms in order to account for speakers’ rationality. This 
shows that NPM’s attempt to explain anti-substitution intuitions in a purely 
psychological fashion fails, and that the Millian will only be able to explain those 
intuitions if some PM account can be made to work.  
Suppose Peter is “enlightened” about Superman’s secret identity, i.e. suppose he 
accepts the following identity sentence: 
 
9) Superman is Clark Kent. 
 
If enlightened Peter is like most ordinary speakers, he will still take (3) to be true and 
(4) to be false, and it seems he will still be rational in doing so. How can NPM explain 
the rationality of his judgments? 
Braun (1998) himself considers this possible variant of the Substitution objection34; 
his response is that NPM can account for Peter’s rationality in the same way as before, 
i.e. by appealing to his having suitably different ways of believing the relevant 
proposition: 
 
The explanation is essentially the same as before. He believes the proposition expressed by (3) in one 
way, a way corresponding to (3); he fails to believe it in another way, a way corresponding to (4). In 
fact, he believes the negation of the proposition in a way that corresponds to (4n). […] Therefore, he 
believes that (3) and (9) are true, and (4) is false (Braun 1998, p. 583, emphasis mine). 
 
We can see why Braun’s response fails by considering the following problem, 
which I will name “the Asymmetry objection”. (Braun does consider this potential 
objection35; my way of presenting the problem is inspired by his, but there are also 
many substantial differences between the two. I find Braun’s description of the issue 
partially unsatisfactory, for reasons I will not discuss here. Braun also offers a reply to 
the objection, which I will discuss in sect. 3.3 (v. especially fn. 44)).    
Suppose Randy, a colleague of Peter and Lois, is also “enlightened”, i.e. he also 
accepts (9). Moreover, assume that: 
                                                
34 This variant was originally brought up by Schiffer as a problem for Millian theories in general: cf. 
Schiffer (1987, pp. 463-466). 
35 Cf. Braun (1998, pp. 583-590). A similar objection is raised by Schiffer (1987, p. 465). 
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• Randy is as reflective and as competent a speaker as Peter; 
• Randy is exactly like Peter in philosophical background, training on logic and 
semantics and so on. In short, they are both equally average speakers under all 
relevant respects.  
 
Finally, suppose Randy carefully evaluates (1)-(2) and claims that (1) is true but (2) 
false. That is, suppose he resists substitution with respect to the simple sentences (1)-(2) 
while also accepting the identity claim (9). Randy seems irrational: (2) is a “[…] simple 
logical consequence of (1) and (9)” (Braun 1998, p. 584) and it can be easily derived 
from them by substituting coreferential terms, so it does not seem rational to accept (1)-
(9) but reject (2) after carefully reflecting on the relevant identity facts. 
Now, if Millianism is true (4) is also a simple logical consequence of (3)-(9) and it 
can also be derived from them by substitution of coreferential terms. So, if Millianism 
is true, someone who accepts (3)-(9) while taking (4) to be false should also count as 
irrational. But enlightened Peter doesn’t seem irrational, even though (like most 
enlightened speakers who are familiar with the Superman story) he accepts (3)-(9) and 
rejects (4).  
Enlightened Randy is irrational but enlightened Peter is not36; if the Millian grants 
this, he must somehow explain their difference in rationality. This is a problem for 
Braun’s psychological account, for I will argue that Peter and Randy are exactly alike in 
their ways of taking the respective propositions: if Peter has suitably different ways of 
believing and disbelieving the proposition expressed by (3)-(4), so does Randy with 
respect to the proposition expressed by (1)-(2). In other words, I will argue that the 
following conditional is true: 
 
(C): If the LoT equivalents of (3) and (4n) are suitably different ways in which Peter 
believes and disbelieves that Lois believes that Superman/Clark Kent can fly, then 
the LoT equivalents of (1) and (2n) are suitably different ways in which Randy 
believes and disbelieves that Superman/Clark Kent can fly. 
 
(C) seems true on both possible construals of the notion of “suitably different” ways of 
believing: 
 
Option A: According to this option, which Braun favors, two LoT sentences are 
suitably different for S just in case S cannot “syntactically” derive a contradictory 
sentence from them. Now, according to NPM Peter has the LoT sentences (3), (4n) and 
(9) in his belief-box. So NPM will explain why Peter is rational by claiming that he 
cannot syntactically derive a contradiction from the inconsistent sentences (3)-(4n), 
even though he also accepts (9). But if this is true of Peter, then Randy too cannot 
                                                
36 From now on I will simply refer to them as “Peter” and “Randy”, taking for granted that they are both 
enlightened. 
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syntactically derive a contradiction from (1)-(2n); the pairs of LoT sentences (1)-(2) and 
(3)-(4) are exactly analogous and there is no reason to suppose that a contradiction 
could be syntactically derived from (1)-(2n)-(9) but not from (3)-(4n)-(9). So under 
option A Randy has suitably different ways if Peter does; therefore, we cannot explain 
their difference in rationality by claiming that only Peter has suitably different ways of 
taking the relevant proposition.  
 
Option B: According to this option, two LoT sentences are suitably different for S just 
in case S takes the corresponding natural language sentences to express different 
propositions. For instance, Lois, who is unenlightened, takes (1) and (2) to express 
different propositions because she takes “Superman” and “Clark Kent” to refer to 
different individuals. Therefore, she is rational in accepting (1) and (2n). But Peter and 
Randy are both enlightened; therefore, NPM cannot claim that they take their respective 
pairs of sentences to express different propositions because of their taking “Superman” 
and “Clark Kent” to refer to different individuals. And if Peter takes (3)-(4) to express 
different propositions for some other reason, then Randy will also take (1)-(2) to 
express different propositions37, since they are ex hypothesi exactly alike under all 
relevant respects (they are both average competent speakers, etc…). So under option B, 
too, Randy has suitably different ways if Peter does, which again blocks NPM’s 
psychological explanation. 
 
On both possible interpretations of the notion of “suitably different ways”, (C) is 
true: if Peter has suitably different ways, so does Randy; conversely, if Randy lacks 
suitably different ways, so does Peter. Therefore, NPM cannot explain why Peter is 
rational and Randy irrational by claiming that Peter, but not Randy, has suitably 
different ways of believing/disbelieving the relevant proposition.  
Less informally: ex hypothesi, both Peter and Randy satisfy conditions (i)-(iii) in 
(Sch); given (C), if Peter satisfies (iv) then Randy also does; so, if Peter satisfies (i)-(iv), 
then Randy does too. Therefore, we cannot explain why Peter is rational by assuming 
(Sch) and claiming that he satisfies (i)-(iv), for then it will follow that Randy is also 
rational. But NPM claims that (Sch) explains the rationality of anti-substitution 
intuitions about reports; therefore, NPM is false. 
 
3.2 . First Reply: Biting The Bullet  
 
A first possible reply would be to deny the asymmetry between Randy and Peter, 
either by arguing that Peter is irrational or by arguing that Randy is rational. The former 
seems very implausible, for most ordinary speakers as well as many trained semanticists 
                                                
37 We will see shortly (sect. 3.3) how NPM could try to deny this. 
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would then count as irrational38: all these subjects are enlightened, and yet they take (3)-
(4) to differ in truth value. Moreover, as Braun remarks, ordinary speakers like Peter 
have not been exposed to the rather esoteric evidence for Millianism (having to do with 
Kripke’s anti-descriptivist arguments, the behavior of indexicals, data about 
quantifying-in and so on). Therefore, they have no reasons to freely substitute proper 
names within belief contexts as required by Millianism. But Peter cannot be deemed 
irrational for his not judging (3)-(4) in the way prescribed by a semantic theory he has 
no reason to believe. 
Maybe NPM could grant that Peter is rational but deny that Randy is irrational39. 
The reason why Randy seems irrational is that (2) is a simple logical consequence of 
sentences (1)-(9) and it can be easily derived from them by substituting coreferential 
terms. But a speaker can fail to draw a conclusion (S) which is a simple logical 
consequence of a set of sentences (Σ) and yet be rational. For instance, one could have a 
sophisticated semantic theory according to which (S) doesn’t follow from (Σ). Or, one 
might be unable to see that (S) follows from (Σ), like most first-year logic students are 
unable to see that the indicative conditional (A → B) follows from (B)40. 
This move would not eliminate the problematic asymmetry: 
 
• First, Randy is ex hypothesi a standard speaker who doesn’t hold any peculiar 
semantic theory about simple sentences. So, unlike the semanticist described above, 
he doesn’t have any sophisticated theoretical reasons to resist substitution. He is also 
unlike the first-year logic student, for competent reflective speakers don’t need any 
training in logic to see that a sentence like (2) follows from (1)-(9) by simple 
substitution. So we have no particular reasons to take Randy to be rational. 
 
• Even if Braun could show that Randy is rational, that would not be enough to 
eliminate the asymmetry. What has to be shown is that Randy is as rational as Peter 
(or, alternatively, that Peter is as irrational as Randy). But this would be wildly 
implausible. After careful reflection, Randy fails to derive (2) from (1)-(9) plus 
certain logical principles that he routinely employs in his everyday reasoning 
(Leibniz’s law). He has no sophisticated theoretical reasons to do this, nor does he 
lack the required training. Certainly, he is more irrational/less rational than Peter, 
who is simply failing to follow a complicated semantic theory he has no evidence 
for? 
 
                                                
38 Braun agrees that speakers who resist substitution about reports are rational, although he claims they 
might not be fully rational; v. Braun (1998, p. 589). 
39 Braun and Saul (2002, p. 22) seem to deny that speakers who resist substitution about simple sentences 
are irrational.  
40 This argument is offered by Braun (1998, pp. 586-587), although he uses it to argue for a different 
claim.  
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It seems hard to deny that there is some difference in rationality between Peter and 
Randy which the Millian has to explain41. I will now discuss a way in which NPM could 
try to offer such an explanation.  
 
3.3 . Second Reply: Anti-Millian Principles  
 
There is a way for NPM to deny (C). This would block the Asymmetry objection 
and save a psychological explanation based on (Sch). An argument in this direction is 
suggested by Salmon in his reply to Schiffer (1987, 2006)42. When it comes to 
specifying what “suitably different ways” amount to, Salmon would endorse option B 
but reject (C): only Peter, but not Randy, has suitably different ways of taking the 
relevant proposition. Moreover, Salmon would argue that this is true even though, being 
enlightened, both Peter and Randy lack suitably different ways of thinking about the 
individual Superman/Clark. 
Suppose Peter has certain views about the semantics of reports like (3)-(4), such that 
he takes them to express different propositions even though he knows that “Superman” 
and “Clark Kent” are coreferential. According to option B, Peter will then have suitably 
different ways of believing/disbelieving the proposition expressed by (3)-(4): he takes 
one and the same proposition, the one expressed by (3)-(4), to be two distinct 
propositions. However, he doesn’t have such suitably different ways in virtue of his 
being unenlightened about Superman/Clark, but in virtue of his beliefs about the 
semantics of reports. Therefore, it doesn’t follow that Randy also has suitably different 
ways of taking the proposition expressed by (1)-(2), for Randy might not have 
analogous beliefs about the semantics of simple sentences. So (C) is false. Therefore, 
the NPM theorist would conclude borrowing Salmon’s argument, we can explain the 
difference in rationality between Peter and Randy by appealing to ways of believing. 
Because of his beliefs about the semantics of reports, Peter has suitably different ways 
of taking the proposition expressed by (3)-(4) and is rational in resisting substitution. 
Since Randy has no such beliefs about simple sentences, he doesn’t have suitably 
different ways for (1)-(2) and his resistance to substitution is irrational.  
 
I grant that, if he helps himself to the solution above, the Millian can account for the 
rationality of enlightened speakers by appealing to his metaphysics of ways; to this 
extent, Braun is right. I deny, however, that the resulting account will exclusively rely 
on the standard Millian metaphysics and be purely psychological.  
According to the response above, Peter has suitably different ways because he 
endorses something like the following principle, which is of course inconsistent with 
Millianism: 
 
                                                
41 Braun (2006, p. 378) and Salmon (2006) seem to agree. 
42 Cf. Salmon (1989, pp. 264-272) and Salmon (2006, pp. 372-374).  
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10) The sentences “Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly” and “Lois Lane 
believes that Clark Kent can fly” express different propositions43.  
 
Crucially, this shows that the explanation offered by NPM doesn’t exclusively rely on 
ways of believing. It’s Peter’s acceptance of the anti-Millian principle (10) which 
explains his having suitably different ways; but then, since NPM holds that Peter’s 
having suitably different ways is what explains why he is rational, (10) will be what 
really accounts for Peter’s rationality. The fact that he has suitably different ways of 
taking the relevant proposition is only a consequence of his anti-Millian credences. 
NPM can explain speakers’ rationality by appealing to ways, but only through a prior 
appeal to anti-Millian principles. Ways alone are not enough.  
Invoking anti-Millian principles like (10) thus simply creates a new explanandum 
for the non-pragmatic Millian: instead of having to explain why speakers are rational in 
their anti-substitution intuitions, he must now explain why they accept (10). And, of 
course, this explanation must not rely on the semantics or pragmatics of attitude reports, 
or it will not be entirely psychological and NPM’s main thesis will be false44.  
In what follows, I will argue that NPM’s appeal to (10) is problematic in itself, and 
that even if it was acceptable, NPM would still be unable to explain why speakers 
accept (10). I will also argue that the only way for NPM to deal with these worries 
would be to appeal to pragmatic factors. If true, this shows that the non-pragmatic 
                                                
43 Alternatively: “The sentences ‘Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly’ and ‘Lois Lane believes that 
Clark Kent can fly’ express different thoughts/have different contents/…”.  
44 Braun usually employs a different anti-Millian principle to account for the rationality of enlightened 
speakers like Peter (Braun 1998, p. 582; Braun 2006, pp. 377-378): 
 
11) If Lois Lane is rational, reflective, and attentive, and she believes that Clark Kent cannot fly, then 
she doesn’t also believe that Clark Kent can fly. 
 
Peter’s reasoning is supposed to go thus: “Lois believes that Clark cannot fly, since she dissents from (2); 
assuming (11), it follows that she doesn’t also believe that Clark can fly; therefore, (4) is false even 
though (3) and (9) are true”. Accepting (11) (which is again inconsistent with Millianism) gives Peter 
excellent reasons to think (4) is false, so he is not irrational in resisting substitution with (3)-(4). 
The problem with (11) is that, unlike (10), it doesn’t enable Peter to have suitably different ways of taking 
the proposition expressed by (3)-(4). (Indeed, notice that now Braun’s account doesn’t at all rely on the 
ways in which Peter takes that proposition, but only on the reasons he has to resist substitution). So (C) 
still holds: under both options A and B, if Peter has suitably different ways, Randy also does. Therefore, 
Braun cannot explain Peter’s rationality by appealing to (Sch), for that would also entail that Randy is 
rational. 
Couldn’t Braun simply appeal to (11) and drop his original psychological account? First, this would 
destroy one of NPM’s main claims, i.e. that we can explain anti-substitution intuitions about simple 
sentences in the same way we explain intuitions about reports. Such explanation would have to be based 
on (Sch), while the explanation based on (11) is not. Second, I hope my arguments in this section will 
show that NPM’s appeal to any anti-Millian principle is bound to fail; if so, then appealing to (11) rather 
than (10) would not help the non-pragmatic Millian.  
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response to the Asymmetry objection fails, and that the Millian will be forced to adopt a 
pragmatic account if he wants to explain the rationality of enlightened speakers45.  
 
If speakers adopt the semantic principle (10), it is presumably in virtue of their 
holding some further anti-Millian view about the semantics of reports. For instance, 
they might be “closet Fregeans” and think that “believes” expresses a two-place relation 
between a subject and a Fregean proposition, whose constituents are the descriptive 
senses expressed by proper names within attitude contexts46. Alternatively, they might 
think that “believes” expresses a three-place relation between a subject, a singular non-
descriptive proposition and a contextually supplied way of believing that proposition47. 
Other options are open, but one thing is clear: if speakers believe (10), they do so in 
virtue of their (more or less implicitly) believing one of the semantic theories which are 
opposed to Millianism. 
Clearly, this has several problematic consequences (it’s certainly not an accident 
that Braun’s original account tried to make do without anti-Millian principles). First, we 
are now assuming that speakers adopt a wrong semantic theory for attitude reports, 
while they adopt no such misleading theory for simple sentences. But it would be 
bizarre if this kind of error was unique to reports. In order for the appeal to anti-Millian 
principles to be plausible, the NPM theorist must find other types of sentences for which 
speakers endorse a false semantic theory which leads them to have systematically 
mistaken intuitions. Of course, a Millian could respond by trying to explain our 
mistaken views pragmatically. Semantics-pragmatics confusions are widespread and 
arise for all kinds of sentences, both simple and not: if our endorsement of (10) results 
from such a confusion, the Millian will not have to postulate a special source of error 
for reports. Clearly, however, this avenue of response is blocked for NPM, which must 
therefore find some alternative solution to the problem. 
One possibility would be to explain mistaken views about reports as the result of 
mistaken views about simple sentences. According to this line of argument, speakers 
take (3)-(4) to express different propositions because they also take (1)-(2) to express 
different propositions48. Presumably, Peter takes (3) to say that Lois believes the 
proposition expressed by (1); mutatis mutandis for (4) and (2). Therefore, the NPM 
theorist might claim, if Peter believes that (1)-(2) express different propositions he will 
infer that (3)-(4) also do. The problem with this explanation is that it will again entail 
that Randy is rational. If ordinary speakers take the simple sentences (1)-(2) to express 
different propositions, Randy also does; but then he will have suitably different ways of 
                                                
45 Schiffer (2006) briefly considers the possibility of appealing to anti-Millian principles to save 
Millianism. His objections are different from mine (although I do share some of his concerns) and don’t 
seem very strong to me, but I won’t discuss this here. 
46 Salmon takes ordinary speakers to be “closet Fregeans” in his (1989, p. 268) and (more explicitly) in 
his (2006, pp. 372-374). 
47 Cf. Crimmins and Perry (1989), Richard (1990). Such views will be extensively discussed in ch. 3. 
48 This is suggested by Salmon (2006, p. 373). 
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taking the proposition expressed by (1)-(2) and he will count as rational according to 
(Sch). NPM must therefore postulate a set of anti-Millian principles specifically 
targeted on reports and not on simple sentences, which gives rise to the worries raised 
in the last paragraph. 
A related problem is that, by appealing to (10), the non-pragmatic Millian is 
explaining away contrary intuitions in the following way: “speakers have anti-Millian 
intuitions because they believe a semantic theory which is inconsistent with 
Millianism”. By itself, this is clearly not an acceptable response; any semantics could be 
saved this way, no matter how large the amount of contrary intuitive data. A satisfactory 
error theory will also have to explain why speakers would ever endorse the false 
semantic view in the first place. Moreover, the appeal to anti-Millian principles ascribes 
a very serious form of “semantic blindness” to ordinary speakers, thus weakening the 
very evidence in favor of Millianism. If speakers are systematically misled by false 
principles in their intuitions, why take seriously pro-Millian data like anti-descriptivist 
intuitions about proper names? Again, notice that a pragmatic account seems to be the 
only way for the Millian to answer this worry. PM postulates a much less serious form 
of semantic blindness than NPM: according to PM, speakers are right about something 
in their anti-substitution intuitions, since they correctly take the pragmatically conveyed 
propositions to differ in truth value. Their only mistake is to confuse such propositions 
with the semantic content of the reports themselves. 
 
Even if NPM could answer the worries above, it would still have to offer a 
psychological explanation of our acceptance of (10). Nothing in Braun’s picture 
suggests what that explanation might look like, and there are principled reasons to doubt 
that NPM will be able to offer the required explanation without appealing to pragmatic 
factors at any point. 
If NPM is true, there is a psychological mechanism “(M)” which causes us to accept 
(10). But what could (M) be? Presumably, it will be unlike the mechanisms which lead 
us to make mistakes in cases like the “Moses Illusion” (“How many animals did Moses 
take on the ark?”). Anti-substitution intuitions about reports are not the result of poor 
concentration or limited cognitive resources; competent, reflective speakers hold on to 
their judgments about (3)-(4) even after we ask them to pay attention to the relevant 
identity facts. Given the robustness of anti-substitution intuitions, they cannot just be 
caused by a “performance limitation” of some sort.  
Perhaps more plausibly, one might identify (M) with a set of principles of our folk 
psychology, i.e. our folk theory of other people’s mental states. There is strong 
consensus in contemporary cognitive science about the existence of “folk theories”: a 
folk physics, a folk biology and so on49. Such theories are generally taken to be 
“implicitly” or “subpersonally” believed by most humans, to be (relatively) modular 
and innate, and to become active at certain developmental stages. (M) could then be 
                                                
49 V. Prinz (2002, ch. 8) for a useful overview of the literature.  
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identified with a set of deep beliefs which are part of our folk psychology and lead us to 
accept (10). After all, (3)-(4) concern what Lois believes, so some folk-psychological 
principle might well bear on our evaluation of such sentences. Moreover, this account 
would be independently motivated (we have strong evidence for the existence of folk 
psychology) and it would account for the robustness of anti-substitution intuitions (folk 
theories are deeply ingrained, so the judgments they produce can be expected to be 
robust). 
Notice, though, that (10) is a semantic principle: it specifically concerns the content 
of belief reports containing coreferential terms, and we accept it because of our having 
certain further semantic views (e.g. because of our closet-Fregeanism; v. supra). So it 
would be implausible to claim that folk-psychological principles can fully explain (10)’s 
acceptance: folk psychology is presumably silent about the content of proper names 
within attitude contexts and similar issues in the semantics of natural language. 
Moreover, folk-psychological principles are generally taken to be innate; but, again, it 
seems odd to claim that speakers reliably become closet-Fregeans at some ontogenetic 
stage, and that their doing so is not in any way influenced by the semantic or pragmatic 
features of reports. Presumably, our interactions with other speakers play a crucial role 
in our coming to endorse (10). For that reason, it seems that a full account of our 
acceptance of (10) must at some point inevitably appeal to the semantic or pragmatic 
profile of ascriptions.  
To illustrate, here is how a semantic account might go: speakers encode certain 
information in the semantic content of (3)-(4), so that they come to express different 
propositions; we are sensitive to the content of other speakers’ utterances; therefore, we 
correctly conclude that the two reports express different propositions, thus coming to 
accept (10). Since this semantic explanation would be straightforwardly inconsistent 
with Millianism, a Millian could instead provide a pragmatic story along the following 
lines: speakers pragmatically convey different propositions by uttering (3)-(4); again, 
we are sensitive to the information conveyed by other speakers’ utterances and realize 
that different propositions are being transmitted by (3)-(4); however, we mistake such 
propositions for the contents of the reports themselves, thus endorsing the false 
principle (10).  
Unlike NPM’s appeal to folk-psychological principles, then, a semantic or 
pragmatic explanation would account for the role that interactions with other speakers 
must play in our coming to accept (10). This means that, since a semantic explanation is 
not an option, any Millian who takes ordinary speakers to endorse principles like (10) 
will have to assume that (3)-(4) pragmatically convey different propositions. Far from 
making the appeal to pragmatics useless, then, Braun’s attempt to explain speakers’ 
rationality by appeal to ways of believing requires adopting a PM account! I conclude 
that the non-pragmatic Millian won’t be able to explain in a purely psychological way 
why speakers accept (10): but this constitutes sufficient reason to reject NPM, which 
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needs a psychological explanation of (10)’s acceptance in order to offer a plausible 
account of enlightened speakers’ rationality50. 
 
In conclusion: Braun is right to claim that the Millian can explain the rationality of 
anti-substitution intuitions about simple sentences and reports in the same way, i.e. by 
appealing to his metaphysics of belief. However, the Asymmetry objection shows that 
such explanation will have to rely on (10) to explain the rationality of enlightened 
speakers like Peter. So NPM must offer a purely psychological, non-semantic and non-
pragmatic account of our acceptance of (10). But I have argued, first, that NPM’s appeal 
to (10) is problematic in itself and, second, that we cannot offer a psychological account 
of its acceptance. The only way for the Millian to explain why ordinary speakers 
endorse (10) would require assuming that (3)-(4) pragmatically convey different 
propositions, in which case NPM’s account would not be non-pragmatic anymore. This 
has two important consequences: 
 
• The non-pragmatic Millian cannot explain in a purely psychological way why 
ordinary speakers are rational in their anti-substitution intuitions, so NPM fails.  
 
• Since the Millian can only explain those intuitions by offering a pragmatic 
account, if the standard objections against PM succeed then Millianism must be 
rejected altogether. 
 
I will discuss some of the objections against PM in section 5 infra; before doing that, 
however, I would like to examine another important aspect of Braun’s non-pragmatic 
strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
50 Isn’t the pragmatic strategy just outlined going to be psychological after all? The NPM theorist might 
stress how psychological facts play a crucial role in all pragmatic explanations (cf. for instance classic 
Gricean accounts or Relevance Theory), so that even PM accounts will count as psychological. 
Of course, I grant that, on this reading of “psychological”, the Millian can offer a psychological 
explanation of speakers’ rationality. But this is irrelevant for my purposes; what I deny is that the Millian 
can provide an explanation which “does not assume that utterances of (3) and (4) pragmatically convey 
different propositions” (Braun 1998, p. 579). This is the psychological account I am attacking, and this is 
what Braun himself means by “psychological explanation”. Notice that, by Braun’s own definition, if an 
explanation assumes at any point (i.e. even when explaining (10)’s acceptance) that (3)-(4) pragmatically 
convey different propositions, that explanation will still count as non-psychological.  
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4. NPM And Behavior 
 
There is a second “classic” objection that all Millians have to face: if Millianism 
was true, we could not account for the role that certain intentional generalizations seem 
to play in the explanation and prediction of behavior51. Braun (2000, 2001a,b) has tried 
to offer a non-pragmatic response to the objection; I will argue that his response fails, 
and that a Millian will again be forced to appeal to what intentional generalizations 
allegedly convey at the pragmatic level in order to account for their role in 
explanation/prediction.  
 
Consider the following generalization52: 
 
12) If a person wants Twain to autograph her book, and she believes that if she 
waves then Twain will autograph her book, then, other things being equal, she will 
wave. 
 
Suppose Lucy is not aware of the relevant identity claim (“Twain is Clemens”) and 
wants Twain to autograph her book. Also, suppose she sincerely says: “If I wave then 
Clemens will autograph my book”. Presumably, Lucy believes that if she waves then 
Clemens will autograph her book. But then, if NPM is true53, Lucy also believes that if 
she waves then Twain will autograph her book. So if NPM is true Lucy satisfies the 
antecedent of (12). However, in the circumstances described Lucy might still not wave 
(she might reason: “If I wave then Clemens will autograph my book; but I want Twain, 
and not Clemens, to autograph my book)”. So there are possible cases where an agent 
satisfies the antecedent of (12) but not its consequent. Therefore, (12) has possible 
counterexamples and is a false generalization. But (12) is true, so NPM is false. The 
problem is particularly serious, since it seems we can use (12) to explain/predict the 
waving behavior of someone who wants Twain to autograph her book and believes that 
if she waves then Twain will autograph her book. But if (12) was false we could not use 
it to produce sound explanations and predictions! 
According to the objection, Lucy’s not waving will constitute a counterexample to 
(12) once we assume NPM. In reply, defenders of NPM54 have employed what I will 
call “the ceteris paribus strategy”: even assuming NPM, Lucy’s behavior is not a 
counterexample to (12) but rather a tolerable exception to it, since other things are not 
equal in her case. If NPM is true, Lucy both wants Twain to autograph her book and 
                                                
51 V. Richard (1990, 1997). 
52 I switch to a Twain/Clemens case to follow Braun’s examples. 
53 I present the objections in this section as aimed against NPM only, for PM would have a different 
response against them; v. infra. 
54 V. Braun (2000, 2001a,b). The same strategy is also used by Schneider (2005, 2011), although for 
slightly different purposes (v. ch. 3, sect. 4.2). The move was originally proposed by Fodor (1994). 
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believes that if she waves then Twain will autograph her book. So she does satisfy the 
first two conjuncts of (12)’s antecedent. However, because she is unenlightened, she 
believes and desires those two propositions in “mismatching” or “suitably different” 
ways (v. previous sections); the mental sentences in her belief and desire box don’t 
“functionally interact” in the same way they would in an enlightened subject, so she 
doesn’t wave. Given the mismatch in her ways of believing/desiring, however, other 
things are not equal in her case and she constitutes a tolerable exception rather than a 
counterexample to (12). 
It might be objected that the move seems entirely ad hoc: why should we take (12)’s 
ceteris paribus clause to include a “matching ways” condition, so that other things are 
not equal with unenlightened subjects? In reply, proponents of the strategy have 
attempted to provide independent reasons to treat subjects like Lucy as tolerable 
exceptions55. As I will now argue, however, (12) is not the crux: even if NPM could 
offer independent reasons to include a “matching ways” condition in the ceteris paribus 
clause of (12), it would still be unable to account for a large class of generalizations 
which appear just as explanatory and predictive as (12). So the ceteris paribus move, 
even if independently motivated, would still not enable NPM to account for our actual 
explanatory practices.  
Consider the following generalization:  
 
13) If a person wants Twain to autograph her book, believes that if she waves then 
Clemens will autograph her book, and doesn’t believe that Twain is Clemens, then, 
other things being equal, she will not wave. 
 
Like (12), (13) seems true; like (12), it seems we can use it to predict and explain 
behavior. The difference with (12), of course, is that (13) can be used to predict/explain 
a subject’s not waving rather than her waving. Indeed, (13) seems to be precisely the 
generalization we would use to explain why Lucy doesn’t wave in the circumstances 
described above. Notice, though, that Lucy (as well as any other intentional subject) 
will be unable to satisfy (13)’s antecedent once we assume NPM. Everyone believes 
that Twain is Twain; if NPM is true, this entails that everyone believes that Twain is 
Clemens; therefore, under NPM it is impossible for an intentional subject like Lucy to 
satisfy the antecedent of (13). But then (13) cannot be used to explain/predict Lucy’s 
not waving, since she doesn’t satisfy the antecedent. Indeed, if NPM is true (13) cannot 
be used to explain/predict the behavior of any intentional subject, for no one will ever 
satisfy its antecedent; but (13) can be so used, so NPM is false56. 
                                                
55 V. especially Fodor (1994) and Schneider (2005, 2011). 
56 Notice that the ceteris paribus strategy would not be of any use here. That strategy can at best show that 
Lucy is a tolerable exception rather than a counterexample to (12). The problem with (13), however, is 
not that Lucy is a potential counterexample to it, but that she cannot satisfy its antecedent once we assume 
NPM. There is no way for NPM to deny this by appealing to the ceteris paribus clause of (13). 
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Contrast NPM with any non-Millian semantics “NM” on which substitution of 
coreferential terms is blocked within propositional attitude contexts. NM can easily 
account for the explanatory/predictive power of both (12) and (13). Assuming NM, 
Lucy doesn’t satisfy the antecedent of (12); she does want Twain to autograph her book, 
but she only believes that if she waves then Clemens will autograph her book. So NM 
has no problems with (12), and without having to appeal to the ceteris paribus strategy. 
NM also has no problems with (13). Assuming NM, Lucy (as well as any other 
intentional subject) can perfectly well satisfy (13)’s antecedent; she does believe that 
Twain is Twain, but she doesn’t thereby also believe that Twain is Clemens. So under 
NM, but not under NPM, (13) can be used to explain/predict the behavior of people like 
Lucy57.  
The problem, in sum, is that the ceteris paribus strategy shows at best that NPM is 
consistent with generalizations like (12). Even then, however, it will still follow from 
NPM that generalizations like (13) cannot be used to explain/predict behavior58. It now 
seems rather irrelevant whether NPM can appeal to (12)’s ceteris paribus clause to 
avoid the first objection. Even if we grant that move, a large class of generalizations 
which seem just as explanatory and predictive as (12) will still be left out as useless for 
purposes of explanation/prediction! (On the contrary, both kinds of intentional 
generalizations will be straightforwardly captured by NM). The heated debate59 about 
whether to include a “matching ways” condition in (12)’s ceteris paribus clause appears 
a lot less urgent once we realize that, in any case, there is a large class of intentional 
generalizations that NPM has no hope to capture. 
 
Is there any way for the Millian to account for our use of (13)? The only available 
option, again, would be to adopt a PM account. While a pragmatic Millian would also 
have to grant that we cannot “use” the semantic content of (13) for explanation and 
prediction, he could still appeal to what an utterance of (13) will allegedly convey. For 
instance, following Salmon’s “metalinguistic” proposal (v. sect. 2.3), he might hold that 
the utterance will convey a proposition having <… and doesn’t believe that “Twain is 
Clemens” is true> as the third conjunct of the antecedent. The antecedent of this 
proposition can clearly be satisfied by intentional subjects like Lucy, even assuming 
Millianism. The pragmatic Millian might then hold that, in a broad sense of “using” 
which includes what is pragmatically conveyed by a generalization, we can use (13) to 
explain/predict behavior. Since no such move is available on Braun’s NPM, the only 
option left for the Millian who wants to account for (13) will against consist in 
appealing to pragmatics.  
A possible reply in defense of NPM is suggested by Schneider (2005, 2011), who 
would argue that NPM can explain/predict Lucy’s not waving. As we have seen, NPM 
holds that, if Lucy believes and desires the relevant propositions in mismatching ways, 
                                                
57 We will go back to non-Millian views at length in ch. 3. 
58 I will say more about intentional explanation and prediction in ch. 2 (sect. 3.1). 
59 V. especially Arjo (1996) and Aydede and Robbins (2001), who respond to Fodor (1994).  
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then she will not wave. So her behavior can be predicted and explained at the 
“computational” level of the theory: if the LoT sentences in Lucy’s belief and desire 
box are disconnected in the right way (due to her being unenlightened), then she will 
not wave. So NPM is perfectly able to explain/predict Lucy’s behavior, although 
admittedly it cannot use (13) to do so60. 
This reply would miss the point. I agree that the NPM theorist can predict/explain 
Lucy’s behavior by appealing to something like the following generalization: 
 
14) If a person wants Twain to autograph her book, believes that if she waves then 
Clemens will autograph her book, and wants and believes these propositions in 
mismatching ways, then, other things being equal, she will not wave. 
 
I grant that (14) is as explanatory and predictive as (13), and that Lucy can perfectly 
well satisfy its antecedent even assuming NPM. Still, these considerations fail to 
address my objection. NPM is a semantic theory; it is a theory about what is 
semantically expressed and pragmatically conveyed by our reports of propositional 
attitudes. If that theory was true, (13) could not be used to predict/explain Lucy’s 
behavior; but since (13) can be so used, that semantic theory is false. The fact that we 
can also use (14) to predict/explain Lucy’s not waving cannot save NPM as a theory of 
ascriptions, for NPM is still unable to account for the generalizations we actually use, 
i.e. (13).  
Is there some other response available to the non-pragmatic Millian? There is no 
way to deny that, if NPM is true, then (13) cannot be used to explain/predict behavior; 
therefore, NPM can only deny that (13) can be so used and explain away our intuitions 
to the contrary as incorrect61. The story will presumably go as follows. We think that 
(13) can be used to explain/predict Lucy’s behavior because we think she can fail to 
believe that Twain is Clemens, thus satisfying (13)’s antecedent. This intuition is 
wrong, just like our parallel intuition about (4): Lois does believe that Clark can fly, and 
Lucy cannot fail to believe that Twain is Clemens. Presumably, our intuitions about 
(13) will then be explained as the product of anti-Millian principles like (10), following 
the strategy outlined in sect. 3. 
Clearly, this concedes a lot to NPM’s opponents. Granting that (13) cannot be used 
to explain/predict behavior is a very substantial cost, especially if one agrees that (12) 
can be so used, as Braun does; prima facie, the two generalizations seem exactly alike 
in their explanatory/predictive power. Moreover, we have seen that NPM has to explain 
away our intuitions about (13) by appealing to anti-Millian principles like (10). But this 
means that, if my previous arguments against NPM’s appeal to (10) succeed, the non-
pragmatic Millian will simply have no way to explain those intuitions. 
                                                
60 I will examine Schneider’s view in detail in ch. 3 (sect. 4.2). 
61 Braun does consider a similar move (with respect to (12)) as a possible alternative to the ceteris paribus 
strategy: v. e.g. Braun 2000 (sect. 11).  
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Given the substantial costs of this line of response, it is not surprising that, when 
answering the original objection, Braun tried to capture our intuitions about (12) rather 
than explain them away as incorrect. What my argument shows is that, when it comes to 
(13), this possibility is not available; there is no way for the non-pragmatic Millian to 
capture the role that such generalizations intuitively seem to play in our everyday 
explanations and predictions of behavior. 
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5. Some Problems With Pragmatic Millianism 
 
We have considered two classic objections against Millianism: the view has troubles 
explaining the rationality of ordinary speakers and accounting for the role of intentional 
generalizations in the explanation and prediction of behavior. I have discussed Braun’s 
attempt to offer non-pragmatic solutions to both problems, and argued that neither of 
them works. If there is any hope for the Millian to deal with these issues, it lies in 
adopting a pragmatic account. Unfortunately, however, such accounts also have to face 
a number of serious objections, which is precisely what pushed Braun to develop his 
non-pragmatic alternative in the first place.  
A first set of objections has targeted the specific PM accounts proposed by Salmon 
and Soames (v. sect. 2.3). Soames explains anti-substitution intuitions by claiming that 
speakers use reports like (3)-(4) to pragmatically assert “descriptively enriched” 
propositions like those expressed by (7)-(8). In reply, Braun and Sider (2006) have 
argued that this exposes Soames to standard Kripkean arguments against 
descriptivism62. Suppose Gödel is about to give a lecture and the host introduces him as 
follows: “We are very pleased to have the person who proved the incompleteness of 
arithmetic with us today. Professor Gödel will speak on logic”. Smith and Jones arrive 
late at the lecture and miss the host’s first sentence. However, they do hear the host utter 
“Professor Gödel will speak on logic”. In addition, they know of Gödel’s theft and 
mistakenly think everyone else does, too. Smith then says to Jones: “How can Gödel 
have the nerve to speak on logic after having stolen the incompleteness proof from 
Schmidt? Still, the host believes that Gödel will speak on logic. So perhaps he will”. 
Now, as Braun and Sider point out: 
 
According to Soames, by uttering ‘The host believes that Professor Gödel will speak on logic’, Smith 
primarily asserts the descriptively enriched proposition The host believes that Professor Gödel, 
who stole the incompleteness proof from Schmidt, will speak on logic. Since the host believes no 
such thing, this proposition is false. Yet […] our intuition is that Smith’s utterance is true […] 
(intuitively, Smith asserts nothing false) (Braun and Sider 2006, p. 673). 
 
If (3)-(4) are standardly used to assert descriptively enriched propositions, then 
presumably Smith’s utterance is also used to assert a descriptive proposition about 
Gödel. If the proposition in bold is the one asserted, however, Soames’ account will 
mistakenly predict that Smith has asserted something false with his utterance. 
Similar problems affect Salmon’s proposal, on which utterances of (3)-(4) are 
routinely used to convey the “metalinguistic” (5)-(6). As Saul (1998) points out, this 
cannot explain anti-substitution intuitions in all cases. Suppose Lois is only acquainted 
with Superman/Clark “demonstratively”: she ignores the name of both the mighty 
superhero she has seen flying and of the reporter with glasses she has seen in the office. 
                                                
62 They also raise a similar objection against Soames’ theory of simple sentences, but I prefer to focus on 
reports here. 
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Clearly, Lois would accept neither “Superman can fly” nor “Clark Kent can fly”. Now, 
an ordinary speaker who knew all this would still think (3) was true and (4) false; 
however, he would now take both (5) and (6) to be false. Therefore, we cannot explain 
his anti-substitution intuitions about (3)-(4) as the result of his intuitions about (5)-(6). 
Salmon’s proposal could be patched by construing the “guises” mentioned in (5)-(6) 
as something other than natural language sentences: we could for instance identify them 
with mental representations (e.g. LoT sentences), as on Braun’s construal of ways of 
believing. While this might avoid the objection against the original meta-linguistic 
proposal, however, Braun notes that any appeal to “guises” in (5)-(6) will still risk being 
implausible for a different reason63. Ordinary speakers have no familiarity with notions 
like “BEL-relation” and “propositional guise”. Therefore, they would not understand 
(5)-(6), nor is there any context in which would they ever utter these sentences. But how 
could speakers’ utterances of (3)-(4) systematically convey propositions that the 
speakers themselves never express or even understand? (Of course, as Braun notes, the 
worry will be even stronger once we adopt a sophisticated construal of guises as LoT 
sentences64). 
Besides the problems affecting specific PM accounts, there is a more general issue 
that all pragmatic Millians have to face. As Braun (1998, pp. 570-571) notes, if 
utterances of (3)-(4) had the same semantic content while conveying different 
propositions, speakers should be able to recognize this and consequently retract their 
original anti-substitution intuitions. For instance, Salmon (1989, pp. 252-53) regards the 
implicatures triggered by belief reports as analogous to the generalized implicatures 
produced by sentences like “Jane became pregnant and she got married”. Ordinary 
speakers usually think that the temporal ordering of the events in question is relevant for 
the truth value of these sentences. However, after appropriate “training” they come to 
realize that such sentences only “suggest” something about temporal order. But ordinary 
speakers will still take (3)-(4) to differ in truth value after we bring up the possibility 
that they might only differ in what they “suggest”. More importantly, trained 
semanticists who are usually perfectly capable of recognizing the distinction between 
the semantic and pragmatic content of an utterance will often have the same response. 
Anti-substitution intuitions are just too robust to be explained in a purely pragmatic 
way. 
 
I am persuaded by some of the standard objections against PM. In particular, I agree 
with Braun that anti-substitution intuitions are too widespread and robust to be the 
outcome of a mere semantics/pragmatics confusion65. Now, I have argued in previous 
                                                
63 Braun (1998, p. 567). 
64 The revised version of Salmon’s proposal might also be vulnerable to other arguments in Saul (1998), 
but I cannot discuss this here. 
65 On the other hand, some of the specific objections against Salmon and Soames’ accounts could also be 
used against the non-Millian, “contextualist” account I favor (v. ch. 3 infra): cf. in particular the 
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sections that non-pragmatic versions of Millianism fail: if Millianism is true, then 
pragmatic Millianism is. Therefore, I take the objections against PM to show that 
Millianism must be rejected in toto as a theory of ascriptions. Clearly, this is not the end 
of the story. There are various moves that pragmatic Millians could attempt in response 
to those objections, and further worries that could be raised against PM66. However, I 
will not discuss the issue further, for two reasons. First, a complete analysis of PM and 
its problems would require a dissertation of its own. Second, and more importantly, my 
arguments in the following chapters would also go through (with some modifications) if 
we assumed pragmatic Millianism instead of a non-Millian semantics (I will explain 
why in ch. 3, sect. 3).  So, while I will take anti-PM arguments at face value and assume 
that the right view of ascriptions must be non-Millian, the substance of my theory of 
concepts would be left untouched if some pragmatic Millian account could be made to 
work after all. 
 
The failure of Millianism is the first important moral that a successful theory of 
reports must take into account. There is, however, a second aspect of our attitude-
reporting practices that should play an equally important role in that theory, and that 
will also be crucial for our later discussion: the truth-conditions of attitude reports seem 
to vary with context. We will develop this point extensively in chapter 3: to anticipate, 
here is an interesting case by Jennifer Saul: 
 
Suppose I am discussing what people in general think of Bob Dylan’s singing abilities, and the 
person I’m talking to knows him only as ‘Bob Dylan’. I’ve been told (truthfully) that Glenda, a 
childhood friend, who knows him only as ‘Robert Zimmerman’, believes that he has a beautiful 
voice. Specifically, someone I trust has uttered sentence (1): 
 
(1) Glenda believes that Robert Zimmerman has a beautiful voice. 
 
I may report this with sentence (2): 
 
(2) Glenda believes that Bob Dylan has a beautiful voice. 
 
(2) seems true, even though Glenda would never assent to it. Further, we have no hesitation in saying 
this, although we know next to nothing about how Glenda may think of Bob Dylan/Robert 
Zimmerman. […] Suppose now that Glenda is participating in a marketing poll which asks for her 
opinions of various singers’ voices, by name. One of the names on the list is ‘Bob Dylan.’ I’m asked 
to predict her responses. It would be wrong for me to reply with ‘Glenda believes that Bob Dylan has 
a beautiful voice’, even though that very sentence seemed true in our previous context. This tells us 
quite straightforwardly that the truth conditions of attitude-reporting sentences seem to vary with 
context (Saul 1999a, pp. 358-59).  
 
                                                                                                                                          
arguments by Saul (1998) and Braun and Sider (2006). I believe those objections could be overcome by 
the contextualist, but I won’t be able to discuss this here. 
66 V. Soames (2006 a,b) for discussion. 
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When conjoined with the results of our anti-Millian arguments, Saul’s considerations 
seem to show that a successful theory of ascriptions must both take into account their 
context-sensitivity and be non-Millian. In chapter 3, we will examine a family of 
theories that were specifically designed to satisfy these two desiderata. As we’ll see, 
such theories don’t just constitute a promising solution to the problem of ascriptions: 
perhaps more surprisingly, they might also shed light on the nature of concepts itself. 
To see why, however, we must first say a bit more about some recent debates on 
concept individuation and possession; this will be our starting point in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Publicity Vs. Holism 
 
 
  60 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter has two main goals. The first one is to provide a basic framework for 
our discussion of concept individuation and possession. That discussion will take place 
against the background of a specific view, the so-called “Representational Theory of 
The Mind” (RTM); I describe the basic tenets of RTM in section 2.1. I then turn to 
examine a principle which many have taken to follow straightforwardly from RTM 
itself (sect. 2.2). To put it in simple terms, that principle holds that two subjects who are 
covered by the same intentional generalization must also have certain specific concepts 
in common. It follows from this principle that concepts are “public” entities which are 
routinely shared by ordinary thinkers: the principle is thus standardly referred to as the 
“publicity principle”. 
Having summarized the main arguments that have been offered in favor of publicity, 
I’ll turn to my second goal. I will examine a specific family of theories of concept 
individuation/possession, namely those “holistic” views according to which concepts 
are individuated by their global inferential role in a system (sect. 2.3). There is a close 
connection between holistic theories and the publicity principle: as we will see, many 
have tried to show holism to be straightforwardly inconsistent with publicity. Having 
summarized these standard anti-holistic arguments, I will discuss two maneuvers that 
have been attempted to defend holism from publicity-based objections, and argue that 
they both fail (sect. 3). In section 4 I will consider a possible alternative response, one 
that has been largely ignored in the literature and that rejects the original argument for 
publicity as invalid. I will suggest that there is no obvious way to patch the argument, 
and that this has two important consequences. First, the standard anti-holistic arguments 
examined in section 2.3 are blocked until an alternative argument for publicity is 
provided. Second, we need to find a new way to answer the question which motivated 
the argument for publicity in the first place, namely: does the interpersonal applicability 
of intentional generalizations require concepts to be public? In response to this question, 
I’ll suggest that there is an alternative way to establish the publicity principle, one 
which is based on our best semantics for attitude ascriptions: this will lead us to the next 
chapter, where this alternative route to publicity will be explored in more detail.  
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2. The Publicity Principle 
 
2.1 . The Representational Theory Of The Mind (RTM) 
 
As anticipated, our discussion will take place within a specific theoretical 
framework. This is the framework against which many contemporary debates about 
concepts have been conducted, and I will take it for granted throughout most of our 
discussion. The framework in question is known as the “Representational Theory of the 
Mind” (RTM). I will characterize RTM as the conjunction of the following claims (my 
reconstruction is mostly based on Fodor (1998, pp. 7-39) and Aydede (2000a, pp. 23-
24): 
 
RTM (I): A subject S has a propositional attitude pa with propositional content P just 
in case S stands in an appropriate functional relation to an internal mental 
representation r expressing proposition P.  
 
RTM (II) A mental representation r expressing a proposition P is a structured entity 
constituted by a set of concepts [C1, C2, … Cn]. 
 
Let’s say a bit more about these two claims67: 
 
RTM (I): According to RTM (I), a subject S believes that P just in case S stands in the 
appropriate belief-relation to an internal mental representation r expressing P; a subject 
S desires that P just in case S stands in the appropriate desire-relation to an internal 
mental representation r expressing P; and so on for all other kinds of propositional 
attitudes. Following standard usage, I will refer to mental representations which express 
propositions as “thoughts” (so [there is beer in the fridge] is a thought, whereas [cold 
beer] is not68). 
The relations that must obtain between a subject and a thought in order for that 
subject to have a certain propositional attitude are functionally defined, in the following 
sense. A mental representation r expressing proposition P constitutes a belief that P 
(rather than, say, a desire that P) just in case r plays the functional role of a belief. For 
                                                
67 I intend my characterization of RTM to be as broad and ecumenical as possible. In particular, I do not 
mean to identify RTM with the Language of Thought (LoT) hypothesis (cf. Fodor 1975, 2008). 
Admittedly, the LoT hypothesis is the most popular and fully worked-out version of the RTM program. 
Still, one might accept RTM (I)-(II) without also identifying mental representations with language-like 
symbols on which mental processes defined over the symbols’ syntactic features operate. Whether 
alternative versions of RTM are possible is not an issue I can discuss here, but it’s at least not obvious 
that RTM (I)-(II) will force us to endorse the LoT hypothesis. (This also constitutes the main difference 
between my way of presenting RTM and Fodor (1998)/Aydede (2000a), who both describe the view as a 
version of the LoT theory). 
68 In this section, I will refer to mental representations by using expressions in brackets and italics. 
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instance, if r is a belief that there is beer in the fridge, then r should be such that, when 
you are in representational state r and you want to have some beer, then you will open 
the fridge other things being equal (you are not paralyzed, blind and so on). So a subject 
will stand in the belief-relation to a thought just in case that thought plays the functional 
role of a belief; mutatis mutandis for all other kinds of propositional attitudes. (For 
brevity, I will say that a subject “accepts” a thought whenever he stands in the belief-
relation to that thought69). 
 
RTM (II): According to this thesis, concepts are the constituents of mental 
representations. How should we interpret this claim? The answer will depend on the 
ontology of concepts we adopt. As anticipated, two options have been especially 
prominent in the literature: concepts can be identified with abstract objects or mental 
representations. RTM (II) can be accepted on both of these views, but the claim will be 
interpreted differently depending on our background ontology: 
 
• According to Fregean RTM ontologies70, concepts are abstract objects (e.g. Fregean 
senses) which are expressed by mental representations: for instance, my mental 
representation [dog] expresses the abstract concept DOG71. On this view, a mental 
representation r with propositional content P is “constituted” by concepts in a 
relatively loose sense: concepts are simply the contents of the basic mental 
representations which compose r. For instance, [dogs bark] is a mental 
representation constructed from the mental representations [dogs] and [bark], which 
in turn express the abstract concepts DOGS and BARK72.  
 
• According to non-Fregean RTM ontologies, concepts are mental representations73. 
On this view, my concept DOG is a mental representation referring to dogs. My 
mental representation [dogs bark] will then be literally constituted by the concepts 
DOGS and BARK, since these just are the basic mental representations from which the 
structured representation in question is constructed. 
 
                                                
69 In passing, note that the belief-relation to mental representations is in fact a species of Salmon’s BEL-
relation (v. ch. 1). 
70 V. especially Peacocke (1992, 2005), Rey (1983, 1985), Glock (2009). 
71 As usual, I refer to concepts by using expressions in small capitals. 
72 Note that a Fregean theorist might want to reserve the label “thoughts” for the propositions expressed 
by mental representations rather than the mental representations themselves. This would be incompatible 
with the definition of “thoughts” I offered above, on which they are identified with mental 
representations. However, my terminology is relatively standard within RTM and it simplifies the 
discussion significantly, so I will stick to it in what follows. Nothing turns on this, since Fregean and non-
Fregean ontologists agree that concepts are the constituents of thoughts in one of the senses delineated 
here. 
73 V. especially Fodor (1998), Laurence and Margolis (1999, 2007).   
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Each of these ontological views is adopted by at least some authors who subscribe to 
RTM, and they will both play an important role in our discussion. In what follows, I 
will remain neutral on which one we should adopt in developing our theory of concepts. 
I will therefore try to cast my arguments in terms that would be acceptable for both 
sides; whenever this is not possible, I will formulate my arguments in two versions, one 
for each of the ontological views at hand.  
 
2.2 . The Argument For Publicity 
 
Given RTM, several arguments can be offered in defense of the claim that concepts 
are “public” entities which are routinely shared by ordinary thinkers: 
 
• The claim that different subjects can have the same desires, beliefs, intentions etc… 
seems plausible in and of itself. But, given RTM (I), it seems that two subjects can 
only have the same belief or desire if they stand in the right functional relation to the 
same mental representation. For instance, two subjects can only believe that dogs 
bark if they both stand in the belief-relation to [dogs bark]. But, by RTM (II), this 
mental representation is constituted by the concepts DOGS and BARK, so it seems that 
two subjects could not both stand in the belief-relation to it unless they both had its 
constituent concepts DOGS and BARK. 
 
• In order for communication to be successful, it must be possible for those who 
exchange information to come to be in the same mental state. If I tell you that dogs 
bark, I will have succeeded in communicating the relevant information only once I 
get you to entertain the thought [dogs bark] (which you might then decide to accept 
or reject). But, again, this thought is constituted by DOGS and BARK, so we could not 
both entertain it unless we both had its constituent concepts DOGS and BARK74.  
 
• Finally, it seems that in order for me and you to genuinely agree on a certain subject 
matter we must be in the same mental state. For instance, we won’t agree on 
whether dogs bark unless we both believe that dogs bark. But, for the reasons 
already given, this will not be possible under RTM unless we also have the relevant 
concepts in common (in this case, DOGS and BARK). Mutatis mutandis for genuine 
disagreement, which will only occur when we (respectively) accept and reject one 
and the same thought75.  
 
All these considerations would deserve careful analysis, and we will go back to 
them later. Throughout chapters 2-3, however, my focus will be on a different argument 
                                                
74 V. Prinz (2002, p. 14), Fodor and Lepore (1992, pp. 8-9). 
75 V. the argument by Williamson (2007) that was discussed in the main Introduction. V. also Fodor and 
Lepore (1992, pp. 11-13) and Sainsbury and Tye (2012, p. 21). 
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that has been offered in defense of concept publicity. Many RTM theorists have argued 
that concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable intentional 
generalizations to be possible. The main reason why I will focus on this argument is 
that it has played a more central role in recent disputes about concepts76. (At the same 
time, the psychological generalizations argument does bear some structural analogies to 
other publicity arguments. For this reason, much of what I’ll say about it would also 
apply to the arguments above, for reasons that will be discussed later).  
 
Several RTM theorists have argued that the interpersonal applicability of intentional 
generalizations and explanations requires concepts to be public: 
 
Publicity seems to be the backbone of explanation and prediction of human behavior. It is by attributing 
propositional attitudes that the folk explain and predict people’s behavior [...]. It appears that this activity 
requires that subjects be subsumed under counterfactual supporting content generalizations that are inter- 
and intra-personally applicable. Consider some examples: “For any person S, if S desires that P and 
believes that S can bring it about that P, then S will try to bring it about that P”; “Thirsty people who 
believe they are thirsty tend to seek water” […]. There are likely to be occasions where these can be used 
to cover more than one agent (to explain or predict their behavior simultaneously or diachronically), so 
that the range of the universal quantifier over people may vary from two people picked out in a certain 
way for the purposes at hand, to entire communities, or even across nations. When they are deployed 
successfully, these generalizations attribute the same propositional attitudes to agents. The agents’ 
behavior is supposed to be explained/predicted by subsuming them under such generalizations. So 
propositional attitudes attributed to agents to explain/predict their behavior are required to be type-
identical across them so they can be subsumed by such generalizations. The success of intentional 
explanation and prediction seems to depend on this fact (Aydede 2000a, pp. 5-6).  
 
Concepts must be capable of being shared by different individuals and by one individual at different 
times. […] concepts are implicated in intentional explanations of behavior. An intentional explanation of 
behavior is one that explains what a person does by appeal to her mental states. For example, Mary 
opened the liquor cabinet because she desired a glass of scotch and believed she could find some there. 
As this example illustrates, typical intentional explanations make reference to propositional attitudes, and 
attitudes are composed of concepts. Perhaps the most striking feature of intentional explanations is their 
apparent generality. A single intentional explanation can subsume many different people. Felix, Hugo and 
Greta might all open their respective liquor cabinets for precisely the same reason that Mary did. But, 
actions can be motivated by the same attitudes only if those attitudes are composed of the same concepts. 
If intentional explanations generalize, concepts must be shareable (Prinz 2002, pp. 14-15). 
 
On the face of it, concepts are the stuff of which psychological claims and explanations are made: 
generalizations and explanations of, e.g., cognitive development, fallacies in reasoning, vision and 
language understanding (to take some of the more successful areas of recent psychology), all these 
presuppose concepts as shared constituents of the propositional attitudes the explanations concern. It’s 
not clear how even to describe the phenomenon of the Müller-Lyer illusion unless we can presume that 
people share a concept of longer than; or the gambler’s fallacy, without them sharing more likely (Rey 
2009a, p. 2).  
 
                                                
76 Two examples: the debate between Fodor/Lepore (1992), Fodor (1998) and Block (1998); and the 
dispute between Aydede (1998, 2000 a,b) and Schneider (2011).  
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[…] RTM takes for granted the centrality of intentional explanation in any viable cognitive psychology. 
In the cases of interest, what makes such explanations intentional is that they appeal to covering 
generalizations about people who believe that such-and-such, or people who desire that so-and-so, or 
people who intend that this and that, and so on. In consequence, the extent to which an RTM can achieve 
generality in the explanations it proposes depends on the extent to which mental contents are supposed to 
be shared77. If everybody else’s concept WATER is different from mine, then it is literally true that only I 
have ever wanted a drink of water, and that the intentional generalization ‘Thirsty people seek water’ 
applies only to me. […] Prima facie, it would appear that any very thoroughgoing conceptual relativism 
would preclude intentional generalizations with any very serious explanatory power […].  
 
From which Fodor concludes that:  
 
Concepts are public: they are the sort of thing that people can, and do, share (Fodor 1998, pp. 28-29). 
 
Setting aside some minor differences, all these arguments seem to have the same 
structure. Before trying to reconstruct that structure in a more perspicuous form, 
however, we must get clearer on what these arguments are trying to establish. What is it 
for two subjects to “share a concept” or “have the same concept”? In particular: is it 
required that the two subjects have two numerically identical concepts C1 and C2, or is it 
only required that they have concepts of the same kind or type? 
Crucially, the answer will depend on the ontology of concepts we choose. Consider 
the two alternatives described in section 2.1: 
 
• Fregean RTM ontology: if concepts are abstract objects which are “expressed” by 
our mental representations, then two distinct subjects can have two numerically 
identical concepts C1 and C2. For instance, I might have a mental representation 
[dog1] expressing concept C1, you might have a mental representation [dog2] 
expressing concept C2, and C1 and C2 might be numerically identical with the abstract 
concept DOG and therefore with each other. 
 
• Non-Fregean RTM ontology: if concepts are mental representations, then (by the 
indiscernibility of identicals) distinct subjects cannot have numerically identical 
concepts (my mental representation [dog] is mine and not yours). But distinct 
subjects could still have type identical concepts, e.g. two token mental 
representations [dog1] and [dog2] belonging to the same type concept DOG78. 
 
In what follows I will leave open whether the publicity constraint, as established by the 
above arguments, requires strict numerical sameness or mere sameness of type79. I will 
therefore assume that both ontologies can account for the kind of “concept sharing” that 
publicity requires by adopting one of the two strategies I just sketched. 
                                                
77 Fodor’s slipping from “concepts” to “contents” in this passage is significant (v. Glock 2009, pp. 23-29), 
but in this context we can ignore it and interpret Fodor as referring to concepts alone. 
78 Cf. Laurence and Margolis (2007, pp. 562-570). 
79 For discussion, v. Rey (2004), Laurence and Margolis (1999, 2007), Glock (2009). 
  66 
We can now try to summarize the common structure of the various publicity 
arguments that were reviewed earlier80:  
 
a) Consider an intentional generalization like: 
 
(G1) If a subject S wants to get water, then other things being equal S will look for 
water81. 
 
(G1) seems to “apply” to many subjects. There are several intentional agents who 
satisfy its antecedent, i.e. who all want to get water. And, if other things are equal (they 
are not paralyzed, they do not have any overriding desires and so on), these agents will 
look for water. Such agents are therefore “covered” by (G1), which “applies” to all of 
them82. 
 
b) Since these agents all satisfy (G1)’s antecedent, they must all satisfy the attitude 
ascription embedded in it: “S wants to get water” must be true of all of them. 
 
c) So these agents presumably have a propositional attitude in common, namely the 
desire to get water. If they didn’t all have this desire, the ascription would not be 
true of them.  
 
d) But, according to RTM (I), someone has a propositional attitude pa with content P 
just in case he/she stands in an appropriate functional relation to a mental 
representation expressing P. In our case, the relevant mental representation is 
presumably something like [I get water], so all the agents to which (G1) applies and 
who share the desire to get water will stand in the desire-relation to the mental 
representation in question. 
 
e) Finally, it follows from RTM (II) that the concept WATER is one of the constituents 
of the mental representation [I get water]. But then all the agents who stand in the 
desire-relation to [I get water] must have the concept WATER. If they didn’t, how 
could they all stand in the desire-relation to a mental representation that is partially 
constituted by that concept? 
 
f) Conclusion: all the agents to which (G1) applies have the same concept WATER 
(equivalently: they “share” WATER or have the concept WATER “in common”). 
                                                
80 For the time being, I prefer to follow the RTM theorists quoted above and state the argument in a 
relatively informal fashion. We will re-assess the argument more carefully in sect. 4 infra. 
81 V. Appendix B for a list of numbered sentences for chs. 2-3. 
82 In fact, things are a bit more complicated: sometimes a generalization applies to a subject even if that 
subject doesn’t satisfy its antecedent. We can ignore this complication for now: v. ch. 3, sect. 2.1 (fn. 
115) for discussion. 
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We can now generalize from our example to a broader principle. Let’s say that a 
concept C is “involved” in an intentional generalization when its possession is required 
for the generalization to apply to someone (like having WATER is required for (G1) to 
apply to a subject). Then our (a)-(f) argument seems to establish the following principle: 
 
Publicity (PUB): For every intentional generalization G, there is a concept C 
“involved” in G, such that G applies to a group of subjects only if these subjects all 
have C. 
 
(Where, remember, we are leaving open whether the subjects to which G applies are 
required to have the very same concept C, i.e. numerically identical concepts, or simply 
concepts belonging to the same type C).  
Crucially, note that intentional generalizations apply to the same subject at different 
times, as well as different subjects. For instance, (G1) applies to my current time-slice at 
time t1, as well as my future time-slice at t2. So it follows from (PUB) that concepts are 
routinely shared not only by different subjects, but also by different time-slices of the 
same person. (For this reason, I will use the phrase “different subjects” to cover 
different people as well as different time-slices of the same person). 
 
2.3 . Publicity And Holism 
 
Why does publicity matter? Among other things, because it can be used to argue 
against certain theories of concepts. In particular, the principle has been frequently used 
by “conceptual atomists” like Fodor against holistic versions of Inferential Role 
Semantics (IRS). Following Fodor83, I will define an IRS (or “inferentialist”) theory of 
concepts as one that holds the following two theses regarding the conditions for concept 
individuation and possession84: 
 
• Concept individuation (IRS): a concept is partially individuated by its inferential 
role: two concepts C1-C2 are the same concept only if they have the same inferential 
role85. 
                                                
83 V. Fodor (1998, pp. 13-14 and 35); Fodor (2004, pp. 32-34). I prefer “Inferential Role Semantics” to 
the potentially misleading label “Concept Pragmatism”, which Fodor has been employing in recent years. 
Reasons to prefer the former are well summarized by Weiskopf and Bechtel (2004, pp. 48-49) and Glock 
(2009, p. 6, fn. 2).  
84 Several authors have defended versions of IRS: v. among others Block (1993, 1998), Harman (1999), 
Peacocke (1992, 2007), Prinz (2002), Rey (1983, 1985, 2005), Schneider (2011), Weiskopf (2009a). 
85 Notice that this leaves open whether concepts are entirely individuated by their inferential role. For 
instance, an IRS theorist could hold that concepts are individuated by inferential role plus reference, so 
that sameness of reference is also required for two concepts to be the same concept. I will not discuss the 
issue here, since what matters for our purposes is the partial individuation claim. V. Schneider (2009 a,b) 
for discussion. 
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• Concept possession (IRS): having a concept requires having certain specific 
inferential dispositions: a subject S has a concept C only if he has some mental 
representation with the same inferential role as C. 
 
For instance: it follows from the individuation claim that my concept DOG1 and your 
concept DOG2 are the same concept only if they have the same inferential role; and it 
follows from the possession claim that I have the concept DOG only if I have some 
mental representation C that has the same inferential role as the concept DOG. (As usual, 
the two claims are closely connected: if concepts are partially individuated by their 
inferential role, then I can only have concept C if I have some mental representation that 
has C’s role).  
It is of course crucial for any IRS theory to give some account of what the 
inferential role of a concept is. But different versions of IRS will spell out the notion in 
very different ways. In particular, holistic versions of IRS individuate inferential roles 
very finely, while non-holistic ones individuate them more coarsely. So we can say that 
all IRS views agree on the two claims above, but diverge on how to construe inferential 
roles. 
A holistic IRS theory (from now on, simply “holism”) can be defined as the 
conjunction of the following theses86: 
 
• Concept individuation (IRS) plus concept possession (IRS) plus: 
 
• Holistic definition of inferential roles: the inferential role of a concept C is the set 
of all the inferential connections in which C stands at a time t for a subject S87. 
 
                                                
86 Other definitions of “IRS” and “holism” are no doubt available, but this is the version of the view that I 
am interested in here. 
87 Cf. the formulation of holism given by Susan Schneider: 
 
[…] symbols must be individuated by their computational roles […] (Schneider 2009a, p. 545). 
 
[The Computational Theory of the Mind] requires a theory that types tokens by sameness and 
difference of total computational role, where the total computational role of a symbol is understood 
as the role it plays in the algorithms of a completed cognitive science (ibid., p. 524). 
 
(It must be noted that Schneider's formulation presupposes a non-Fregean ontology for concepts, whereas 
I intend my formulation to be compatible with Fregean views as well. V. also Schneider (2009a, pp. 534-
36; 540; 548) and Schneider (2011)). Cf. also the statement of holism given by Ned Block: 
 
[According to holism] all the inferences in which an expression participates are included in its 
inferential role (Block 1993, p. 39). 
 
(Block also defends a parallel holistic claim at the level of mental representations). 
  69 
What is it for a concept to stand in an inferential connection for a subject at a time? 
Suppose I have a certain concept (call it DOG1) and I am disposed to make certain 
inferences involving that concept at time t. For instance suppose that, since I believe 
that all dogs are animals, I am disposed to infer from X IS A DOG1 to X IS AN ANIMAL at t 
88. We can then say that the concept DOG1 stands in an inferential connection to the 
concept ANIMAL for me at t. Assuming a holistic definition of inferential roles, it will 
then follow that the inference X IS A DOG1 → X IS AN ANIMAL is part of the inferential 
role of my concept DOG1. Combining this consequence with IRS, the result is that my 
concept DOG1 is partially individuated by the inference X IS A DOG1 → X IS AN ANIMAL, 
and that someone can have DOG1 only if he is disposed to infer from X IS A DOG1 to X IS 
AN ANIMAL. 
Holistic IRS views like the one just described have been defended by various 
authors, most notably Ned Block and Susan Schneider89. We are now in a position to 
see how the publicity principle can be used against such views. As Fodor and others 
have argued90, holism entails that two subjects and two time-slices of the same subject 
will almost never have any concepts in common. Suppose for instance that you and I 
have (to put it a bit roughly) very similar beliefs about dogs: we both believe they are 
animals, mammals and so on. We will then respectively have two concepts DOG1 and 
DOG2 with very similar inferential roles. For instance, I will be disposed to infer from X 
IS A DOG1 to X IS AN ANIMAL, just like you are disposed to infer from X IS A DOG2 to X IS 
AN ANIMAL, and so on for all the other properties we ascribe to dogs. But suppose that, 
as it might well happen, I am disposed to infer from X IS A DOG1 to X BELONGS TO THE 
SAME SPECIES AS ANDREA ONOFRI’S PET, while you are not disposed to infer from X IS A 
DOG2 to X BELONGS TO THE SAME SPECIES AS ANDREA ONOFRI’S PET (maybe you just 
don’t know I have a dog as a pet). If holism is true, then my DOG1 and your DOG2 are 
different concepts, since they have different inferential roles at t. Moreover, this will 
also determine a difference in our respective concepts ANIMAL1/ANIMAL2, 
MAMMAL1/MAMMAL2 and so on: these concepts are inferentially related to our respective 
concepts DOG1/DOG2, so they will also have different inferential roles if DOG1 and DOG2 
are different concepts. Under holism, any slight difference in our beliefs will thus 
determine a difference in the concepts involved in those beliefs, as well as all the 
concepts related to them. This means that, in order for one of my concepts to be the 
same as one of your concepts, we must have the same global set of beliefs about the 
world. Clearly, this will almost never happen; nor will different time-slices of the same 
subject ever have the same beliefs, since people change their mind across time. Holism 
is therefore clearly incompatible with a principle like (PUB), since it entails that two 
                                                
88 Recall that expressions in small capitals refer to concepts: the expression “DOG1” is thus meant to pick 
out a certain specific concept I possess and use in my inferences and judgments.  
89 V. Block (1993, 1995, 1998) and Schneider (2005, 2009 a,b, 2011); v. also Rupert (2008). Later on, we 
will examine some differences between Block and Schneider’s views. 
90 V. Fodor (1998, p. 29); Fodor and Lepore (1992, pp. 13-16); Laurence and Margolis (2002, pp. 48-49); 
Laurence and Margolis (1999, pp. 48-50); Aydede (2000a, pp. 16-21). 
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subjects (and even two time-slices of the same subject) will almost never have any 
concepts in common. But (PUB) follows from independently plausible RTM principles 
that the holist himself accepts; so, the Fodorian would conclude, holism must simply be 
rejected91. 
 
Before we move on, it will be useful to say a bit more about the notion of “concept 
individuation” in relation to the two ontologies of concepts that were discussed earlier. 
In this section, I have presented theories of concept individuation like IRS and holism; 
but what does it mean to say that a concept C is “individuated” in a certain way, e.g. by 
all its inferential connections? Again, claims about concept individuation will have to be 
interpreted differently depending on the ontology of concepts we adopt: 
 
• On a Fregean ontology, a theory of concept individuation will spell out the identity 
conditions for concepts, where these are identified with abstract objects expressed 
by our mental representations. For instance: claiming that concept C is individuated 
by property F amounts to claiming that a concept CX is identical to C only if CX also 
has F. So suppose we follow the holist and claim that my concept DOG1 is partially 
individuated by its inferential connection to BELONGS TO THE SAME SPECIES AS 
ANDREA ONOFRI’S PET (as well as ANIMAL, MAMMAL etc…). On a Fregean ontology, 
this amounts to the following claim: a mental representation [dog] expresses the 
abstract concept DOG1 only if its owner is disposed to infer from [dog] to [belongs to 
the same species as Andrea Onofri’s pet]. If the subject doesn’t have such an 
inferential disposition, then that mental representation does not express DOG1, but a 
numerically distinct concept DOG2: this is because, again, DOG1 is partially 
individuated by its connection to BELONGS TO THE SAME SPECIES AS ANDREA 
ONOFRI’S PET.  
 
• On a non-Fregean ontology, a theory of concept individuation will spell out the 
typing conditions for concepts, where these are identified with concrete mental 
representations. For instance: claiming that concept C is individuated by property F 
amounts to claiming that two token concepts C1-C2 will both belong to type concept 
C only if they both have F. We will then interpret a holistic theory of concept 
individuation in the following terms: your token concept DOG2 belongs to the same 
type concept DOG as my token concept DOG1 only if those two token concepts stand 
in the very same inferential connections. For instance, since I am disposed to infer 
                                                
91 Fodor’s anti-holistic argument also plays an essential role in his more general attack on IRS: if holism 
is incompatible with publicity, then IRS must be rejected altogether, for non-holistic IRS views are 
affected by equally fatal problems. This makes it even more important to carefully assess Fodor’s 
publicity argument against holism (although Fodor also has further anti-holistic objections; v. especially 
the compositionality arguments in Fodor and Lepore 2002, chs. 1-2). For a good reconstruction of 
Fodor’s “master argument” against IRS, v. Prinz and Clark (2004, pp. 59-60); v. also Fodor (2004, pp. 
34-39) and Fodor (2008, ch. 2).  
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from DOG1 to BELONGS TO THE SAME SPECIES AS ANDREA ONOFRI’S PET, you must 
also have that inferential disposition in order for our two concepts to belong to the 
same type. 
 
This brief overview shows how a theory of concept individuation can always be cast in 
terms that would be acceptable on both of our ontologies. For this reason, I will often 
discuss theories of concept individuation in very general terms, without declining them 
in their Fregean/non-Fregean versions unless it’s necessary. This will considerably 
simplify our discussion: for more details about how to construe Fregean and non-
Fregean versions of a theory of concept individuation, I ask the reader to wait until 
chapter 3 (sect. 4.1), chapter 4 (sect. 3) and chapter 5, where the topic will be 
extensively discussed. 
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3. Two Failed Holistic Responses 
 
3.1 . Fundamental Generalizations? 
 
In this section I discuss and reject two strategies that have been proposed to defend 
holism from publicity-based arguments. The first one is suggested by Block (1998). 
Block grants that, if concepts are holistically individuated, then no two subjects will 
ever be in the same mental state, but he denies that this should lead us to reject holism: 
Fodor and LePore (1992) object to holistic accounts of mental content on the ground that they would 
preclude psychological laws, for example: the belief that one is in immediate danger causes release 
of adrenalin. According to holism, there is no such thing as “the” belief that one is in immediate 
danger because the belief that you designate in this way is not quite the same as the belief that I 
designate in this way. Beliefs are too fine grained to be referred to in this way. One strategy for 
dealing with this issue is to observe that many candidate psychological laws can generalize about 
contents without actually specifying them. Consider this candidate for a law: For any action a and 
any goal g, if one wants g and also believes that a is required for g, then one will try to do a. This is a 
universally quantified law (because of the role of “any”), albeit a trivial one. Universally quantified 
laws are a good scientific bet, and these can involve holistic content. By quantifying over goals, one 
can state laws without committing oneself to two agents ever having exactly the same goal. The point 
just made says that the holist can allow one kind of psychological law (the quantified kind) but not 
another (the kind that mentions specific contents such as the belief that one is in danger). But the 
holist may go further, arguing that there is something wrong with the putative laws of specific 
contents. The point is that “The belief that one is in immediate danger causes release of adrenalin” 
stands to psychological law as “Large slippery rocks on mountain-tops can damage cars on roads 
below”, stands to physical law. Laws should quantify over such specific items, not mention them 
explicitly. 
Let’s try to develop the suggestion. Consider a standard psychological generalization: 
 
G2) If a subject S wants to get water and believes that if she opens the fridge she 
will get water, then other things being equal S will open the fridge. 
 
(G2) simply seems to be a specific instance of the more general: 
 
G) If a subject S wants P and believes that if she performs action a then P, then 
other things being equal S will perform action a92. 
 
We can see this by noticing that, no matter how we replace the contents of the attitudes 
to which (G2) makes reference, we still get a true generalization: 
 
                                                
92 I prefer (G) to the generalization suggested by Block since it conforms to other examples used in this 
chapter. 
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G3) If a subject S wants to get [orange juice] and believes that if she opens the 
fridge she will get [orange juice], then other things being equal S will open the 
fridge.  
 
We can also change the contents more radically: 
 
G4) If a subject S wants to [annoy x] and believes that [if she opens the fridge she 
will annoy x], then other things being equal S will open the fridge. 
 
Generalizations (G2)-(G4) seem equally true, predictive and explanatory. Presumably, 
this is because they are mere consequences of a more fundamental law of intentional 
psychology, namely (G). So (G) is at the very least a perfectly acceptable intentional 
generalization. This seems to spell trouble for the publicity principle. (G) is an 
interpersonally applicable generalization par excellence: indeed, it is so general that it 
seems to apply to all the subjects who are covered by the laws of intentional 
psychology. And yet, (G) doesn’t require the subjects it covers to share any specific 
propositional attitude. Two subjects S1-S2 will both satisfy (G)’s antecedent, even if one 
of them only has a desire to get water and the other only has a desire to get juice. So two 
subjects could both fall under the generalization even if they didn’t have any 
propositional attitudes in common. A fortiori, (G) doesn’t require the subjects it covers 
to share any specific concepts, since no specific attitudes are required in order to fall 
under the generalization. Contra (PUB), then, (G) is an interpersonally applicable 
generalization which does not “involve” any particular concept C. If so, then we have a 
perfectly acceptable generalization which doesn’t require the subjects it covers to share 
any concepts at all93.  
 
There are several problems with this response to publicity arguments: 
 
Problem n.1: The defender of publicity might argue that even “fundamental” laws of 
intentional psychology like (G) require the shareability of some concepts. After all, the 
subjects to which (G) applies must still be able to have beliefs whose content has the 
form: if I perform action a then P. But, arguably, these subjects could not have such 
beliefs if they didn’t have the concept of a conditional and the concept of an action. So 
the shareability of these concepts will be required for the interpersonal applicability of 
intentional laws like (G), and this is not a constraint that can be satisfied if we assume 
holism. 
                                                
93 Of course, the subjects to which (G) applies must be capable of having a desire that P and a belief that 
if they perform a then P. That is, they must be capable of having some desire and some belief that 
performing a will fulfill that desire. But this simply means that they must be able to form beliefs and 
desires in general, i.e. that they must be creatures capable of having intentional states with propositional 
content. Clearly, this is compatible with holism, which only denies that these subjects could be in the 
same intentional states. 
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Problem n.2: A further problem is that Block’s response might be simply missing the 
point. Block argues that psychological laws like (G) do not require the shareability of 
specific mental states. However, as he explicitly concedes, other intentional 
generalizations (e.g. (G2)) do impose that requirement: like (G), (G2) also applies to a 
large number of subjects, and it could not do so if the specific attitudes mentioned in the 
antecedent (e.g. the desire to get water) were not shareable by all of these subjects. 
Given RTM, this entails that the subjects in question have certain specific concepts (e.g. 
WATER) in common. Since holism precludes this possibility, holism is incompatible 
with the interpersonal applicability of laws like (G2) (even though it might be 
compatible with the interpersonal applicability of more general laws like (G)). 
Block would presumably reply that “specific” generalizations like (G2) cannot be 
accepted as laws of intentional psychology: “[…] there is something wrong with the 
putative laws of specific contents. The point is that ‘The belief that one is in immediate 
danger causes release of adrenalin’ stands to psychological law as ‘Large slippery rocks 
on mountain-tops can damage cars on roads below’, stands to physical law. Laws 
should quantify over such specific items, not mention them explicitly” (Block 1998). 
Block’s claim could be supported further by pointing out that (G2) and the like simply 
follow as direct consequences of the more general (G). Being more fundamental, only 
(G) and other such “unspecific” generalizations qualify as laws of intentional 
psychology: specific generalizations like (G2) simply follow from fundamental ones, so 
they are not genuine laws. 
I don’t think Block’s reply can be made to work. First, it rules out many important 
psychological generalizations such as “If you see the moon as being on the horizon, 
then you will see it as oversized”. If such generalizations are non-nomological, then 
most of the generalizations psychologists attempt to discover are not laws. After all, 
cognitive science is not in the business of stating platitudinous folk-psychological laws 
like (G); it is rather interested in more specific generalizations like the moon illusion. 
This is the kind of generalization cognitive scientists put forward once they have 
gathered the relevant empirical evidence. If the only psychological laws are 
fundamental generalizations like (G), then most of cognitive science is not in the 
business of discovering the laws of human psychology. 
Second, determining whether (G2) does qualify as a law seems simply irrelevant 
here. All that matters is that (G2) is a true generalization which applies to more than one 
subject. If Block grants this much, he will also have to grant that some propositional 
attitudes are shareable, or else no more than one subject would satisfy (G2)’s 
antecedent. So the publicity argument would work even if (G2) was not a law, but 
simply a true and interpersonally applicable generalization. Now, since Block cannot 
deny that the generalization is true, he will have to deny that it applies to more than one 
subject, and hold that only fundamental generalizations like (G) are interpersonally 
applicable: that is, he will have to maintain that no more than one subject can satisfy 
(G2)’s antecedent. But this is a very implausible claim: even though they are more 
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specific than (G), (G2) and the like still seem to apply to several agents, and to have 
antecedents that can be easily satisfied by people like you and me! 
 
Problem n.3: Suppose, however, that we grant Block the implausible claim that (G2) 
and the like only apply to one subject. Even then, a further problem will arise once we 
move from intentional generalizations to intentional explanations. Following the model 
of explanation that most defenders of publicity seem to presuppose, I will assume that 
intentional explanations have a deductive-nomological (DN) structure 94 . A DN 
explanation of an event is a sound deductive argument whose conclusion is a statement 
describing the event in question (the explanandum). A DN explanation will always 
include a nomological premise (a true statement expressing a law) and a set of 
descriptive premises stating the initial conditions from which the explanandum 
originated. An “intentional” explanation will then just be a DN explanation that makes 
reference to intentional states (in our case, propositional attitudes). For example, here is 
a possible intentional explanation of why Mary opened the fridge based on our 
generalization (G2): 
 
Explanation (A) 
 
1) If a subject S wants to get water and believes that if she opens the fridge she will 
get water, then other things being equal S will open the fridge.  
 
2) Mary wants to get water. 
 
3) Mary believes that if she opens the fridge she will get water. 
 
4) Other things are equal. 
 
5) Mary will open the fridge. 
 
Let an “explanation schema” be a DN explanation like (A), where all singular terms 
referring to intentional subjects have been replaced with variables ranging over 
intentional subjects (more precisely, the variables will range over the domain of the 
universal quantifier employed in the nomological premise). For instance, the following 
will be the explanation schema subsuming explanation (A): 
 
                                                
94 Cf. Hempel (1965), Hempel and Oppenheim (1948); v. Woodward (2010) for an overview. The DN 
model is not widely accepted anymore, and several alternative theories have been proposed. However, 
nothing in my argument turns on the details of the model, and my point against Block would also go 
through assuming a different theory of explanation. Moreover, given his emphasis on fundamental laws 
like (G), Block presumably endorses at least some aspects of the DN model, like the principle that laws 
are necessary components of successful explanations. 
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Explanation schema (A) 
 
1) If a subject S wants to get water and believes that if she opens the fridge she will 
get water, then other things being equal S will open the fridge.  
 
2) S wants to get water. 
 
3) S believes that if she opens the fridge she will get water. 
 
4) Other things are equal. 
 
5) S will open the fridge. 
 
Against Block, the defender of publicity might argue that schema (A) is interpersonally 
applicable just like its nomological premise (1) (which, notice, is simply generalization 
(G2)). Suppose Rosie, Janet, Claire etc… also want to get water, believe that if they 
open the fridge they will get water, and open the fridge as a result. By replacing the 
variable “S” in the schema with the names “Rosie”, “Janet”, “Claire”, we will get 
deductive arguments that have the same form as the explanation (A) we used for Mary. 
Since the premises and conclusions of the resulting arguments will be true of the 
subjects in question, each argument will be a sound DN explanation. So explanation 
schema (A) is applicable to all of these subjects, i.e. it is “interpersonally applicable”. 
Of course, the explanations obtained after replacing the variable would not be sound 
unless the subjects in question all satisfied the relevant descriptive premises: the 
arguments obtained from schema (A) will only explain the actions of Mary, Rosie, 
Janet, Claire… if these subjects do want to get water and believe that, if they open their 
respective fridges, they will get water. But if these subjects all want to get water, then 
they have a specific propositional attitude in common, and this is incompatible with 
holism. Therefore, the defender of publicity will conclude, holism is not only 
incompatible with the interpersonal applicability of generalizations like (G2), but also 
with the interpersonal applicability of the explanations based on them.  
Following his usual strategy, Block might be tempted to respond that an argument 
like (A) is not an interpersonally applicable explanation, since it is based on a “specific” 
generalization like (G2) and these generalizations only apply to one subject (v. problem 
n. 2 supra). In fact, Block might go as far as denying that (A) is an explanation at all: if 
(G2) is not a law, but only a true generalization, then (A) does not count as an 
explanation under the DN model. 
Unfortunately for Block, this reply would miss the point: our argument goes through 
even on the DN explanation Block would favor, i.e. one based on fundamental laws of 
psychology like (G). Consider the following, alternative explanation of Mary’s action: 
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Explanation (B) 
 
1) If a subject S wants P and believes that if she performs action a then P, then 
other things being equal S will perform action a [notice this is just law (G)] 
 
2) Mary wants to get water. 
 
3) Mary believes that if she opens the fridge she will get water. 
 
4) Other things are equal. 
 
5) Mary will open the fridge. 
 
The explanation schema for (B) is: 
 
Explanation schema (B) 
 
1) If a subject S wants P and believes that if she performs action a then P, then 
other things being equal S will perform action a. 
 
2) S wants to get water. 
 
3) S believes that if she opens the fridge she will get water. 
 
4) Other things are equal. 
 
5) S will open the fridge. 
 
Like (A), schema (B) is applicable to multiple subjects (Mary, Rosie, Janet, Claire…) 
and can be used to produce sound explanations of their actions. Again, this seems 
incompatible with holism. If the DN arguments obtained by replacing “S” with the 
names of Mary, Rosie etc… are sound, then descriptive premises (2)-(3) are true of all 
these subjects. Therefore, the subjects in question have certain specific propositional 
attitudes in common (e.g. the desire to get water), which is inconsistent with holism. 
This time, however, the response Block used for explanation (A) is unavailable. The 
holist cannot respond: “Schema (B) is not interpersonally applicable because its 
nomological premise (1) isn’t”. Block agrees that fundamental psychological laws like 
(G) apply to multiple subjects, since they don’t make reference to specific mental states. 
Therefore, he cannot respond that the nomological premise of schema (B) is not 
interpersonally applicable. But if schema (B) is interpersonally applicable, the 
corresponding mental states are shareable and holism is false.  
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The only option for Block would be to appeal to the descriptive premises (2)-(3). 
Such premises, he might hold, are “too specific”: they make reference to particular 
propositional attitudes like the desire to get water, whereas an interpersonally applicable 
DN argument should only employ unspecific premises such as “S wants P”. But this 
reply seems even more implausible than the one given in response to problem 2. There, 
Block had to concede that we can’t apply generalizations like (G2) to more than one 
subject; it now turns out that we also can’t use explanations that make reference to 
specific beliefs/desires in order to explain the behavior of multiple subjects! Clearly, 
this claim is even more problematic, as it would rule out most of the DN explanations 
we actually use as non-interpersonally applicable. 
 
Problem n. 4: In fact, the holist’s troubles have a deeper source. Issues with 
generalizations and explanations arise from Block’s concession that (under holism) no 
more than one subject can have a specific attitude pa (e.g. the desire to get water, or the 
belief that dogs bark). Suppose Block is right, and consider the following “schematic 
ascription” (Ds): 
 
(Ds) S believes that dogs bark 
 
(A schematic ascription is simply a propositional attitude ascription (e.g. “Sam believes 
that dogs bark”) where the singular term in subject position has been replaced with a 
variable ranging over intentional subjects). According to Block, holism entails that (Ds) 
can only be true of a specific subject S (say, Gary). Indeed, if Block is right (Ds) will 
only be true of Gary at a specific time t, since people change their inferential 
dispositions across time. To put it more simply: if holism is true, then the predicate 
“believes that dogs bark” only applies to a single time-slice of a specific subject. And 
this is simply incredible. Holism now appears to be in contrast not only with the 
interpersonal applicability of generalizations and explanations, but with our most 
fundamental intuitions about the general applicability of intentional predicates. If 
holism does have this consequence, then it must clearly be rejected; no metaphysical 
view about the nature of propositional attitudes can be correct if it leads to such 
revisionary claims about the semantics of natural language.  
The interpersonal applicability of intentional generalizations/explanations, on which 
anti-holistic arguments have relied, is thus only a manifestation of a deeper problem. 
The real issue is: holism seems to have the unacceptable consequence that attitude 
predicates can only apply to one subject at a certain specific time. In turn, of course, this 
brings about further problematic consequences: no generalization ever has an 
antecedent that is true of more than one subject, and no schematic explanation has 
descriptive premises that are satisfied by more than one agent. Once we see that the 
latter problems have a deeper source, however, we also realize that Block’s solution to 
them is bound to fail: even if Block’s appeal to “fundamental” laws like (G) could help 
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solve the problem of generalizations/explanations, it would still be unable to account for 
the interpersonal applicability of intentional predicates95. 
 
3.2 . The Appeal To Similarity 
 
A different strategy that several holists have found tempting consists in appealing to 
concept similarity rather than concept identity to account for the interpersonal 
applicability of intentional generalizations96. (PUB) requires the subjects to which a 
certain generalization applies to have “the same concept”, i.e. that specific concept 
which is “involved” in the generalization. A holist might reply that a generalization can 
apply to multiple subjects as long as they have concepts which are similar enough: 
sameness of concepts is not required.  
While seemingly intuitive and unproblematic, the appeal to concept similarity raises 
a number of challenges for the holist. First, as Fodor has famously argued, the 
possibility of concept similarity seems to be parasitic on the possibility of concept 
identity; if so, the holist is still in trouble, as concept identity is (almost) impossible if 
concepts are holistically individuated. Fodor’s objection goes along the following 
lines97. Consider the subjects covered by generalization (G1): 
 
(G1) If a subject S wants to get water, then other things being equal S will look for 
water. 
 
Suppose the holist claims that (G1) can apply to all these subjects as long as their 
respective mental representations I GET WATER98, as well as their constituent concepts, 
are similar enough. Our driving question will be: what does the similarity of their 
concepts for water consist in?  
 
First option: Their similarity consists in in the fact that their inferential roles contain 
many identical inferential connections: 
 
 
                                                
95 Susan Schneider has developed a more sophisticated response to publicity arguments, one which 
combines Block’s strategy with her Millian semantics for ascriptions. I will discuss Schneider’s response 
in ch. 3 (sect. 4.2). 
96 V. Block (1998) and Harman (1993, pp. 169-79, quoted by Fodor 1998, p. 30). V. also Laurence and 
Margolis (1999, pp. 49-50) for discussion. 
97 V. for instance Fodor (1998, pp. 29-35). 
98 To simplify the exposition, I switch to small capitals as a notation for mental representations. This is 
not meant to beg the question against the Fregean ontologist; even though I use the same notation for 
concepts and mental representations, I want to leave open whether concepts are expressed by mental 
representations or identical to them. 
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• S1 has WATER1 and is disposed to infer: X IS WATER1 →  X IS LIQUID1, 
TRANSPARENT1, ODORLESS1 … 
• S2 has WATER2 and is disposed to infer: X IS WATER2 →  X IS LIQUID2, 
TRANSPARENT2, ODORLESS2 99… 
 
And so on for all the other subjects. The intuitive idea is that the inferential roles of the 
concepts in question “overlap” enough: they contain many of the same inferential 
connections (as well as some different ones), and this is what accounts for their being 
similar. Unfortunately, as Fodor notes, this option is not available to the holist. 
Assuming holism, S1’s LIQUID1 will be a different concept from S2’s LIQUID2; mutatis 
mutandis for TRANSPARENT, ODORLESS etc… . Therefore, the inferential connection X IS 
WATER1 → X IS LIQUID1 included in WATER1’s inferential role will be different from the 
inferential connection X IS WATER2 → X IS LIQUID2 included in WATER2’s inferential role, 
since they are constituted by different concepts. Or, to put the point differently: the 
holist would now have to give an account of what the identity of these inferential 
connections consists in, and it seems he has no way to do so. For instance, suppose he 
responds that the two inferential connections are the same because the concepts 
WATER1-WATER2, LIQUID1-LIQUID2 involved in them have same reference. If so, then the 
holist must concede that WATER1 is the same concept as WATER2, and LIQUID1 the same 
concept as LIQUID2: this is what makes the inferential connections in which they are 
respectively involved the same connection. But, of course, if WATER1 is the same 
concept as WATER2, and LIQUID1 the same concept as LIQUID2, holism is 
straightforwardly false, since these concepts have different inferential roles. 
 
Second option: Alternatively, the holist could respond that the similarity of water-
concepts consists in the fact that their inferential roles contain many similar inferential 
connections: 
 
•  S1 has WATER1 and is disposed to infer: X IS WATER1 →  X IS LIQUID1, 
TRANSPARENT1, ODORLESS1 … 
• S2 has WATER2 and is disposed to infer: X IS WATER2 →  X IS LIQUID2, 
TRANSPARENT2, ODORLESS2 … 
 
Where, for instance, the inferential connection between X IS WATER1 and X IS LIQUID1 is 
sufficiently similar to the inferential connection between X IS WATER2 and X IS LIQUID2. 
The problem with this strategy, of course, is that it simply seems to launch a regress. 
Our original question will now arise again, but at the level of inferential connections: 
what does the similarity of these two connections consist in? Clearly, the holist cannot 
appeal to the similarity of the concepts involved to answer this question, or he would 
                                                
99 The indexes indicate the subject to which the concepts in question belong.  
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now have to give an account of concept similarity that didn’t appeal to the similarity of 
their connections.  
 
Third option: The most promising strategy, it seems, would be to simply refuse to 
answer our original question and take concept similarity to be primitive. The holist 
cannot be required to give an account of what it is for water-concepts to be similar, 
since it’s impossible to give such an account: roughly speaking, there is nothing their 
similarity consists in, i.e. no other fact to which their being similar can be “reduced”. 
Fodor’s response to this move is: “Sure; but then why not take content identity as 
primitive and stop trying to construe it? In which case, what is semantics for?” (Fodor 
1998, p. 32 fn. 5). It is not clear to me what Fodor has in mind here. In any case, there 
are deeper problems with this response, for the appeal to primitive similarity appears 
entirely ad hoc. Why should we take the similarity of two concepts to be a “fundamental 
fact of the universe” analogous to (say) an electron’s having a certain spin?  
There seem to be two possible ways for the holist to justify his response. First, he 
might adopt an anti-reductionist position about mental representations in general100: just 
like all other facts involving mental representations, the fact that two concepts are 
similar cannot be fully reduced in non-intentional terms. But not only would this reply 
be ad hoc; it would also miss the point, since the holist is allowed to employ intentional 
notions in giving an account of concept similarity. The holist is not being asked to 
provide a reductive account of concept similarity in non-intentional terms. He is only 
being asked to provide some account of what concept similarity amounts to, and he can 
freely help himself to other intentional notions (such as concept identity) if he wants to. 
The problem is not that the holist cannot offer a reductive account of concept similarity, 
but that he cannot offer any non-circular account whatsoever.  
A more promising strategy would be to adopt a metaphysical position on which 
similarity facts were in general irreducible to identity facts. Trope theorists, for 
instance, have argued that the similarity of two tropes t1-t2 cannot be reduced to their 
having some property in common, i.e. to their having the same property F: their being 
similar is a fundamental, primitive fact that cannot be further reduced101. Similarly, one 
might argue that facts about concept similarity cannot be reduced to facts about concept 
identity. It might then be permissible to refuse to answer our original question, just like 
the trope theorist will refuse to give an account of the fact that t1-t2 are similar. 
Regardless of whether this would block Fodor’s objection, however, appealing to a 
controversial metaphysical view in order to save concept holism appears dialectically 
unacceptable in this context. The holist should offer independent reasons for thinking 
trope theory was true before employing it against Fodor’s charge102.  
 
                                                
100 V. e.g. Burge (2010). 
101 V. e.g. Williams (1953). 
102 Indeed, Block (1998) does not take this line and concedes that the holist must offer some account of 
what concept similarity amounts to. 
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There is also a second, more general problem affecting every appeal to concept 
similarity. In a number of ordinary cases, we have no problems saying that two people 
have “the same F”, for some category F to which the object in question belongs. For 
instance: we routinely claim that different people have the same car, the same sweater, 
the same dressing style and so on. We often use these claims to ascribe an identity in 
type or kind to the objects in question: this is what I do if I know that Tim and Susan 
each have a Rolls-Royce Silver Ghost and claim “Tim and Susan have the same car”. 
Sometimes, however, we also use sameness claims to ascribe numerical identity; this is 
what I do if I know that Tim and Susan own one and the same car (suppose they are a 
couple), in which case each subject’s car is numerically identical to the other subject’s 
car. For most classes of objects, both kinds of sameness ascriptions are entirely 
unproblematic; there is no reason to think that they will be systematically false due to 
the peculiar metaphysical nature of cars, sweaters or dressing styles103.  
Clearly, then, the holist who appeals to concept similarity must think that concepts 
are different from most everyday objects. That is, he must think that concepts constitute 
a peculiar ontological kind, such that: 
 
• Different subjects cannot have numerically identical concepts, and any 
ascription of numerically identical concepts to distinct subjects is false. 
• Different subjects cannot even have concepts of the same type or kind; again, 
any ascription of type- or kind-identical concepts to distinct subjects is false. 
 
If the holist’s appeal to concept similarity was correct, all our claims about different 
subjects having “the same concept” would be strictly speaking false; we would only be 
entitled to ascribe similar concepts. But, clearly, this position will only be plausible if 
supported by a suitable metaphysics of concepts, one showing why concepts should 
constitute such a peculiar class of entities. For if concepts are like other kinds of objects, 
it should always be possible to ascribe at least type-identity to them, and perhaps even 
strict numerical identity. Of course, this does not mean that two concepts cannot be 
similar: just like other kinds of objects, they will be (more or less) similar when they 
have a certain number of properties in common (reference, inferential connections 
etc…). But then, as with other objects, their similarity will consist in their having many 
of the same properties104. And if two concepts have the same property F, then there will 
be at least one type to which they both belong, i.e. the type including all and only the 
Fs: that is, they will be type-identical105.  
                                                
103 One might object that two subjects cannot have numerically identical dressing styles. This will depend 
on one’s metaphysics of styles, and in any case it will still be possible for different subjects to have type-
identical styles. 
104 Unless the holist adopts a trope theory for all classes of objects, an option I have already rejected. 
105 There are some complications having to with the type-token taxonomy here; v. ch. 3 (sect. 4.1) for 
discussion.  
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I conclude that, unless the holist has some specific metaphysical reasons to think 
that both numerical identity and type-identity are impossible between concepts, his 
claim that ordinary subjects only have similar concepts will be clearly unacceptable. At 
the very least, if two subjects have similar concepts there will be one type to which the 
two concepts both belong, in which case we can truly claim that they have “the same 
concept” (in the type-identity sense). Together with Fodor’s objection, this shows that 
the holist’s appeal to concept similarity is not a successful reply to the argument from 
publicity106. 
                                                
106 Later on (ch. 3, sect. 4.1), I will discuss a possible construal of the appeal to similarity which I find 
more convincing. However, a lot more background is needed before introducing this version of the 
strategy, so I ask the reader to wait until then. 
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4. Back To Publicity 
 
In this section I will consider a different strategy that the holist might employ to 
deal with publicity-based objections. The strategy consists in rejecting the argument 
from psychological generalizations as invalid. This possibility is often obscured by 
standard formulations of the argument, which never specify its assumptions in a 
sufficiently precise way (as the reader can confirm by looking back at the quotes in sect. 
2.2). Partly for this reason, the issue doesn’t seem to have been acknowledged in the 
literature. This is unfortunate, not just because a possible defense of holism has been 
overlooked as a result, but especially because the issue is important in and of itself. As 
we will see later, the argument from psychological generalizations seems to rest on a 
highly controversial interpretation of RTM, and it is all but clear whether we should 
accept that version of the view. This will leave our main question unanswered: does the 
interpersonal applicability of psychological generalizations require intentional subjects 
to have the same concepts? In the next chapter, I will try to provide a new answer to this 
question by taking a slightly different perspective on the issue. 
 
Let us briefly restate the argument for publicity considered in section 2.2 in a more 
general form: 
 
a) An intentional generalization G “applies” to several subjects: that is, there are many 
intentional agents who satisfy its antecedent and consequent (when other things are 
equal). 
 
b) The antecedent and/or consequent of an intentional generalization G embeds a 
schematic attitude ascription: this is what makes the generalization intentional. (For 
instance, (G1) embeds the schematic ascription “S wants to get water”). So the 
agents to which G applies must satisfy the ascription in question: if “A” is the 
relevant propositional attitude verb, then “S As that P” will be true of all the subjects 
to which G applies. (For instance, “S wants to get water” is true of all the subjects 
covered by (G1)). 
 
c) Since the ascription “S As that P” is true of all the subjects to which G applies, these 
subjects must all have the corresponding propositional attitude pa; if they didn’t, the 
ascription would not be true of them. For instance, since “S wants to get water” is 
true of all the subjects to which (G1) applies, all these subjects must have the desire 
to get water. 
 
d) But, according to RTM (I), someone has a propositional attitude pa with content P 
just in case he stands in an appropriate functional relation to a mental 
representation r expressing P. Therefore, all the subjects who have the same 
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propositional attitude pa must also stand in the appropriate functional relation to the 
same mental representation r107. For instance: all the agents who share the desire to 
get water must also stand in the desire-relation to the same mental representation I 
GET WATER. 
 
e) Finally, it follows from RTM (II) that our mental representation r is constituted by a 
set of concepts [C1, C2… Cn]. For instance: the concept WATER is one of the 
constituents of the mental representation I GET WATER. But then all the agents who 
stand in a functional relation to r must have [C1, C2… Cn], since the mental 
representation in question is constituted by these concepts. 
 
f) Conclusion: all the agents to which G applies have [C1, C2… Cn]. So, for every 
intentional generalization G, there will be a concept C “involved” in G, i.e. some 
concept C such that all the subjects to which G applies have C; which is just what 
(PUB) amounts to.  
 
Having summarized the standard publicity argument in a more general form, we can see 
more easily what might be wrong with it. The problem, a holist could argue, is that (d) 
does not seem to follow from (c) plus RTM (I). A holist will grant that, by RTM (I), 
someone has a propositional attitude pa with content P just in case he stands in an 
appropriate functional relation to a mental representation expressing P. He could deny, 
however, that all the subjects who have pa must also stand in an appropriate functional 
relation to the same mental representation r expressing P. For suppose there are (at 
least) two different mental representations r* and r** expressing P: I could then have pa 
in virtue of being related to r*, while you have pa in virtue of being related to r**. We 
would then have the same propositional attitude by being related to different mental 
representations. Going back to our example, the subjects to which (G1) applies might 
have the desire to get water in virtue of standing in the desire-relation to different 
mental representations expressing the same proposition I get water. I might have that 
desire by being desire-related to [I GET WATER]*, while you have it by being related to a 
different mental representation [I GET WATER]**, where both representations express the 
same proposition I get water108.  
In sum, a holist could hold the following: mental representations and their 
constituent concepts are not shareable, but this is compatible with propositional 
attitudes being shared. The same attitude can be had in virtue of having different mental 
representations and different concepts. This would block all the objections discussed in 
previous sections: the claim that concepts are holistically individuated would be 
                                                
107 As you might have guessed, the italicized part will be important later. 
108 Arguably, the proposition expressed is not the same in this case, since our respective indexical 
concepts will pick out different individuals. To avoid this complication, the reader should feel free to use 
an example involving non-indexical concepts (e.g. one involving the mental representation DOGS BARK). I 
use the water example to follow Fodor (1998). 
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compatible with the interpersonal applicability of intentional generalizations, 
explanations and ascriptions. For instance, holism would be compatible with the fact 
that multiple subjects have the desire to get water, and with the fact that the schematic 
ascription “S wants to get water” is true of more than one agent. Of course, the holist 
would still have to deny that different thinkers can have the same concept WATER; that 
is, he would still have to reject the publicity of concepts. But why would that be a 
problem, if sameness of concepts is not required in order for an intentional 
generalization to apply to multiple subjects 109,110? 
                                                
109 Notice that analogous worries arise for the other publicity arguments sketched in section 2.2: 
 
• One could grant that different subjects can have the same desires, beliefs and so on, while denying 
that this requires them to have the same mental representations; they might simply have the same 
attitude by standing in the right functional relation to different representations.  
• Similarly, one could hold that successful communication does not require different subjects to 
entertain the same mental representation, but only the same proposition. 
• Finally, one could hold that genuine agreement does require having the same belief, but deny that 
this also requires accepting the same mental representation.   
 
Now, the next chapter will largely be an attempt to provide a different version of the psychological 
generalizations argument for publicity. As the reader will note, it’s not clear whether the same strategy 
could also be used to “patch” the arguments above. While I do think there are interesting analogies 
between the two kinds of arguments that could be exploited for this purpose, I will not discuss them here 
(although I plan to do so in future work). We will however go back to the other publicity arguments in 
chapter 4 (sect. 1), where they will play an important role in our discussion.  
110 There is a complication with the holistic strategy. Suppose you endorse a Fregean ontology of 
concepts and a holistic theory of concept individuation/possession. Then, it seems, the reply I just 
described would not be available. On a Fregean ontology, concepts are the constituents of the 
propositions expressed by our mental representations. Now, by RTM (I) two subjects can only have a 
propositional attitude pa with propositional content P if they have a mental representation expressing P; 
but then, assuming a Fregean ontology, they will also have the concepts [C1, C2, … Cn] constituting P, 
since these are the constituents of the proposition in question. For instance: two subjects will not stand in 
the desire-relation to the same proposition I get water unless they both have the concept WATER, which is 
among the constituents of that proposition.  
Now, I do not know of any holists who endorse a Fregean ontology of concepts, but I think it would be 
easy to rephrase the strategy suggested in the main text in terms that would be acceptable for them. To do 
so, our Fregean holist would just have to replace RTM (I) with the weaker RTM (I)*: 
 
RTM (I)*: A subject S has a propositional attitude pa with Russellian propositional content P just in 
case S stands in an appropriate functional relation to an internal mental representation r expressing P. 
 
(Where, recall, a Russellian proposition is an ordered pair <x, is F> consisting of an object x and a 
property F). Assuming RTM (I)* instead of RTM (I), it’s open to our Fregean holist to hold that different 
subjects can have the same propositional attitude without having the same concepts. Under RTM (I)*, 
two subjects can have the same attitude as long as they are related to the same Russellian proposition, 
even if they have different concepts (e.g. different Fregean senses) for each constituent of that 
proposition. To simplify the discussion, I will simply assume that holists with Fregean sympathies will 
endorse RTM (I)* instead of RTM (I) as long as they want to employ the strategy suggested in the main 
text. 
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What, then, is needed to make the argument for publicity valid and effective against 
the holist? Here are two principles that the defender of publicity might add as premises 
to his argument in order to make it valid (the list is not meant to be exhaustive, but these 
seem to be the most obvious candidates): 
 
Additional Premise n. 1: Different mental representations never express the same 
proposition. 
 
This premise entails that, for any proposition P, there is at most one mental 
representation r expressing P. So, whenever two subjects have the same attitude pa with 
propositional content P, they must both stand in an appropriate functional relation to r. 
But then, since concepts are the constituents of mental representations, these subjects 
will also have to share the concepts which constitute r. 
Alternatively, we could establish publicity by appealing to: 
 
Additional Premise n. 2: For every propositional attitude pa with propositional 
content P, there is a unique mental representation r such that r expresses P and a 
subject S has pa iff S stands in an appropriate functional relation to r.  
 
This premise is, in fact, a stronger version of RTM (I). It holds that, in order to have a 
certain attitude pa with content P, one must be related to a certain specific 
representation r: it’s not enough to be related to some representation or other expressing 
P. Again, it will then follow from RTM (II) that, whenever two subjects share pa, they 
must also share the concepts which constitute that unique representation r which is 
required in order to have pa111. 
Here I will not try to determine whether the above premises are true or not. On the 
face of it, justifying their acceptance seems no easier than providing an argument for 
publicity itself. Let me briefly mention a few difficulties that might arise: 
 
• To justify n.1, the defender of publicity would have to commit to a specific view 
concerning the semantics of mental representations, one on which different 
representations never express the same proposition. (Interestingly, the view in 
question would not be an option for Fodor. Fodor holds that the semantic content of 
mental representations reduces to their referential content, so that CICERO IS 
BALD/TULLY IS BALD are different mental representations expressing the same 
proposition112). 
 
                                                
111 Premise n. 2 would follow from premise n. 1 + RTM (I). However, an RTM theorist might want to 
endorse n. 2 not because he also endorses n. 1, but for independent reasons. 
112 V. Fodor (1998, p. 39). V. chs. 4-5 for discussion of Fodor’s view. 
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• It’s even less clear what kind of argument could be provided for n. 2. Moreover, 
endorsing n. 2 would force one to specify, in a principled way, what particular 
mental representation is required in order to have a given attitude. For instance: 
among all the mental representations expressing the proposition dogs bark, which 
one is required in order to have attitudes about that proposition? What special 
features does it have, which make it distinct from other representations with that 
content? 
 
Clearly, settling the status of these two premises would be no easier than settling the 
status of the publicity principle itself. If so, the holist has a clear dialectical advantage: 
his opponent will have to do a lot more work before having a sound anti-holistic 
argument based on publicity. More importantly, however, we seem to have reached a 
stalemate regarding our original question: does the interpersonal applicability of 
intentional generalizations really require concepts to be public?  
In the next chapter, I will consider an alternative way to answer this question. 
Instead of trying to patch the old publicity argument, I will offer a new version of it, one 
that does not rely on any of the controversial premises above. My defense of publicity 
will be based on the non-Millian, contextualist semantics for ascriptions which I began 
to defend in chapter 1. As we will see, that semantics does require the subjects covered 
by an intentional generalization to have certain specific concepts in common. Our main 
task will then be to spell out more precisely what kind of publicity principle is 
established by our semantics, and what consequences this will have vis-à-vis holistic 
theories of concepts. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Publicity, Contextualist-Style 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will argue for two main theses. The first one is that our best semantics 
for attitude reports entails a version of the publicity principle: assuming that semantics, 
if a generalization G applies to a group of subjects then there is a specific concept C 
such that the subjects covered by G must all have C. I will start (sect. 2.1) by developing 
further the semantics for reports I began to defend in chapter 1. There, I argued that a 
theory of attitude ascriptions should satisfy two main desiderata: it should take into 
account the context-sensitivity of reports, and it should be non-Millian. I will then 
describe a family of contextualist theories that were specifically designed to meet such 
desiderata (sect. 2.2), moving on to consider their implications in section 3. There, I 
will show how contextualism entails a version of the publicity principle and spell out 
more precisely what that principle amounts to. 
In section 4 I will turn to my second thesis: our new publicity principle is still 
incompatible with holism, but we can modify standard holistic views so as to make 
them consistent with the principle (sect. 4.1). This will require weakening some of the 
holist’s original claims, thus raising the question of whether such “watered down” 
holism would still be a form of holism worth having. (I will defend a positive answer to 
this question in the next two chapters (chs. 4-5)). I will then conclude (sect. 4.2) by 
rejecting an alternative holistic strategy recently proposed by Susan Schneider, which 
consists in appealing to a Millian semantics for generalizations in order to reject the 
publicity principle.  
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2. Intentional Generalizations And The Semantics Of Reports  
 
2.1 . Two Morals 
 
An important point that has too often been ignored in the literature on intentional 
generalizations is that they are sentences in a language113. As such, they have a semantic 
content which is compositionally constructed from that of their constituents. Among the 
constituents of an intentional generalization, we will of course find a (schematic) 
propositional attitude ascription: this is what makes the generalization intentional114. 
For instance, our generalization (G1) (”If a subject S wants to get water, then other 
things being equal S will look for water”) embeds the schematic ascription “S wants to 
get water” in its antecedent. Now, if a true generalization “applies” to a group of 
subjects, those subjects will satisfy its antecedent (and its consequent, if other things are 
equal). When this happens, the schematic ascription embedded in the antecedent will be 
true of such subjects. For instance: the subjects to which (G1) applies all satisfy (G1)’s 
antecedent, which means that the schematic ascription “S wants to get water” is true of 
all of them. So: a generalization applies to a group of subjects only if the ascriptions 
embedded in its antecedent/consequent are true of the subjects in the group115. 
This seemingly obvious fact has an important consequence: the conditions for 
interpersonal applicability of intentional generalizations depend on the truth-conditions 
of attitude ascriptions. For instance: if the truth-conditions of a certain schematic 
ascription “S believes that P” are such that it is not true of more than one subject at a 
specific time, then a generalization embedding that ascription will only apply to that 
subject at that time116. So, once we know what’s required for an ascription to be true of 
                                                
113 In fact, this problem affects the literature on ceteris paribus generalizations in general; v. Carroll 
(2010). Schneider (2005, 2011) is a notable exception; my approach has been partially inspired by her 
attempt to use a Millian semantics for generalizations in order to defend holism (v. sect. 4.2 infra).  
114 Some intentional generalizations might involve non-propositional mental states, but they can be 
ignored here. 
115 There is a complication: the generalization “If a subject S believes that she is going to be attacked by a 
bear, then other things being equal S will be scared” applies to me, even though I have never satisfied the 
antecedent. Notice, however, that I would satisfy the antecedent if I was in the appropriate circumstances 
(e.g. if I happened to see a bear rushing angrily towards me); similarly, other intentional subjects will also 
satisfy the antecedent when they happen to be in those circumstances. We could therefore say that the 
generalization is “applicable” to all these subjects, since the ascription in the antecedent would be true of 
them under certain conditions. Consequently, notice that if a theory (e.g. holism) entails that these 
subjects would not satisfy the antecedent under those conditions (e.g. because only one subject at a time 
can have the relevant belief), that theory is ipso facto false. The gist of our discussion of holism in the 
previous chapter is therefore untouched by this complication; in what follows, I propose to ignore this 
problem whenever possible in order to make the discussion smoother. 
116 Everything I say here also applies, mutatis mutandis, to intentional explanations. For instance: if the 
truth-conditions of a certain schematic ascription are such that it is not true of more than one subject at a 
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a subject, we will also know more about what’s required for a generalization embedding 
that ascription to apply to multiple subjects; establishing the truth conditions of attitude 
reports can help us establish the conditions that must be satisfied for a generalization to 
cover a group of agents. Suppose for instance that, according to our best semantics for 
reports, a certain schematic ascription (A) cannot be true of someone who doesn’t have 
a certain specific concept C; we can then conclude that a generalization embedding (A) 
will not apply to a group of subjects unless they all have C. So choosing a theory of 
attitude ascriptions might enable us to answer the question that was left unanswered at 
the end of the last chapter: does the interpersonal applicability of intentional 
generalizations require concepts to be shared? Let us, then, go back to attitude 
ascriptions and their semantics to see whether this can help us solve the problem of 
publicity. 
 
Two important morals can be drawn from our discussion in chapter 1. The first one 
is that, in many contexts, utterances of attitude ascriptions will encode information not 
only about the Russellian proposition believed by the subject, but also about the “way” 
in which the subject believes that proposition. The second one, which I will soon 
develop in more detail, is that the truth conditions of attitude reports vary with context. 
These two morals will (hopefully) provide the key to solve our problem. 
Let’s start by focusing on the first moral, which is simply the conclusion of my 
arguments against Millianism. According to the Millian, a belief report of the form “S 
believes that P” is true iff S stands in the BEL-relation to the Russellian proposition 
expressed by “that P” in some way w117. If w1 and w2 are two possible ways of believing 
P, it is irrelevant for the truth of the report whether S believes P through w1 or w2. For 
instance: the report “Lois believes that Clark can fly” is true of Lois, since she stands in 
the BEL-relation to SUPERMAN CAN FLY and this mental representation expresses the 
Russellian proposition <Superman, can fly>118. The fact that Lois does not stand in the 
BEL-relation to CLARK CAN FLY does not affect the truth-value of the ascription. If 
Millianism is true, then (for any report of the form “S believes that P”) the way in which 
S believes the Russellian proposition expressed by “that P” is irrelevant for the truth of 
the report itself.  
Now, I have argued that a Millian semantics will be unable to explain our intuitions 
about attitude ascriptions; moreover, it will also be unable to account for the role that 
intentional generalizations have to play in our everyday explanations/predictions of 
behavior. The failure of Millianism gives us reason to think that, on our best theory of 
attitude reports, the way in which the subject of the report does/does not believe119 the 
                                                                                                                                          
time, then an explanation schema having that ascription as one of its premises will only apply to that 
subject at that time (v. ch. 2, sect. 3.1 for more details about explanation schemas). 
117 Cf. my summary of Salmon’s account in ch. 1 (sect. 2.2). 
118 Note that, of course, this proposition is identical to the Russellian proposition <Clark, can fly>. 
119 I will henceforth focus on belief ascriptions and assume that everything I say about them will also hold 
for ascriptions of desires, intentions, etc... . 
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relevant Russellian proposition should be relevant for the truth of the report itself. 
Reports do not just encode the information that S believes a certain Russellian 
proposition in some way or other; they also tell us something about the specific way in 
which S believes that proposition (in at least a significant number of contexts).  
Now, there are at least two ways to think of ways of believing. Ways might be 
identified with mental representations, e.g. with LoT sentences to which we stand in the 
belief-relation and through which we believe the relevant propositions120. If the anti-
Millian adopts this construal, he will take the truth of “Lois believes that Clark can fly” 
to depend on what mental representation Lois uses when she believes <Superman, can 
fly>. Ways might also be identified with Fregean senses, e.g. with Fregean propositions 
constituted by Fregean senses picking out the constituents of the relevant Russellian 
proposition. If the anti-Millian adopts this construal, he will take the truth of “Lois 
believes that Clark can fly” to depend on the Fregean senses under which Lois believes 
<Superman, can fly> (more specifically, on whether she ascribes the property of being 
able to fly to Superman/Clark under the sense Superman or under the sense Clark). 
The differences between these possible construals do not matter much for our 
purposes. No matter how we decide to think of ways, the first moral from chapter 1 can 
be summarized as follows: 
 
First moral: In at least some contexts, the truth-value of an utterance u of an 
ascription “S believes that P” will depend on whether S believes the Russellian 
proposition expressed by “that P” and on the concepts under which S believes that 
proposition. 
 
This should be acceptable for both the non-Millian theorists I just described121. The 
non-Fregean will identify concepts with mental representations (e.g. with LoT 
symbols): he will then hold that the truth of “Lois believes that Clark can fly” depends 
on whether she believes <Superman, can fly> under the concept/mental representation 
SUPERMAN or under the concept/mental representation CLARK. The Fregean, on the other 
hand, will identify concepts with Fregean senses; he will then hold that the truth of 
“Lois believes that Clark can fly” depends on whether she believes <Superman, can 
fly> under the concept/sense Superman or under the concept/sense Clark.  
On both views, concepts will be relevant for the truth-conditions of attitude reports. 
Clearly, this is straightforwardly inconsistent with Millianism. Our first moral shows 
that the satisfaction conditions of a report are stricter than the Millian thinks. It’s not 
enough for a subject to believe the relevant Russellian proposition under any old 
concept; he must also believe that proposition under a concept satisfying certain specific 
                                                
120 This was the view defended by Braun. It is also (roughly) the view of non-Millians such as Crimmins 
and Perry (1989) or Richard (1990) (more on this soon).  
121 Crimmins and Perry (1989, p. 710) make a similar point; v. also Sainsbury (2010). 
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requirements. Predictably, then, non-Millian views will also yield stricter applicability 
conditions for intentional generalizations. To see why, consider the report122: 
 
(L) Lois believes that Clark can fly. 
 
(I will refer to this sentence as “(L)” throughout). Suppose that the non-Millian truth-
conditions for (L) are as follows (for the time being, we can ignore the context-
sensitivity of (L); we will go back to this later): 
 
(L) is true iff Lois stands in the belief-relation to the thought CLARK CAN FLY  
 
These truth-conditions make reference to a specific thought and a specific concept 
CLARK which is among the constituents of that thought. The non-Millian might then 
characterize CLARK as follows: “The concept CLARK is that unique concept which: 
 
• Refers to Superman/Clark 
• Is inferentially connected to [IS CALLED “CLARK”, IS SHY, WEARS GLASSES…]123” 
 
Clearly, it follows from our non-Millian truth-conditions that (L) is false: Lois does not 
stand in the belief-relation to any thought consisting of the singular concept CLARK and 
the predicative concept CAN FLY (although she does stand in the belief-relation to 
SUPERMAN CAN FLY). Unlike Millianism, then, this semantics would be able to explain 
our intuition that (L) is false. 
Crucially, our semantics for (L) will have immediate consequences for the 
applicability conditions of certain generalizations. Assuming that semantics, the 
schematic ascription: 
 
(Ls) S believes that Clark can fly 
 
will only be true of subjects who accept the thought CLARK CAN FLY, so only of subjects 
who have the concept CLARK in the first place. Now consider a generalization 
embedding (Ls), such as124: 
 
G5) If a subject S believes that Clark can fly and believes that Clark just jumped off 
a skyscraper, then other things being equal S will not be worried. 
 
                                                
122 This was sentence (4) in ch. 1. 
123 As usual, if a concept C is “inferentially connected” to concepts [F, G, H…], C’s owner must be 
disposed to infer from X IS C to X IS F, G, H… (or, more simply, to accept the thought C IS F, G, H…). 
Whenever a concept C is inferentially connected to a group of concepts, I will put these concepts in 
square brackets.   
124 I follow the order of intentional generalizations from ch. 2. 
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Of course, a subject S won’t satisfy (G5)’s antecedent unless the schematic ascription 
(Ls) is true of him. Assuming our non-Millian semantics for (L)-(Ls), then, (G5) will 
only apply to subjects who accept CLARK CAN FLY, so only to subjects who have the 
concept CLARK. On that semantics, the conditions for interpersonal applicability are 
strict: for a generalization to apply to a group of subjects, these will be required to have 
specific concepts like CLARK. (As the reader will have noted, this is a version of the 
publicity principle; we will go back to this at length in sect. 3 infra). 
Clearly, the conditions for interpersonal applicability would be rather less strict on a 
Millian semantics. Suppose someone doesn’t have the concept CLARK, but only some 
other concept which, while also referring to Superman/Clark, is not inferentially 
connected to [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…]. (Maybe this person only has a 
concept SUPERMAN with the standard “Superman-ish”125 role [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, HAS 
SUPERPOWERS, WEARS A COSTUME...]; he just never heard of “Clark Kent”). While this 
subject obviously cannot accept CLARK CAN FLY, he can still satisfy (G5)’s antecedent 
on a Millian semantics, e.g. if he accepts SUPERMAN CAN FLY. So the conditions for 
interpersonal applicability are looser, since (G5) will also apply to subjects who don’t 
have the concept CLARK at all.  
Notice that this has immediate consequences for holism. If concepts are holistically 
individuated, then no more than one subject can have the concept CLARK; if two subjects 
had the concept in question, they would have to share all their inferential dispositions. 
Assuming a non-Millian semantics, then, holism would entail that (G5) is not 
interpersonally applicable. On a Millian semantics, on the other hand, (G5) will also 
apply to subjects who don’t have CLARK, as long as they believe the Russellian 
proposition <Superman, can fly> under some concept or other. So holism would be 
compatible with interpersonal applicability on a Millian semantics126: it’s bad news for 
the holist that a Millian semantics for generalizations is out at this point.  
 
Having spelled out the consequences that our first “anti-Millian” moral will have for 
the applicability conditions of intentional generalizations, let’s turn to our second moral. 
 
Second moral: The truth conditions of attitude reports vary with context127. 
 
I take our discussion of Millianism to have established that, in several contexts, an 
utterance u of sentence (L) would be false. This, of course, is what our intuitions about 
(L) seem to show, and what our best semantics for ascriptions predicts. At the same 
time, however, there are strong reasons to think that (L) will be true in certain other 
contexts. This point was anticipated in chapter 1 (sect. 5), where we discussed the 
context-sensitivity of reports like “Glenda believes that Bob Dylan has a beautiful 
                                                
125 I borrow the expression from Braun (2001a, p. 99). 
126 Indeed, this is an essential component of Schneider’s defense of holism: v. sect. 4.2 infra for 
criticisms.  
127 Saul 1999a, p. 356.  
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voice” (Saul 1999a). Similar considerations apply to (L). For instance, suppose you 
know nothing about Superman/Clark. I decide to tell you that there is a superhero in 
Metropolis who wears a certain costume, is able to fly and has other amazing 
superpowers. Being enlightened about Clark’s secret identity, I also tell you that this 
person goes by the name “Clark Kent”; however, I don’t tell you that he also goes by 
the name “Superman”. As it happens, no one else informs you about the superhero’s 
two names; moreover, you also remain ignorant about his everyday life as a reporter and 
his attempts to conceal his secret identity. In fact, you are completely unaware of the 
existence of a shy reporter called “Clark Kent”. You are simply left with the 
information I gave you when I first told you about the superhero, and inquire no further 
into the matter. Now suppose you ask me “Does Lois believe that Clark can fly?” and I 
answer: 
 
(L) Lois believes that Clark can fly. 
 
My utterance of (L) seems true in this context, even though Lois would reject both 
“Clark can fly” and (L) itself. After all, you only know about the superhero under the 
name “Clark”, so uttering (L) seems a perfectly acceptable way to communicate to you 
what Lois knows about him128. 
In light of our second moral, the correct semantics for belief reports will be a 
“contextualist” one that can explain how the truth conditions of sentences like (L) vary 
with context: in particular, that semantics must be able to account for all those contexts 
in which (L) appears false, as well as those few contexts in which it appears true. 
Putting together our two morals, then, the account we are looking for is one on which: 
 
a) In at least some contexts, the truth-value of an ascription of the form “S believes 
that P” depends on whether S believes the Russellian proposition expressed by 
“that P” and on the concepts under which S believes that proposition. 
 
b) The truth conditions of attitude reports vary with context. 
 
2.2 . Crimmins’ Theory Of Ascriptions 
 
Several contextualist theories have been proposed in the attempt to satisfy our two 
desiderata, and it would be impossible to examine all of them here129. I have therefore 
decided to focus on the specific contextualist view developed by Mark Crimmins, since 
                                                
128 Further cases are offered by Crimmins and Perry (1989); v. also Kripke’s (1979) “Paderewski” case. If 
you are puzzled by some aspects of the case, note that all I need here is that there be some attitude reports 
whose truth-conditions are context-dependent. (The details of the Superman/Clark story make it a bit 
harder to cook up “contextualist” cases involving (L)). 
129 V. for instance Richard (1990), Forbes (1990, 1993), Schiffer (1992). 
  98 
it fits particularly well with the general terms of our discussion130. However, my 
arguments in this chapter do not depend on the details of Crimmins’ account and they 
would also go through assuming another contextualist view in its place. 
Here is a (much simplified) summary of Crimmins’ view 131 . According to 
Crimmins, the “that”-clause in a belief report “S believes that a is F” expresses the same 
proposition as the unembedded sentence “a is F”. Moreover, just as on Millian 
accounts, “a is F” expresses the Russellian proposition <a, is F> constituted by the 
object a and the property being F. However, belief reports do not only specify what 
Russellian proposition is believed by a subject, but also how (i.e. via what mental 
representation) that proposition is believed; in particular, they specify what “notions” 
and “ideas” constitute the mental representation through which the subject believes the 
proposition in question. A notion is a singular concept referring to the individual picked 
out by the singular term in the “that” clause (CLARK is a notion); an idea is a predicative 
concept expressing the property picked out by the predicate (CAN FLY is an idea). (In 
what follows, I will mostly focus on notions).  
Notions are specified by contextually supplied, “unarticulated constituents” of the 
proposition expressed by a belief report. An unarticulated constituent is a propositional 
constituent which is not represented by any linguistic unit in the sentence. So an 
utterance u of a report will be true of a subject S iff S believes the relevant Russellian 
proposition through a mental representation satisfying certain contextually specified 
conditions, where the conditions in question are specified by the unarticulated 
constituents of the proposition expressed by u. Crimmins calls these contextually 
supplied conditions “providing conditions”. Such conditions are determined by the 
speaker’s intentions in the relevant context and they obviously play a crucial role in 
fixing the truth conditions of a report, since they determine what mental representation 
S must accept in order for the report to be true. 
 
Notions may be specified in two different ways. A notion may be provided, in 
which case it will be a constituent of the proposition expressed by the report. 
Alternatively, a notion may be only constrained, in which case it will not be among the 
propositional constituents: in this case, the proposition expressed is just that there is 
some notion which is involved in S’s belief and which satisfies the description D that is 
contextually supplied by the speaker in c132. 
Here is an example to illustrate the distinction. (From now on, I will simply talk of 
“concepts” instead of talking about “notions” and “ideas”; recall that both notions and 
ideas are concepts according to Crimmins). Consider our ascription (L) “Lois believes 
that Clark can fly” as uttered in an ordinary context c in which it appears false. On 
                                                
130 V. Crimmins and Perry (1989), Crimmins (1992). Following Saul (1999a), I will simply refer to this 
position as Crimmins’ view.  
131 My summary is based on Saul (1999a). Like Saul, I will only discuss those features of the account 
which will be relevant for our discussion. 
132 V. Crimmins and Perry (1989, pp. 701-709). 
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Crimmins’ account, (L) might have one of two sets of truth conditions, which would 
both account for our intuitions about (L)’s falsehood. If our context c is one in which 
concepts are directly provided, the utterance will have the following truth-conditions: 
 
(L) (provided-concepts version): (L) is true in c iff there is some mental 
representation Lois accepts which expresses the Russellian proposition <Superman, 
can fly> and is partially constituted by CLARK. 
 
Where CLARK might be that concept which refers to Superman/Clark and has the 
standard Clark-ish role [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…]. Clearly, given the 
above truth-conditions, (L) will be false in c: Lois does not accept any mental 
representation which expresses <Superman, can fly> and is partially constituted by the 
concept CLARK.  
Alternatively, context c might be one in which concepts are only constrained, in 
which case our utterance will have the following truth-conditions: 
 
(L) (constrained-concepts version): (L) is true in c iff there is some mental 
representation Lois accepts which expresses the Russellian proposition <Superman, 
can fly> and is partially constituted by a concept satisfying description D. 
 
Where D might be: “Is a concept that refers to Superman/Clark and has the standard 
Clark-ish role [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…]”. Again, it follows from these 
truth-conditions that (L) is false in c: Lois does not accept any mental representation 
which expresses <Superman, can fly> and is partially constituted by a concept 
satisfying description D. 
While (L) has the same truth-value in both contexts, notice how in the second one 
we refer to the concept that must be involved in Lois’ mental representation through a 
description, while in the first one we refer to it directly. The difference can be seen most 
clearly if we hypothesize that there is no concept referring to Superman/Clark and 
having the standard Clark-ish role. In our second context, (L) will be false, since there is 
no concept satisfying D. In our first context, however, “CLARK” will become an empty 
name like “Santa Claus” and it will fail to refer: consequently, our utterance of (L) will 
be neither true nor false (on at least some theories of empty names)133.  
 
Following Crimmins, we will assume (as seems plausible) that there are both 
constraining and providing contexts 134 : speakers sometimes pick out concepts 
descriptively and sometimes refer to them directly. As Saul (1999a) notes, in both kinds 
of contexts it will be the “providing conditions” fixed by speakers’ intentions that 
determine what mental representation S must accept in order for the report to be true. In 
                                                
133 Crimmins and Perry (1989, pp. 701-706).  
134 Crimmins and Perry offer reasons to acknowledge both kinds of contexts, a topic I cannot discuss 
here: v. Crimmins and Perry (1989, pp. 701-706). 
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constraining contexts, those conditions (e.g. having the standard Clark-ish role) will 
figure in description D and appear among the propositional constituents. In providing 
contexts, the conditions will not appear in the proposition, but they will still determine 
what concept (if any) the speaker is referring to: in the above example, the concept 
CLARK is that concept which has the standard Clark-ish role, i.e. which satisfies the 
conditions provided by the speaker in that context. Following Saul (1999a, p. 361), we 
can therefore offer a single set of truth-conditions for constraining and providing 
contexts: 
 
Contextualism: An utterance u of a belief report “S believes that P” is true in 
context c iff there is some mental representation r S accepts which expresses the 
Russellian proposition expressed by “that P” and is partially constituted by the 
concepts specified by u’s providing conditions135. 
 
For instance, (L)’s truth-conditions will be: 
 
Contextualism for (L): An utterance u of (L) is true in context c iff there is some 
mental representation r Lois accepts which expresses <Superman, can fly> and is 
partially constituted by the concepts specified by u’s providing conditions. 
 
Crimmins’ contextualist account yields the right predictions about those ordinary 
contexts in which reports like (L) appear false, as well as those special contexts in 
which they appear true. In an ordinary context, speakers will supply the following 
providing conditions: r must be constituted by a concept having the standard Clark-ish 
role [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…]. Since Lois does not accept a 
representation r expressing <Superman, can fly> and satisfying this condition, (L) will 
be false in these contexts (be they providing or constraining; v. supra).  
In a context where (L) appears true, the providing conditions will be different: in 
particular, it will not be a condition on the truth of the report that r be constituted by a 
concept with the Clark-ish role. For instance: in the context described earlier, I (= the 
speaker) clearly don’t intend to communicate to you that Lois believes <Superman, can 
fly> under a concept that is inferentially connected to [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS 
GLASSES…] (the reason why I’m using “Clark” in my report is that this is the only name 
you have for Superman). Therefore, it is not a condition on the truth of the report that 
                                                
135 What about a Fregean who endorsed a contextualist view on which a report is true iff S stands in the 
belief-relation to a Fregean descriptive proposition whose features are contextually specified? This view 
would also be captured by our formula; we would simply have to feed in a description of the relevant 
Fregean proposition among the providing conditions, and S would then be required to accept a mental 
representation expressing that proposition. The equivalence of Fregean and non-Fregean versions of 
contextualism is noted by Crimmins and Perry (1989, p. 710). 
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Lois believe <Superman, can fly> under that concept. So (L) can still be true of Lois in 
this context, which is just what we want.   
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3. A Contextualist Picture Of Publicity  
 
By appealing to contextually shifting conditions on concepts, a non-Millian 
contextualist semantics like Crimmins’ can account for the contextual variability in our 
intuitions about reports (second moral). Moreover, it can also account for the fact that, 
in at least some contexts, a report will be true only if the subject believes the relevant 
Russellian proposition under a certain specific concept (first moral): this will be that 
concept which satisfies the conditions provided by the speaker in that context. 
In the rest of this chapter, I will assume that some version of the contextualist 
semantics I just sketched is correct136. My plan is to apply that semantics to our two 
guiding questions, which were left unanswered after we examined the shortcomings of 
the original publicity argument in the previous chapter: 
 
• Does the interpersonal applicability of intentional generalizations require concepts 
to be public? More precisely: is it the case that, for every generalization G that 
applies to two or more subjects, there is a concept C that these subjects must all have 
in order for G to apply to them? And, more generally: what conditions must be 
satisfied in order for a generalization to cover multiple agents? 
 
• Is holism incompatible with the interpersonal applicability of intentional 
generalizations? 
 
In light of our semantics, my answer to the first question will be “yes”: contextualism 
does entail a version of the publicity principle for intentional generalizations. My 
answer to the second question (which I will defend in sect. 4.1 infra) will be: “yes; but 
there is a way to modify holism so as to make it compatible with the interpersonal 
applicability of generalizations”. 
 
As anticipated, our choice of a semantics for reports can affect the conditions under 
which a generalization will apply to a group of subjects: depending on our background 
theory of ascriptions, those conditions will often change dramatically. A contextualist 
semantics will give us the following picture of those conditions: 
 
a) In many contexts, an intentional generalization will only apply to a group of subjects 
if they all have a specific concept C. 
 
b) The conditions under which an intentional generalization applies to a group of 
subjects vary with context.  
 
                                                
136 I won’t be able to discuss objections against contextualism here, although I plan to do so in future 
work: v. Saul (1999 a,b), Sider (1995), Soames (1995), Clapp (1995), Schiffer (1992, 1996). 
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Let me address each of these points in turn. According to our general statement of 
contextualism, a report “S believes that P” will be true of S in context c only if S 
believes the relevant Russellian proposition under a concept satisfying the conditions 
provided by the speaker in c. This has immediate consequences for intentional 
generalizations, which will only apply to subjects who have a concept that satisfies the 
contextually supplied conditions. This is because intentional generalizations embed 
schematic ascriptions in their antecedents/consequents, and these schematic ascriptions 
will only be true of subjects who have a concept satisfying the relevant conditions.  
For illustration, consider a context c in which (L) is uttered. In c, the schematic 
ascription (Ls) “S believes that Clark can fly” will only be true of subjects who satisfy 
the conditions associated with (L). For instance, suppose c is one of the many ordinary 
contexts in which speakers intend (L) to be true only if Lois believes <Superman, can 
fly> under the concept CLARK. It follows that, in c, (Ls) is only true of a subject S if S 
believes <Superman, can fly> under CLARK. Now suppose our intentional generalization 
(G5) is uttered in c: 
 
G5) If a subject S believes that Clark can fly and believes that Clark just jumped off 
a skyscraper, then other things being equal S will not be worried. 
 
Since (G5) embeds (Ls) in its antecedent, only subjects who believe <Superman, can 
fly> under CLARK will satisfy (G5)’s antecedent. A fortiori, it’s only subjects who have 
CLARK that can satisfy the antecedent of (G5) as uttered in c137. So an utterance of (G5) 
in c will only apply to subjects who possess the concept CLARK. (Mutatis mutandis for 
an explanation schema based on (G5). An utterance of that schema in c will only apply 
to subjects who have CLARK: if they didn’t, the descriptive premises of the schema 
would be false of them)138.  
                                                
137 (I.e. the antecedent of (G5)’s utterance in c). 
138  One might be skeptical about the applicability of a contextualist semantics to intentional 
generalizations and explanations. While sentences like (L) will indeed be uttered by actual speakers in a 
number of circumstances, generalizations like (G5) presumably won’t be (setting aside highly 
sophisticated philosophical contexts). Nor will a speaker ever utter a full DN explanation schema based 
on (G5)! 
These are genuine concerns, but I cannot fully address them here. It’s a notorious problem for the DN 
model in general that speakers rarely (if ever) provide complete deductive-nomological explanations. But 
then in what sense does my utterance u “Mary wants to get water” explain why she opened the fridge? 
The standard answer is that u is an “elliptical” explanation “grounded” in an ideal explanation that, while 
not actually asserted, could be provided in that context (v. Woodward 2010). A generalization will then 
play an explanatory role even though it is not actually asserted, and so will the other components of the 
explanation which are left implicit.  
Of course, one might be skeptical about the appeal to elliptical explanations. Since both friends and foes 
of publicity appeal to the DN theory, however, we are allowed to take the move at face value in this 
context (v. ch. 2, sect. 3.1, fn. 94). Moreover, alternative models of explanation might also face analogous 
problems. I will therefore assume that, if a contextualist semantics is true for reports like (L), it will also 
apply to generalizations like (G5) and to explanation schemas based on them. Such 
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More generally: given a contextualist semantics, a generalization G uttered in 
context c will only apply to those subjects who have a concept satisfying the conditions 
that, in c, are associated with the report(s) embedded in the generalization. As we’ll now 
see, this means that, in many contexts, sharing of specific concepts is required, so that a 
“contextualist” version of the publicity principle is established. 
 
Let’s start with those contexts in which concepts are directly provided. In these 
contexts, speakers refer directly and non-descriptively to specific concepts, which must 
be involved in the belief of the relevant subject in order for the report to be true. The 
context c that was discussed in the previous two paragraphs is one of these contexts. In 
c, our speaker is supplying the following truth-conditions for (L): 
 
(L) is true in c iff there is some mental representation Lois accepts which expresses 
the Russellian proposition <Superman, can fly> and is partially constituted by 
CLARK. 
 
Where, again, CLARK is that concept which refers to Superman/Clark and has the 
standard Clark-ish role [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…]. Clearly, c is one of 
the many ordinary contexts in which (L) is false. Crucially, it is also a context in which 
certain Clark-related generalizations require the subjects they cover to have a specific 
concept in common: that concept being CLARK, of course. For the reasons given in 
previous paragraphs, a generalization like (G5) (as uttered in c) will not apply to two 
subjects S1-S2 unless they both have CLARK. If they didn’t, they could not possibly 
believe <Superman, can fly> under CLARK; they would then fail to satisfy the conditions 
imposed by the speaker, (Ls) would be false of them, and (G5) would not apply. More 
generally: for all those contexts in which specific concepts are provided, generalizations 
uttered in such contexts will require the subjects they cover to have certain specific 
concepts in common. 
Things are a bit different in those contexts in which concepts are constrained: here, 
the speaker will simply provide a description D which must be satisfied by the subject’s 
concepts. If c was one of these contexts, our report (L) might have the following truth-
conditions in c: 
 
(L) is true in c iff there is some mental representation Lois accepts which expresses 
the Russellian proposition <Superman, can fly> and is partially constituted by a 
concept satisfying the description D: “Is a concept that refers to Superman/Clark 
and has the standard Clark-ish role [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…]” 
 
                                                                                                                                          
generalizations/explanations embed the schematic ascription (Ls): therefore, whatever the truth conditions 
for an utterance of (L) in c are, the same truth conditions will be given (mutatis mutandis) for (Ls) in c, 
and consequently for all those generalizations/explanations which embed (Ls) and might be uttered in c.  
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(Again, (L) will be false in c). Since speakers do not directly provide specific concepts 
in this kind of context, possession of some concept satisfying the description will be 
enough for purposes of interpersonal applicability. For instance, (Ls) can be true in c of 
anyone having some concept C satisfying D. So suppose we respectively have two 
concepts C1-C2 which both have the standard Clark-ish role. Suppose, moreover, that I 
believe <Superman, can fly> under C1 and you believe  <Superman, can fly> under C2. 
(Ls) will then be true of both of us, and we will consequently both satisfy (G5)’s 
antecedent, even if my concept C1 is different from your concept C2. So it seems that, in 
constraining contexts, interpersonal applicability will not require intentional subjects to 
share a specific concept C: any concept satisfying D will do. 
But this conclusion would be too hasty: in many constraining contexts, sharing of 
specific concepts will still be required. The first thing to note is that, in some sense, 
intentional subjects will still be required to have “the same concept”, i.e. a concept 
satisfying description D: they will be required to have a concept belonging to the same 
contextually specified class of concepts, i.e. the class including all and only the 
concepts that satisfy D. So a weaker, “descriptive” version of the publicity principle still 
holds in constraining contexts. Secondly, one could argue that, in many/all constraining 
contexts, there will be only one concept satisfying D: for instance, that there is a single 
concept CLARK which has the standard Clark-ish role, so that concepts C1-C2 in the 
above example are in fact the same concept CLARK139.  
While important, these considerations do not conclusively show that constraining 
contexts require concept publicity. After all, someone (e.g. a holist) with a fine-grained 
theory of concept individuation could grant that intentional subjects must have some 
concept belonging to the same (contextually specified) class, but deny that the concepts 
in the class will therefore be “the same concept”. Similarly, this theorist could deny that 
description D is only satisfied by a single concept: there are multiple concepts satisfying 
D, e.g. multiple concepts with the standard Clark-ish role. (A holist, for instance, will 
hold that these concepts are all distinct since they have different global roles, even 
though they all share the Clark-ish role).  
Setting this controversy aside, a different line of argument shows that, in at least 
some constraining contexts, sharing of specific concepts will certainly be required. This 
is because, in many of these contexts, the supplied description D will make reference to 
other concepts that the believer is required to have. Indeed, the above context c is a case 
in point. In c, (Ls) is only true of subjects who have some concept with the role 
specified by description D: [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…]. But, clearly, 
someone will have a concept with that role only if he also has the specific concepts 
included in D, e.g. SHY and GLASSES: if he didn’t have such concepts, he certainly 
couldn’t have a concept which was inferentially connected to them! Consequently, our 
schematic ascription (Ls) will only be true of subjects who have the specific concepts in 
                                                
139 As usual, this claim would have to be declined differently depending on our background ontology: 
more on this soon. 
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question. It follows that, within our concept-constraining context, a generalization 
embedding (Ls) will not apply to two subjects S1-S2 unless they both have the concepts 
mentioned in the description: for instance, two subjects will both need to have SHY in 
order for (G5) to apply to them. Therefore, in many140 concept-constraining contexts a 
generalization will require intentional subjects to share certain specific concepts, i.e. 
those that the relevant description D makes reference to.  
Of course, this would not happen if constraining descriptions never made reference 
to other concepts, but this seems extremely implausible. Presumably, speakers will 
often pick out the concept they are interested in through its connections with other 
concepts. Surely, links to action and perception might also be relevant: we might e.g. 
require Lois to accept a mental representation that usually causes utterances of “Clark 
can fly” and not “Superman can fly”. Still, it seems we would not be able to impose all 
of our contextual constraints in a purely “behavioristic” way, without referring at all to 
other conceptual representations. 
 
Summarizing the results of our discussion: in all contexts in which concepts are 
provided, and in at least many contexts in which they are descriptively constrained, a 
generalization will only apply to a group of subjects if they have a specific concept C in 
common. We have thus established a “contextualist” version of the publicity principle. 
Let’s reconstruct in more detail what that principle amounts to, and how the general 
argument from contextualism to publicity is supposed to go. Consider an utterance u in 
context c of a belief report (R) “A believes that P”: 
 
a) Assuming contextualism, u is true iff A believes the Russellian proposition 
expressed by “that P” under a concept satisfying u’s providing conditions. 
 
b) For all providing contexts, and for at least many constraining contexts, there is a 
concept C such that a subject has a concept satisfying u’s providing conditions 
only if he has C. 
 
(In providing contexts, C will be that very concept which satisfies u’s providing 
conditions; in constraining contexts, it will be one of the concepts included in D). 
 
c) So, for all providing contexts and for many constraining contexts, there is a 
concept C such that A has a concept satisfying u’s providing conditions only if 
he has C [from (a), (b)]. 
 
d) The schematic ascription (Rs)141 “S believes that P” is true of a subject S in c 
only if S has a concept satisfying u’s providing conditions in c. 
                                                
140 (I leave open the possibility that, in some constraining contexts, D does not make reference to specific 
concepts).  
141 Of course, (Rs) is simply the schematic ascription derived from our report (R). 
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(For instance: (Ls) is true of a subject S in c only if S satisfies the providing conditions 
that (L): “Lois believes that Clark can fly” has in c).  
 
e) So, for all providing contexts and for many constraining contexts, there is a 
concept C such that (Rs) is true of S in c only if S has C [from (c), (d)]. 
 
f) A generalization G embedding (Rs) applies to a group of subjects in c only if 
(Rs) is true of these subjects in c.  
 
(For instance: (G5) applies to a group of subjects in c only if (Ls): “S believes that Clark 
can fly” is true of these subjects in c). 
 
From (e)-(f), our contextualist version of publicity follows: 
 
Contextualist Publicity: For all providing contexts and for (at least) many 
constraining contexts, there is a concept C such that, in one of these contexts, certain 
generalizations apply to a group of subjects only if these subjects all have C. 
 
We have thus established that, according to contextualism, the conditions for 
interpersonal applicability of a generalization will often involve possession of specific 
concepts; a second thing to note is that those conditions will vary with context. This 
follows straightforwardly from the context-dependence of attitude reports. Consider 
those non-ordinary contexts in which (L) is true (v. the example in sect. 2.1 supra). 
Clearly, in these contexts the speaker does not require Lois to believe <Superman, can 
fly> under CLARK, or (L) would be false (where, as usual, we take CLARK to be that 
concept which refers to Superman/Clark and has the standard Clark-ish role). Now 
consider subjects who don’t have the concept CLARK at all (maybe they just don’t know 
about the shy reporter called “Clark Kent”). In one of our non-ordinary contexts, the 
schematic ascription (Ls) can be true of these subjects even though they lack CLARK: 
consequently, (G5) could still apply to them and we would be able to use it to 
explain/predict their behavior. In an ordinary context where CLARK was provided as part 
of the truth-conditions, none of this would be possible.  
In general, a contextualist framework allows for great flexibility in the applicability 
conditions of a generalization: those conditions will be stricter in some contexts, looser 
in others. For instance, there might be contexts in which someone who utters (L) only 
requires Lois to believe <Superman, can fly> under a concept that has part of the 
standard Clark-ish role, e.g. under a concept that is connected to [CALLED “CLARK”]142. 
This would again be a context in which (L) is false, but the applicability conditions of 
(G5) would be looser than in other ordinary contexts: the generalization would now 
apply to subjects who were acquainted with Superman/Clark under the name “Clark 
                                                
142 These are what Crimmins calls “de dicto notions”: v. Saul (1999a, p. 361).  
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Kent” without knowing that he is a shy reporter with glasses. In other contexts, the 
conditions might be even looser. A speaker might intend (L) to be true just in case Lois 
believes <Superman, can fly> under some concept referring to Superman/Clark. In this 
context, (L)’s truth-conditions would be extensionally equivalent to those provided by 
Millian accounts, and (L) would be true. (G5) would then apply to anyone who had a 
concept referring to Superman/Clark, no matter how impoverished or mistaken their 
beliefs about Superman/Clark might be. Conclusion: under contextualism, the 
applicability conditions of a generalization will vary across a wide range of contexts, 
depending on how strict the contextually provided conditions on concepts are.   
 
Two additional remarks are in order at this point. First: this picture of intentional 
generalizations will have to be declined differently depending on our background 
ontology of concepts. Consider those contexts (providing or constraining) in which 
possession of a specific concept C is required for a generalization to apply to a group of 
subjects [S1, S2 … Sn]. A Fregean contextualist will hold that each of these subjects 
must have some concept [C1, C2 … Cn] that is numerically identical to the contextually 
specified C; by the transitivity of identity, it will then follow that [C1, C2 … Cn] are also 
numerically identical to each other. A non-Fregean contextualist, on the other hand, 
will simply hold that each of these subjects must have some token concept [C1, C2 … Cn], 
such that each of these concepts belongs to the same contextually specified type concept 
C. On the first picture, speakers contextually provide conditions on the abstract concept 
that [S1, S2 … Sn] must have (e.g. the abstract concept CLARK, which is that concept of 
Superman/Clark that has such-and-such inferential role). On the second, they provide 
conditions on the type concept to which each subject’s token concept must belong (e.g. 
the type concept CLARK, which is that type concept including all and only the token 
concepts that refer to Superman/Clark and have such-and-such inferential role).  
Second: I can now explain why my arguments in this chapter would still go through 
(with some modifications) if we assumed a Pragmatic Millian theory of ascriptions 
instead of a non-Millian one143. According to PM, utterances of (L) pragmatically 
convey a proposition concerning the way in which Lois believes <Superman, can fly>: 
since the proposition in question is false, speakers mistakenly take (L) itself to express a 
false proposition. As we have seen, the conveyed proposition can be construed in 
various ways144: on all of them, however, that proposition is best seen as encoding 
information about the concept under which Lois allegedly believes <Superman, can 
fly>. On Soames’ proposal, the conveyed proposition is something like the descriptive 
proposition Lois Lane believes that Clark, the milquetoast reporter, can fly. This 
proposition is true just in case Lois believes <Superman, can fly> under the concept THE 
MILQUETOAST REPORTER. On Salmon’s original proposal, the conveyed proposition was 
something like Lois Lane believes the proposition that Superman/Clark can fly under 
                                                
143 As anticipated in ch. 1 (sect. 5). 
144 V. ch. 1, sect. 2.3. 
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the guise of the sentence “Clark can fly”. As we have seen, however, identifying ways 
of believing with linguistic items gives rise to various problems145. Suppose Lois is only 
acquainted with Superman/Clark “demonstratively”: she ignores the name of both the 
mighty superhero she has seen flying and of the reporter with glasses she has seen in the 
office. Clearly, Lois would accept neither “Superman can fly” nor “Clark can fly”. 
Now, an ordinary speaker who knew all this would still think that “Lois believes that 
Superman can fly” is true and “Lois believes that Clark can fly” is false. But if belief 
reports conveyed propositions about linguistic guises, our speaker should judge both 
reports to be false: Lois does not believe the proposition that Superman/Clark can fly 
under either “Superman can fly” or “Clark can fly” (by hypothesis, she accepts neither 
of these sentences). The proposition conveyed by (L) on Salmon’s account is thus best 
seen as concerning the mental (rather than linguistic) representations under which Lois 
believes <Superman, can fly>. For instance, utterances of (L) might convey: Lois Lane 
believes the proposition that Superman/Clark can fly under the guise of a mental 
representation which is partially constituted by the concept CLARK146.  
If attitude ascriptions systematically convey propositions about concepts, they will 
do the same when embedded within intentional generalizations 147 . On Salmon’s 
account, for instance, utterances of (G5) might convey a proposition whose antecedent 
has the following first conjunct: 
 
If a subject S believes that Superman/Clark can fly under the guise of a mental 
representation which is partially constituted by the concept CLARK … 
 
Crucially, this means that the generalization148 which is conveyed by (G5) is one whose 
antecedent can only be satisfied by subjects who have CLARK. Therefore, there is a 
specific concept that must be shared by all the subjects who fall under the generalization 
in question. (On the contrary, the antecedent of the generalization which is semantically 
expressed by (G5) will be satisfied by anyone who believes <Superman, can fly>, even 
if they don’t have CLARK at all). Pragmatic Millian theories will then also entail a 
version of the publicity principle, one which (unlike the contextualist version stated 
above) will concern the proposition conveyed by a generalization rather than the one 
                                                
145 V. ch. 1, sect. 5. 
146 As Braun (1998, p. 568) notes, Kripke’s Paderewski case offers further reasons not to identify ways 
with linguistic representations. PM cannot explain our intuitions about belief reports concerning Peter by 
appealing to pragmatically conveyed metalinguistic propositions, since there is only one natural language 
name Peter has for Paderewski, i.e. the name “Paderewski”. On the other hand, Peter arguably has two 
distinct concepts PADEREWSKI1-PADEREWSKI2: if the conveyed propositions concern such concepts, we 
can explain why speakers accept “Peter believes Paderewski has musical talent” in some contexts (those 
in which we are discussing Peter’s beliefs about Paderewski-the-pianist) but reject it in others (those in 
which we are discussing Peter’s beliefs about Paderewski-the-politician). 
147 Indeed, this gives PM a way to account for our “use” of intentional generalizations which is not 
available to the non-pragmatic Millian: v. ch. 1 (sect. 4) for more details. 
148 Note that I am using “generalization” to refer to a proposition rather than a sentence here. 
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that is semantically expressed. Simplifying a bit, the principle could be stated thus: for 
any intentional generalization G, there is a concept C such that the generalization which 
is pragmatically conveyed by utterances of G applies to a group of subjects only if these 
subjects all have C.  
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4. Holism In A Contextualist Framework  
 
4.1 . A Revised Version Of Holism 
 
In response to the first of our two driving questions (“Does the interpersonal 
applicability of intentional generalizations require concepts to be public?”), I have 
argued for the following claim: for many contexts (both providing and constraining), 
there is a concept C such that, in one of these contexts, the utterance of a generalization 
G will only apply to a group of subjects if these subjects all have C. I have then spelled 
out further the implications that contextualism will have for the applicability conditions 
of intentional generalizations, noting how one and the same generalization will have 
radically different applicability conditions in different contexts. 
In conclusion: even if the standard RTM argument for publicity (ch. 2) is invalid, 
there is an alternative route to publicity, one based on our best semantics for attitude 
reports. That semantics forces us to recognize that the interpersonal applicability of 
generalizations does require specific concepts to be public, in a significant number of 
contexts. This leads us to our second question: is holism compatible with the 
interpersonal applicability of intentional generalizations across the various contexts in 
which they are used? If we stick to the original formulation of holism provided in 
chapter 2 (sect. 2.3), the answer is a clear “no”. According to the holistic theories 
defended by authors like Block and Schneider, two subjects will have the same concept 
C only if they have exactly the same inferential dispositions; for instance, this will be 
required for two subjects to have the same concept CLARK. Now consider all those 
contexts in which having CLARK is required for a subject to satisfy the schematic 
ascription (Ls), either because CLARK is directly provided or because it is part of the 
constraining description D. In all these contexts, (Ls) cannot be true of more than one 
subject: consequently, generalizations embedding (Ls) will not apply to multiple 
subjects when uttered in these contexts. Assuming contextualism, holism turns out to be 
incompatible with the interpersonal applicability of intentional generalizations in a 
significant number of contexts. 
When conjoined with a contextualist semantics, the original Block-Schneider 
formulation of holism has unacceptable consequences. Fortunately, some of the holist’s 
original theses can be revised to avoid these consequences while preserving the spirit of 
the view149. Depending on whether our holist endorses a Fregean or a non-Fregean 
ontology, the details of the strategy will vary: I’ll discuss each version in turn. 
 
Revising holism (non-Fregean version): Consider a type concept C as a class of token 
concepts. That class will have certain “membership conditions”: a token concept Cx will 
                                                
149 An analogous move is suggested by Laurence and Margolis (1999, p. 76, fn. 30) and (in passing) by 
Block (1993, pp. 56-57). I am much indebted to both of these passages for some of the ideas in this thesis. 
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belong to C iff it satisfies those conditions (e.g. iff it has a certain reference, a certain 
inferential role and so on). Clearly, a token concept can belong to multiple type 
concepts150, and two token concepts can belong to the same type concept C while also 
belonging to two different type concepts C1-C2. Similarly, my cat and your dog belong to 
the same kind mammal while also belonging to two different species. 
This allows the holist to deal with problematic contexts in the following way. 
Consider a context c in which a specific concept is directly provided, e.g. one in which 
our ascription (L) has the following truth-conditions: 
 
(L) is true in c iff there is some mental representation Lois accepts which expresses 
the Russellian proposition <Superman, can fly> and is partially constituted by 
CLARK. 
 
In this context, having CLARK is required in order to be covered by generalizations like 
(G5). To account for this, a holist might take the above statement to refer to a type 
concept CLARK whose membership conditions are non-holistic. More precisely, he 
might rephrase the above truth conditions as:  
 
(L) is true in c iff there is some token mental representation Lois accepts which 
expresses <Superman, can fly> and is partially constituted by a token concept 
belonging to the type concept CLARK. 
 
Where CLARK’s membership conditions are non-holistic. (The membership conditions 
for a type concept C will be non-holistic just in case two token concepts can belong to C 
even if they don’t have the same global inferential role). A holist could for instance take 
CLARK’s membership conditions to include: referring to Superman/Clark Kent and 
having the standard Clark-ish inferential role. (In general, the holist can always point at 
speaker’s intentions to provide the right membership conditions for the relevant non-
holistic types. In many ordinary contexts, the conditions provided by the speaker will be 
the ones I just mentioned, although there will also be contexts involving more coarse-
grained types: v. sect. 3 supra). Two subjects who possess token concepts referring to 
Superman/Clark and having the standard Clark-ish role will then be able to satisfy (Ls), 
and fall under the corresponding generalizations, even if those token concepts differ in 
some of their inferential connections (one subject thinks Clark is handsome, the other 
one doesn’t). In this context, given the speaker’s communicative intentions, such 
differences are intuitively irrelevant for the truth of the report and the applicability of 
the corresponding generalizations; fortunately, the holist can account for this by holding 
the type concept provided by the speaker to be non-holistic. 
                                                
150 The point is made by both Laurence and Margolis (1999, p. 76, fn. 30) and Block (1993, pp. 56-57). 
V. infra for possible objections. 
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Of course, this strategy is consistent with the claim that some type concepts do have 
holistic membership conditions. For instance, consider the type concept CLARKH 
comprising all and only those token concepts that refer to Superman/Clark and have the 
inferential role that my token concept for Clark has right now. Clearly, no one other 
than my current time-slice will have a token concept belonging to CLARKH. Luckily, a 
token can belong to multiple types at the same time: while our respective token 
concepts for Clark cannot both belong to CLARKH, they do belong to the same, more 
coarse-grained type CLARK. Similarly, my cat and your dog both belong to the kind 
mammal while also belonging to two different species; and just like the species dog is 
encompassed by the broader kind animal151, CLARKH will be a more fine-grained type 
encompassed by the broader type concept CLARK152. Since it’s the latter, non-holistic 
type that the speaker refers to in the above context, we can both fall under 
generalizations uttered in that context. A holist can thus account for interpersonal 
applicability in providing contexts while maintaining that our token concepts do belong 
to distinct holistic types!  
A similar line will be applied to constraining contexts in which specific concepts are 
part of the contextually supplied description D; v. for instance the concept SHY, which 
will be part of D in most ordinary contexts in which (L) is uttered. Again, the holist will 
hold that the membership conditions of a concept like SHY are non-holistic. The speaker 
who utters (L) is not requiring the believer to have a concept SHY that has exactly the 
same inferential role as the speaker’s own shy-concept at t; he simply wants the 
believer to have a token concept with the “standard shy-role” ([INTROVERTED, DOES NOT 
TALK MUCH…]). Again, this is compatible with the existence of a type concept SHYH, 
whose membership conditions are indeed holistic but which just isn’t part of the 
description D supplied by the speaker.  
In passing, note how the “multiple types” solution gives us a way to charitably 
reinterpret the similarity strategy that was rejected in chapter 2 (sect. 3.2). The holist’s 
strategy was to hold that concepts are holistically individuated, and that different 
thinkers never have the “same” concept but only “similar” ones. Now, if a token 
concept can belong to multiple types, then we should simply say that two token 
concepts had by different subjects will belong to many of the same types (e.g. the type 
CLARK), while also belonging to many different types (e.g. the type CLARKH). Depending 
on what types two token concepts have in common, we will then say that these concepts 
are more or less “similar”. Of course, two tokens will share infinitely many types, since 
they share infinitely many properties. So if all types were equally important for 
                                                
151 Objection: while a particular animal can belong to several sets of objects, it cannot belong to two 
species at the same time (nothing is both a cat and a dog, a cat and a tiger etc…). Kinds that are at the 
same “taxonomic level” (e.g. cat and dog) have mutually exclusive membership conditions. Reply: since 
the less specific CLARK will subsume the more specific CLARKH, there is no reason to think that CLARKH 
and CLARK will have mutually exclusive membership conditions. Similarly, it’s perfectly possible for 
something to belong to both mammal and cat, since the former is located at a higher taxonomic level. 
152 This point is made by Laurence and Margolis (1999, p. 76, fn. 30).  
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similarity, all concepts would be equally similar. For this reason, we need context to 
help us in our similarity ascriptions. In any given context, some types will be more 
salient than others: in the contexts described above, CLARK is more salient than CLARKH, 
since it is part of the providing conditions imposed by the speaker. We will then say that 
two concepts are “similar” when they share enough contextually salient types (I will go 
back to this in ch. 5, sect. 4.3). In sum, the holist can account for publicity without 
having to invoke a mysterious notion of “primitive” similarity: the similarity between 
two concepts just reduces to their having certain (contextually salient) types in common. 
On its most charitable interpretation, then, the similarity strategy simply boils down to a 
version of the multiple types solution. 
 
A possible objection against the appeal to multiple types is that it confuses type 
concepts with classes (or sets) of concepts153. On Goodman’s original formulation of 
the type/token distinction, a token can only belong to one type at a time (Goodman 
1968, p. 133). So a specific token of the word “dog” will only belong to one type, i.e. 
the type-word “dog”. On the other hand, an object can obviously belong to several 
classes of objects at the same time: indeed, it belongs to an infinite number of classes, 
since it instantiates infinite properties. So we should say that a concept belongs to 
multiple classes of concepts, but only one type concept154. Of course, this would be 
inconsistent with the claim that one of my token concepts belongs to the type concept 
CLARK (to which one of your token concepts also belongs) as well as the holistic type 
concept CLARKH (to which none of your token concepts belongs).  
The non-Fregean holist might simply respond by changing his terminology. Instead 
of claiming that a token concept can belong to multiple types, he will now hold that a 
token concept can belong to multiple classes or sets of concepts: some of these classes 
(CLARKH) have holistic membership conditions, while others (CLARK) do not. The 
objector might reply that this is not enough to satisfy the publicity requirement. What’s 
needed to account for the interpersonal applicability of (G5) is not simply that our token 
concepts belong to the same class of concepts CLARK; our token concepts must also 
belong to the same type concept CLARK (where this is a “proper” type concept, not just a 
class or a set). It is not clear to me that this reply would be warranted: some reasons 
should be provided for thinking that publicity requires sameness of (proper) type 
concepts. In any case, the non-Fregean does have a further response available; before 
turning to that response, however, let’s see how a Fregean holist might try to revise his 
view so as to accommodate publicity. 
 
Revising holism (Fregean version): A Fregean holist might hold that only some 
abstract concepts are individuated by their global inferential role; other concepts are 
                                                
153 The objection is raised by Glock (2009, pp. 26-27) against Laurence and Margolis (1999). 
154 The reasons for formulating the distinction in this way are complex and cannot be discussed here. V. 
Dilworth (2003) for criticism, and Wetzel (2006) for an overview of the topic. 
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individuated less specifically, and it is these concepts that speakers refer to in providing 
and constraining contexts.  
The required moves will of course parallel those made by the non-Fregean. Consider 
for instance a context like the above, in which CLARK is directly provided in the truth-
conditions for (L). Our holist will hold that the provided concept CLARK is not 
individuated by its global inferential role at some specific time t for a specific subject S: 
it is simply individuated by its referent (Clark/Superman) and a part of its inferential 
role (which might e.g. correspond to the standard Clark-ish role). Different thinkers will 
then have CLARK as long as they have some mental representation referring to 
Clark/Superman and having the Clark-ish role, even if those representations differ in 
some of their inferential connections (I think Clark is handsome, you think he is not).  
The holist can then maintain that, alongside CLARK, there exist many other concepts 
referring to Clark/Superman, and that some of these concepts are holistically 
individuated. For instance: there exists a concept CLARKH individuated by its reference 
plus its global inferential role for subject S1 at time t1 (roughly speaking: by the totality 
of inferential dispositions/beliefs that S1 has with respect to Superman/Clark at t1155); 
there exists a different concept CLARKH* individuated by its reference plus its global 
inferential role for subject S2; and so on. Clearly, such concepts will not be shared. This, 
however, is unproblematic, since speakers will not provide such concepts in their 
ordinary belief ascriptions. In a standard context c, a speaker who utters (L) will 
presumably provide an “ordinary” concept of Clark, i.e. one that refers to 
Superman/Clark and is associated with those features that most people ascribe to him. 
There would be no need for the speaker to provide a more specific concept, e.g. one 
individuated by all his beliefs about Superman/Clark at the time of utterance, in order to 
communicate information about Lois’ mental state. Consequently, generalizations 
uttered in c will only require possession of the non-holistic CLARK, and not of the 
holistically individuated CLARKH/CLARKH*. So, even if many concepts are holistically 
individuated, intentional generalizations uttered in providing contexts can still apply to 
multiple subjects. (Again, the same line will be run for concepts like SHY in constraining 
contexts; v. supra for more details).  
We can now see how a non-Fregean might respond to the objection that sameness of 
(proper) type concepts is required for publicity. The response will follow closely the 
one just sketched in defense of Fregean holism. Some type concepts are not shared: 
these are type concepts such as CLARKH, CLARKH*…, which are holistically individuated 
by their global inferential role within a specific subject. For instance, my token concept 
C1, which instantiates the holistic type CLARKH, will belong to a different type from your 
token concept C2, which might instantiate the holistic type CLARKH*. At the same time, 
however, each of us might have two further token concepts (call them, respectively, C3 
and C4) which do instantiate the same type concept CLARK, just like two concrete 
                                                
155 Oversimplifying the Fregean picture, you can imagine CLARKH as an extremely long description 
encoding all of S1’s beliefs about Clark at t1.  
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tokenings of the same type-word “dog”. So the non-Fregean can still account for 
concept sharing, even if he grants that sameness of proper type concepts is required for 
this. 
 
The two holistic responses I just described can be summarized in a single formula: 
even assuming contextualism, holism is compatible with interpersonal applicability 
since: 
 
• (Non-Fregean): some type concepts have non-holistic membership conditions156; 
• (Fregean): some abstract concepts are non-holistically individuated. 
 
Two problems can be noted with this strategy157. First, the holist must now give up one 
of the two theses used to characterize his position in chapter 2 (sect. 2.3): 
 
• Concept individuation (IRS): a concept is partially individuated by its inferential 
role: two concepts C1 and C2 are the same concept only if they have the same 
inferential role. 
 
• Holistic definition of inferential roles: the inferential role of a concept C is the set 
of all the inferential connections in which C stands at a time t for a subject S. 
 
The holist now maintains that only some concepts are individuated by their global 
inferential role: CLARKH is, but CLARK is not; SHYH is, but SHY is not158. Once we also 
define “inferential role” as “the set of all the inferential connections in which C stands at 
a time t for a subject S”, it follows that not all concepts are individuated by their 
inferential roles. Concepts like CLARK and SHY are now individuated by only part of 
their roles (respectively, by [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…] and 
[INTROVERTED, DOES NOT TALK MUCH…]), not by all the inferential connections159.  
This is a substantive concession, but one that holists might be prepared to accept as 
long as some concepts are holistically individuated160. However, even this more 
                                                
156 From now on, I will mostly ignore complications having to do with the “proper” type-token distinction 
(v. supra) and simply identify type concepts with classes/sets of token concepts, so as to conform to 
standard usage in the literature.  
157 In passing, note that the strategy would also have been available to the holist in response to the 
original Fodorian argument (ch. 2). However, we need a contextualist framework to implement the move 
effectively. Only within that framework can we see which “non-holistic” concepts will be contextually 
selected by speaker’s intentions, how they will be selected, and for what purposes. 
158 From now on, I will simply talk of “concept individuation” and leave it to the reader to reformulate my 
claims in terms that would be acceptable on each of our ontologies. 
159Alternatively, the holist might decide to adopt a weaker definition of “inferential role”: the two options 
are substantially equivalent. 
160 Indeed, in at least one passage Block acknowledges explicitly that concepts can be typed in multiple 
ways, sometimes holistic and sometimes non-holistic: 
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moderate claim might now be challenged. To account for interpersonal applicability, the 
holist needs two assumptions: 
 
• Some concepts are non-holistically individuated. 
• In contexts where a generalization G is used, the speaker will make reference to 
“non-holistic” concepts rather than holistic ones.  
 
The second assumption is of course as crucial as the first one: if speakers referred to 
holistic concepts, G would still fail to be interpersonally applicable. But that assumption 
raises a worry: why think that any concepts are holistically individuated, if there are no 
contexts in which speakers make reference to holistically individuated concepts?  
The worry can be declined differently, depending on whether we are targeting a 
Fregean or a non-Fregean version of holism. Against a Fregean, one might argue as 
follows. To be warranted in postulating the existence of holistically individuated 
abstract concepts, we must have sufficient theoretical reasons. But suppose speakers 
never make reference to such concepts, so that they don’t play any role in our attitude 
reports or in the intentional explanations/predictions based on them; suppose we simply 
appeal to non-holistic concepts like CLARK or SHY for such purposes. Why, then, should 
we think that there are holistically individuated concepts in the first place? 
The objection might seem less worrying for non-Fregean holists. After all, types are 
cheap: you can classify things any way you like without incurring any ontological 
commitments. You might then, if you so please, decide to type concepts into those that 
fall under the holistic type CLARKH (only one) and those that don’t (all the others)161. 
Similarly, you might decide to classify things as “grue”/“non-grue” rather than 
“green”/“non-green”, or as “things-bigger-than-my-thumb-at-t” and things that are not. 
Whether these classifications would be theoretically useful, of course, is a different 
matter. If there are no contexts in which we need to classify concepts in the very fine-
grained way suggested by the holist, then the claim that concepts can be typed 
holistically will be true but uninteresting. What we have to show is that, given our 
purposes in certain contexts, we sometimes need to type concepts holistically. This is a 
much harder task, and one facing Fregean and non-Fregean holists alike. 
This objection against the revised holistic view I sketched leads us to the next 
chapters. There, I will try to show (among other things) that there are some contexts in 
                                                                                                                                          
 
Similar points about individuation of computations are familiar. We can type-identify computations 
by function computed, ignoring the specific algorithm deployed and its implementation, or by the 
algorithm, or by the implementation. We can type identify bathtubs architecturally - in terms of size, 
shape, weight, and decorative properties. Alternatively, we can type identify them economically, in 
terms of initial price, usable life, and thermal insulation, ignoring architectural features. Equivalence 
relations can be based on any of these features (Block 1993, p. 57) 
 
161 Things will be different if we adopt a “proper” construal of types. In this case, the worry will arguably 
parallel the one arising for Fregean ontologies.  
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which holistically individuated concepts will play an important theoretical role. In these 
contexts, appealing to holistic concepts will turn out to be extremely useful, and perhaps 
indispensable. If so, then holism might still have a role to play in our best theory of 
concepts, even after we revise it substantially to make it compatible with the publicity 
principle. 
 
4.2 . Schneider’s Appeal To Millianism 
 
Before moving on to chapter 4, I would like to discuss an alternative strategy that 
the holist might employ in order to answer publicity objections without weakening his 
view. Susan Schneider162 has recently proposed a sophisticated holistic theory that is 
supposed to escape standard publicity worries. Having spelled out my favored theory of 
intentional generalizations, I am now in a better position to point out what I think is 
wrong with her view.  
Schneider’s central thesis is that LoT symbols (which she identifies with concepts) 
“[…] should be typed by their total computational roles, where, to a first approximation, 
the total computational role of a symbol is the role it plays in the relevant ‘program’ ” 
(Schneider 2011, p. 120). (Roles are then defined as including inferential links to other 
concepts, as well as links to perceptual inputs/behavioral outputs). Schneider agrees that 
different subjects will never have concepts of the same type on her view of concept-
individuation, but she doesn’t take this to be incompatible with the interpersonal 
applicability of intentional generalizations and explanations, for two reasons. 
First, like Block163, Schneider notes that several psychological generalizations do 
not make reference to specific propositional attitudes. One instance of this are the 
“fundamental” generalizations we discussed in chapter 2: “For any action a and any 
goal g, if one wants g and also believes that a is required for g, then one will try to 
do a” (Block 1998). Other “unspecific” generalizations are offered by cognitive 
psychology: consider for instance “George Miller’s generalization about the upper limit 
on the number of items in working memory: the magical number seven, plus or minus 
two” or “ ‘syntactic’ or proof theoretic versions of logical generalizations like modus 
ponens and conjunction elimination” (Schneider 2011, p. 144). Finally, some important 
methods of explanation in cognitive science will also avoid referring to specific 
attitudes: v. for instance the method of “functional decomposition”, which explains the 
functioning of a certain cognitive capacity (e.g. working memory) by decomposing it in 
terms of its more basic components and then describing their functioning without 
making reference to any specific symbols in the process (Schneider 2011, pp. 140-42). 
Since the generalizations/explanations just described do not make reference to 
specific attitudes, a fortiori they do not require the subjects they cover to have any 
specific concepts in common. As noted in chapter 2, however, this is not enough as a 
                                                
162 Schneider 2005; 2009 a,b; 2011. 
163 V. ch. 2 (sect. 3.1). 
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defense of holism (v. sect. 3.1, problems 2-4): there still is a large class of intentional 
generalizations, explanations and ascriptions which do make reference to specific 
attitudes, such as: 
 
G2) If a subject S wants to get water and believes that if she opens the fridge she 
will get water, then other things being equal S will open the fridge. 
  
How will the holist account for the interpersonal applicability of these generalizations? 
Schneider’s response is that attitude ascriptions, and the generalizations/explanations 
embedding them, have a Millian semantics164. Since ascriptions are Millian, they don’t 
encode any information about the concepts under which subjects believe the Russellian 
propositions expressed by “that” clauses. Consequently, our schematic ascription “S 
believes that if she opens the fridge she will get water” will be true of two subjects S1-
S2 as long as they both believe the relevant Russellian proposition under some concept 
or other. S1-S2 are therefore not required to believe that proposition under some specific 
concept WATER. So, even though holism entails that WATER cannot be had by more than 
one subject, this is compatible with the ascription being true of both S1-S2. 
Consequently, generalizations and explanations embedding that ascription will be 
interpersonally applicable under holism.  
Schneider’s defense of holism is more sophisticated than Block’s: by appealing to a 
Millian semantics, the holist can account for the interpersonal applicability of those 
generalizations that make reference to specific attitudes, while still holding that 
concepts aren’t shareable. The holist can then reject the publicity principle (in both its 
original and its contextualist version) and avoid weakening her view in the way I 
suggested previously. There is no need to concede that some concepts must be 
shareable, and thus non-holistically individuated, since concepts are simply not 
involved in our intentional generalizations: all that’s required for a generalization to 
apply to a group of subjects is that they believe the relevant Russellian proposition 
under some concept or other. 
Now, in chapter 1 I offered several reasons to reject the Millian semantics on which 
Schneider’s defense hinges. Some of those arguments concerned our intuitions about 
ascriptions in general, while others were focused on intentional generalizations and 
explanations. In this section, I will concentrate on the latter class of arguments in order 
to highlight the problem with Schneider’s strategy. Once we adopt a Millian semantics, 
we “impoverish” the content of ascriptions, which will now encode less information 
about the belief states of the relevant subjects. In particular, no information will be 
communicated about the concepts under which those subjects believe the relevant 
propositions. This has the advantage of making the conditions for interpersonal 
applicability easier to satisfy: in particular, it is now possible for different subjects to 
satisfy those conditions even if they have no concepts in common, as the holist 
                                                
164 In her terminology: they are “broad”. V. Schneider (2005) and Schneider (2011, pp. 136-140). 
  120 
maintains. But adopting a Millian semantics also has its costs. By impoverishing the 
content of generalizations, we make them less useful for purposes of explanation and 
prediction: wider applicability is bought at the expense of explanatory and predictive 
power. The holist’s appeal to Millianism makes it impossible to account for the fact that 
certain generalizations are routinely used to explain/predict intentional behavior; only a 
non-Millian semantics can account for this. On that semantics, however, specific 
concepts will again be involved in our generalizations: Schneider’s defense of holism 
will then become unavailable, and the holist will have to adopt the weakened view 
described in the previous section.  
To see why Schneider’s appeal to Millianism runs into trouble, I want to analyze 
two close relatives of the generalizations examined in our discussion of Braun’s view 
(v. (12)-(13), ch. 1, sect. 4). Consider first: 
 
G6) If a subject S believes that Superman is nearby and believes that Lex Luthor is 
nearby, then other things being equal S will run towards Superman165. 
 
(G6) appears true; moreover, it seems we can use it to explain and predict behavior166. 
For familiar reasons, however, (G6) will face several apparent counterexamples once 
we assume a Millian semantics. Consider Lucy, who: 
 
a) Does not accept the identity claim “Superman is Clark”. 
b) Sincerely utters “Clark is nearby”. 
c) Sincerely utters “Luthor is nearby”. 
 
Clearly, Lucy believes that Luthor is nearby; moreover, she also believes that Clark is 
nearby. Assuming Millianism, it follows that she also believes that Superman is nearby. 
So, assuming Millianism, Lucy seems to satisfy (G6)’s antecedent. But Lucy might 
perfectly well not run towards Superman in the circumstances described above (suppose 
Superman/Clark is dressed in his reporter clothes, so that Lucy would not accept 
“Superman is nearby”). Therefore, Lucy seems to satisfy (G6)’s antecedent but not its 
consequent, thus constituting an apparent counterexample to (G6). Moreover, similar 
counterexamples can be multiplied at will (imagine a crowd of people in Lucy’s 
predicament who run away screaming instead of running towards Superman/Clark). 
Of course, Schneider’s reply would be that Lucy does not in fact satisfy (G6)’s 
antecedent: other things are not equal in her case, since she represents Superman/Clark 
in mismatching ways167. As usual, I will grant for the sake of the argument that the 
Millian is allowed to include a “matching ways” requirement in the ceteris paribus 
                                                
165 I borrow (G6) from Aydede (1998) and Schneider (2011, p. 149), with some modifications.  
166 In what follows I will mostly focus on explanation, although everything I say would also apply to 
prediction. 
167 Cf. ch. 1 (sect. 4) for more details about the ceteris paribus strategy. 
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clause of generalizations like (G6)168. Even then, the move is not powerful enough to 
save a Millian semantics for generalizations, since it cannot be applied to negative ones. 
Consider: 
 
G7) If a subject S does not believe that Superman is nearby and believes that Lex 
Luthor is nearby, then other things being equal S will run away. 
 
Like (G6), (G7) appears true. Moreover, it seems it can be used for purposes of 
explanation and prediction; indeed, (G7) seems to be precisely the generalization we 
would use to explain why Lucy runs away in the circumstances described above. Of 
course, however, Millianism entails that we cannot use (G7) to explain Lucy’s behavior, 
since she doesn’t satisfy the antecedent (by assumption, she does believe Clark is 
nearby). But since (G7) can be so used, Millianism is false. To put the same point 
differently: if Millianism was true, the following DN argument would be an unsound 
explanation of Lucy’s behavior (premise 2 would be false):  
 
1) If a subject S does not believe that Superman is nearby and believes that Lex 
Luthor is nearby, then other things being equal S will run away. 
 
2) Lucy does not believe that Superman is nearby. 
 
3) Lucy believes that Lex Luthor is nearby. 
 
4) Other things are equal. 
 
5) Lucy will run away. 
 
But (1)-(5) certainly seems to be a sound explanation of why Lucy ran away in the 
above circumstances! 
As with the positive generalization (G6), Millianism seems to make negative 
generalizations like (G7) useless for purposes of intentional explanation. This time, 
however, the ceteris paribus move will not help: the problem with (G7) is that Lucy 
doesn’t satisfy the antecedent, not that she risks satisfying the antecedent but not the 
consequent (as with (G6))169. If (G7) can be used to explain/predict Lucy’s behavior, it 
cannot have a Millian semantics. 
On the contrary, our non-Millian contextualist semantics can easily account for both 
the positive (G6) and the negative (G7). On that semantics, in all contexts in which (G6) 
appears true Lucy will not satisfy the antecedent. In such contexts, “S believes that 
Superman is nearby” will only be true of subjects who believe <Superman, is nearby> 
                                                
168 Schneider provides several reasons to include this requirement: v. Schneider (2005) and Schneider 
(2011, ch. 8).  
169 Alternative moves available to the Millian would also not help: v. ch. 1 (sect. 4) for more details. 
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under SUPERMAN, while Lucy only believes that proposition under CLARK. So Lucy is 
not a counterexample, and we have no need to make any controversial assumptions 
about (G6)’s ceteris paribus clause. Moreover, our semantics can also account for (G7): 
in all contexts in which we can use (G7) to explain Lucy’s behavior, she does satisfy the 
antecedent. In these contexts, “S believes that Superman is nearby” is false of Lucy, 
since, again, she believes <Superman, is nearby> under CLARK and not under 
SUPERMAN. Therefore, “S does not believe that Superman is nearby” is true of Lucy, the 
antecedent is satisfied and (G7) can be used to produce a sound DN explanation of her 
behavior. 
In conclusion: if intentional generalizations have a Millian semantics, we will have 
troubles accounting for our use of positive generalizations like (G6) in 
explanations/predictions; moreover, we will certainly be unable to account for our use 
of negative generalizations like (G7). But recall the central thesis in Schneider’s 
strategy: holism is compatible with the interpersonal applicability of intentional 
generalizations, since such generalizations have a Millian semantics. My arguments in 
this section show that strategy to be unsuccessful: intentional generalizations cannot 
have a Millian semantics, or we would not be able to use them to explain/predict the 
behavior of subjects like Lucy. 
Recall, moreover, that a non-Millian contextualist semantics can straightforwardly 
account for both (G6) and (G7). On that semantics, however, there will be many 
contexts in which a generalization only applies to a group of subjects if these subjects 
share a specific concept C: this is precisely the (new) publicity principle discussed in 
section 3. For instance, our semantics entails that a generalization like (G6) will only 
apply to subjects who have the concept SUPERMAN. This is straightforwardly 
incompatible with Schneider’s holistic position: on that view, the concept SUPERMAN 
can only be had by one subject at a time, so (G6) will not cover multiple subjects. On 
our best semantics for generalizations, holism is still incompatible with their 
interpersonal applicability. 
In an attempt to defend her strong holistic position through Millianism, Schneider 
makes the content of intentional generalizations too impoverished to capture their 
explanatory and predictive power. Only a non-Millian, contextualist view can account 
for the fact that we successfully employ generalizations like (G6)-(G7) in our folk-
psychological practices. On that view, however, specific concepts are often involved in 
our generalizations, and concept publicity must be respected. Schneider’s “strong” 
holism thus becomes untenable, and the only option left for the holist is to adopt the 
“weakened” view I sketched in the previous section. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Publicity And The Fregean Constraint 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the present chapter (ch. 4) and the next (ch. 5) I will tackle our main problem, 
that of establishing a set of conditions for concept individuation/possession, from a 
slightly different angle. I will discuss the relationship between the publicity principle 
and a second widely endorsed constraint on a theory of concepts. Publicity holds that 
subjects who are covered by the same generalizations must have the same concepts; our 
second constraint, which I will call “the Fregean constraint”, pulls in the opposite 
direction. To a first approximation, it holds that a subject who finds himself in a certain 
kind of scenario (a so-called “Frege case”) must have distinct coreferential concepts for 
one and the same object or property. For instance, someone like Lois Lane must have 
two different concepts SUPERMAN and CLARK KENT for one and the same person, 
Superman/Clark.  
The Fregean constraint has also been widely recognized as an important 
desideratum for a theory of concepts, although it isn’t always openly stated170. As we 
will see later, however, many authors who don’t endorse the constraint explicitly still 
seem to conform to it when developing their theories, while others have accepted 
principles in the vicinity that have very similar consequences171. Getting clearer on the 
implications that the Fregean constraint will have for a theory of concepts is thus of 
paramount importance: this is what the next two chapters are about.  
To a first approximation, my main thesis will be that there is a tension between 
publicity and the Fregean constraint: theories of concepts that satisfy the latter seem to 
run into trouble with the former172. My aim, however, is not to show that the two 
constraints are inconsistent; on the contrary, I believe they can be made compatible by 
adopting various strategies, which I will examine in the next chapter. I rather aim at 
showing that, once we adopt these strategies, certain important consequences for a 
theory of concept individuation/possession will follow. I am particularly interested in 
two of these consequences, since they bear directly on the issues discussed in chapters 
2-3. Examining the relationship between our two constraints will help us show that: 
 
• The “modified” version of holism sketched at the end of chapter 3 (sect. 4.1) will 
have a useful role to play in our best theory of concepts. 
 
• The most plausible version of the publicity principle is the contextualist one 
developed in chapter 3. 
                                                
170 The constraint does have its opponents: v. especially Millikan (2000, chs. 9-12). V. also Sainsbury and 
Tye (2012), whose position will be discussed later. 
171 Cf. sect. 2 infra. 
172 To my knowledge, no one in the literature has stated the problem in these terms, although issues in the 
vicinity have certainly been recognized: v. especially Aydede (1998; 2000 a,b), Rupert (2008), Schneider 
(2009 a,b; 2011). 
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Let me say a bit more about the second goal. I want to convince you that, if you like the 
publicity principle, then you should endorse the contextualist picture sketched in 
chapter 3; assuming the publicity principle is true, we should hold a contextualist 
version of it. (This is because, as we will see later, a non-contextualist version would 
make it hard for us to solve the tension between publicity and the Fregean constraint). 
Because I want the next chapters to provide independent support for my version of 
publicity, I will not rely on that version of the principle in what follows. I will instead 
assume (something like) the original publicity principle defended by Fodor and 
others173 and try to convince you that, once we assume that principle, we will have to 
accept a contextualist version of it. In addition, the publicity principle I’ll presuppose in 
chapters 4-5 will be more general than the one discussed in chapters 2-3. That principle 
was exclusively concerned with psychological generalizations, while my focus in the 
next chapters will be broader: instead of concentrating on generalizations alone, I will 
be taking all the “standard” arguments for the publicity of concepts at face value. As 
you might recall from chapter 2 (sect. 2.2), those arguments were: 
 
• It seems plausible to hold that ordinary thinkers can have the same desires, beliefs, 
intentions etc… . But how could two thinkers have the same propositional attitude, 
unless they also shared the corresponding concepts? For instance: how could two 
thinkers both have the belief that dogs bark, unless they both had the concept DOG? 
 
• In order for communication to be successful, it should be possible for two 
communicating subjects to be in the same mental state. If I say “dogs bark”, our 
communicative exchange will be successful only if I get you to entertain the same 
thought DOGS BARK which I have in mind and intend to communicate to you. But 
how could we entertain that same thought if we didn’t both have DOG? 
 
• In order for me and you to genuinely agree on a certain subject matter we must be in 
the same mental state: for instance, we won’t agree on whether dogs bark unless we 
both accept the thought that dogs bark. But how could we accept that same thought 
unless we both had its constituting concepts? (Mutatis mutandis for genuine 
disagreement). 
 
If sound, these arguments establish (together with the one from psychological 
generalizations) that concepts are routinely shared by ordinary thinkers for a variety of 
purposes: 
 
• Whenever two thinkers have the same propositional attitude, there will be a set of 
concepts involved in that attitude which are shared by both thinkers. 
                                                
173 Cf. ch. 2 (section 2.2). 
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• Whenever a communicative exchange succeeds, the two parties must share all those 
concepts that constitute the communicated thought. 
 
• Whenever two parties genuinely agree on a certain subject matter, they must share 
all those concepts which constitute the thought that was agreed upon. 
 
• Finally, whenever two subjects are covered by the same generalization they must 
share all the concepts involved in that generalization. 
 
This broader formulation of publicity is the one I will be presupposing in the following 
chapters. Put more concisely, we could state it as follows: 
 
(PUB) (general version): For any two subjects S1-S2 who [share an 
attitude/communicate successfully/genuinely agree or disagree/ are covered by the 
same generalization], there is a set of concepts [C1, C2, … Cn] such that S1-S2 would 
not [share an attitude/communicate successfully/genuinely agree or disagree/ be 
covered by the same generalization] unless they both had [C1, C2, … Cn]. 
 
In less formal terms: ordinary intentional agents often have many of the same concepts, 
and this plays an essential role not only in their being covered by the same 
psychological laws, but also in a number of other aspects of their cognitive lives. This 
formulation of publicity is somewhat less precise and rigorous than the various versions 
that were discussed in previous chapters, but this should not be a problem; a fairly 
general and intuitive formulation will be enough to raise the problem we are interested 
in. 
Also, notice that much of our previous discussion focused on the motivations for 
publicity: I discussed standard arguments by Fodor and others, argued that it’s not clear 
whether they are valid, and then offered an alternative argument based on our best 
semantics for ascriptions. In the next chapters, I will focus instead on the implications 
of publicity. In particular, I will try to determine whether our constraint is inconsistent 
with an independently plausible principle, the Fregean constraint. That might easily 
tempt us to reject publicity: fortunately, I will show that this is not necessary and that 
the two constraints can coexist. My hope is that this will make publicity more attractive 
and easier to accept, especially when declined in the contextualist version I favor. 
 
Now that I have clarified what version of publicity I will be assuming, here is how I 
propose to proceed. Having described our second constraint and the motivations behind 
it (sect. 2), I will move on to consider its relationship with publicity. I will examine 
some of the main theories of concept individuation/possession currently on the market 
and show that they all have a similar structure (sect. 3). Then (sect. 4), I will show that 
theories with that kind of structure have problematic consequences: they either fail to 
satisfy the Fregean constraint or turn out to be inconsistent with publicity. In the next 
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chapter, I will explain what I take the source of the problem to be, and how I think it 
should be solved. My ultimate goal will be to show that: 
 
• On all possible solutions, holism will turn out to play an important role in our best 
theory of concepts. 
 
• On at least one of those solutions, a contextualist version of the publicity principle 
becomes extremely plausible. 
 
I will then conclude by drawing a general picture of concept individuation and 
possession, which, I think, is strongly supported by the results of our discussion 
throughout chapters 1-5. 
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2. The Fregean Constraint 
 
2.1 . Frege Cases And Rationality 
 
In a number of cases, a good theory of concepts should count certain subjects as 
having distinct concepts for one and the same object or property. Following standard 
usage, I will refer to such cases as “Frege cases”174. Consider our familiar scenario 
involving Lois Lane and Superman/Clark. Lois, we might suppose, is a normal subject 
under all relevant respects: she is intelligent, attentive, reasonably cautious in forming 
her judgments and so on. She has certain evidence (perceptual, testimonial etc…) 
regarding the identity of the person called “Superman” and the person called “Clark”. 
On the basis of that evidence, she has formed certain beliefs about the matter, and as a 
result she sincerely accepts the claims “Superman can fly” and “Clark cannot fly”. 
Clearly, Lois’ case is perfectly possible. At the same time, however, it also presents a 
number of puzzling features that call for an explanation. Here is one that will be 
particularly important for our purposes:  
 
• Since Lois accepts “Superman can fly”, she seems to believe of Superman/Clark that 
he can fly; and, since she accepts “Clark cannot fly”, she also seems to believe of 
Superman/Clark that he cannot fly. So Lois believes, of one and the same 
individual, both that he can fly and that he cannot fly175. That is, Lois is ascribing 
contradictory properties to one and the same object, even though she knows full 
well that nothing can be both F and not-F at the same time. 
 
• Still, Lois doesn’t seem irrational in accepting the above claims. Given her 
evidence, she has excellent reasons to take them to be true, and little or no reasons 
to doubt either of them. After all, she has always seen the person called “Superman” 
fly while wearing his red and blue outfit, not while wearing his reporter uniform; 
she has all reasons to believe that the person called “Clark Kent” is a normal human 
being in all relevant respects; and so on176. Given her epistemic situation, then, Lois 
certainly doesn’t seem guilty of irrationality in (mistakenly) accepting both of the 
above claims. 
 
                                                
174 V. e.g. Aydede and Robbins (2001), Schneider (2005), Rupert (2008), who use the same terminology.  
175 Notice that Millians and non-Millians agree that subjects in Frege cases have contradictory de re 
beliefs. For instance, it is usually agreed that Lois believes, of Superman/Clark, that he can fly and that he 
cannot fly; the disagreement is on whether she also believes that Clark can fly. V. Schiffer (2006, pp. 
361-363) and Salmon (2006). 
176 Of course, the story can be modified so that Lois’ evidence against the identity of Superman and Clark 
is almost irresistible. 
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• But how can Lois rationally believe, of one and the same individual, that he both 
can and cannot fly? This appears especially puzzling since, again, Lois 
wholeheartedly agrees that nothing can be both F and not-F at the same time! 
  
A satisfactory theory of the mind should be able to explain why Lois is rational 
despite her contradictory beliefs. Clearly, subjects in other popular “Frege cases” will 
also raise the same problem. For instance: in Kripke’s (1979) famous case, Peter 
believes of Paderewski that he has musical talent (in some contexts, he accepts 
“Paderewski has musical talent”), but at the same time believes, of the very same 
person, that he does not have musical talent (in other contexts, he accepts “Paderewski 
does not have musical talent”); Oedipus believes, of Jocasta, that she is and she is not 
his mother; and so on. Given their evidence, these subjects don’t seem irrational in their 
doxastic behavior, and yet they all form contradictory de re beliefs on the basis of that 
evidence. The general problem posed by Frege cases can then be stated thus: 
 
The Rationality Problem: Why are Lois, Peter and other subjects in Frege cases 
rational, even though they all believe, of the same object x, that x is both F and not-
F177? 
 
2.2 . Explaining Rationality: The Fregean Constraint 
 
To solve the Rationality Problem, we must explain why Lois and other 
“unenlightened” subjects are rational despite their contradictory beliefs. Different 
explanations have been proposed within RTM, but I believe it’s possible to isolate a 
basic strategy which would be endorsed by most RTM theorists. More specifically, 
there is a basic assumption made by all these theorists about how to explain the 
rationality of characters like Lois. This assumption, which I will call “the Fregean 
Constraint”, is our second constraint on a theory of concepts178.  
To see what the Fregean constraint amounts to, let’s start by analyzing some 
specific explanations that have been proposed by RTM theorists to account for the 
rationality of unenlightened thinkers like Lois. (Some of them will be familiar from ch. 
1, but it will be useful to repeat them here). Here is the account proposed by Braun 
within his LoT-RTM framework: 
 
[Lois] would not be able to deduce any contradiction from [the propositions expressed by (1) and 
(2n)179], given the ways in which she believes them, for no contradictory sentence can be validly 
                                                
177 My way of stating the problem is partially based on the way Braun presents the Substitution objection 
against Millianism (ch. 1, sect. 2.1). The relationship between the two constitutes an interesting issue in 
itself, but I cannot discuss this here. 
178 Some of these theorists have not explicitly acknowledged the assumption, but the explanations they 
propose do seem to rely on it. Braun (1998) is a case in point: v. next paragraph. 
179 (1) = “Superman can fly”; (2n) = “Clark cannot fly”. 
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derived (in the syntactic sense) from sentences (1) and (2n) alone. Thus it may be no more irrational 
for her to have (1) and (2n) in her belief-box than for her to have ‘Gingrich is a Republican’ and 
‘Clinton is not a Republican’ in her belief-box (Braun 1998, pp. 575-576). 
 
And here is how Recanati summarizes the explanatory strategy that was originally 
suggested by Frege and afterwards employed by many others (including himself): 
 
In the Fregean framework, modes of presentation provide a solution to the following puzzle: A 
rational subject can think of a given object a both that it is and that it is not F – how can that be? 
Frege solved the problem by appealing to modes of presentation over and above the objects thought 
about. A rational subject can believe of a, thought of under a mode of presentation m, that it is F, and 
at the same time believe of the same object a, thought of under a different mode of presentation m’, 
that it is not F. Insofar as the modes of presentation are distinct, there is no irrationality (Recanati 
2009, pp. 254-255). 
 
Let’s try to provide a more general formulation of the strategy suggested by these 
passages. (Some RTM theorists might disagree about the details here, but I have no 
ambition to offer a faithful reconstruction of a particular philosophical view: I am only 
interested in what is in common between the various specific explanations that have 
been proposed)180: 
 
The Standard Explanation 
 
i. Lois has two distinct concepts SUPERMAN and CLARK, both of which refer to 
Superman/Clark.  
ii. Since concepts are the constituents of thoughts, Lois’s thoughts SUPERMAN CAN 
FLY and CLARK CAN FLY are distinct thoughts [from premise (i)]. 
iii. Lois stands in the belief-relation to (from now on: “accepts”) the thought 
SUPERMAN CAN FLY. She also accepts the thought CLARK CANNOT FLY, which is 
the negation of the thought CLARK CAN FLY. So Lois believes, of 
Superman/Clark, that he can fly and that he cannot fly in virtue of accepting 
SUPERMAN CAN FLY and the negation of the thought CLARK CAN FLY. 
iv. Therefore, Lois believes, of Superman/Clark, that he can fly and that he cannot 
fly in virtue of accepting a thought T1 and the negation of a thought T2 distinct 
from T1 [from (ii), (iii)]. 
v. If someone believes, of one and the same object, that it is both F and not-F in 
virtue of accepting a thought T1 and the negation of a thought T2 distinct from T1, 
then that person is not irrational181. 
                                                
180 For further instances of the same strategy, v. e.g. Salmon (1986, chs. 7-8) and Schiffer (1990, pp. 251-
252). V. Millikan (2000, chs. 9-10) for a similar reconstruction of the standard explanation. (Notice that 
Braun and Recanati respectively identify modes of presentation with LoT symbols and mental files, so 
they would both agree on restating their explanation in terms of “concepts” as I do in this section).  
181 Other things being equal: there might be other reasons why the person is irrational, but she won’t be 
irrational in virtue of accepting T1 and the negation of a distinct thought T2.  
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vi. Therefore, Lois is not irrational [from (iv), (v)].  
 
(A proponent of the Standard Explanation will then hold that Lois would be irrational if 
she believed of Superman/Clark that he can and cannot fly in virtue of accepting a 
thought (e.g. SUPERMAN CAN FLY) and the negation of that very same thought (e.g. 
SUPERMAN CANNOT FLY). Since Lois accepts and rejects182 distinct thoughts, however, 
she is not irrational in her attitudes).  
A lot could be said about the Standard Explanation: in particular, one might want an 
argument for the crucial principle (v) connecting rationality and sameness/difference in 
thought. A discussion of this point would be of great interest, but it is not something I 
will attempt here. In what follows, I will simply assume that the Standard Explanation 
(or something close to it) is a sound explanation of Lois’s rationality: I am interested in 
drawing the implications that the explanation has for our theory of concepts, not in 
assessing its merits183. In any case, the intuitive idea behind it should be clear enough. 
There is nothing irrational in accepting a thought and the negation of a different 
thought, even if, by doing so, one ends up ascribing contradictory properties to the same 
object. Because the two thoughts are distinct, the thinker is not in a “position to see” 
that, by accepting them, he holds contradictory de re beliefs about the same object. If 
the two thoughts were the same thought, on the other hand, he would be able to 
recognize that his beliefs are contradictory. If he then persisted in accepting both 
thoughts, he would be knowingly ascribing contradictory properties to the same object, 
which arguably constitutes an irrational doxastic behavior.  
Crucially, once we endorse the Standard Explanation as a correct account of Lois’ 
rationality, we also seem to be committed to a certain general principle concerning the 
identity conditions of concepts. This principle is our second constraint on a theory of 
concepts; I will refer to it as “the Fregean constraint”184. The principle has been stated 
in a variety of different ways; my formulation is in fact a mere terminological variant on 
some better known versions (I prefer my formulation because it fits better with the 
terms of our discussion in the following chapters).  
Let’s say that, when a subject has a de re belief about some x in virtue of accepting a 
thought that is partially constituted by some concept C, then C is “involved” in the 
subject’s belief. For instance, we will say that Lois’ SUPERMAN-CLARK are “involved” in 
her contradictory beliefs about Superman/Clark: Lois believes of Superman/Clark that 
he can fly in virtue of accepting SUPERMAN CAN FLY, and she believes of 
Superman/Clark that he cannot fly in virtue of accepting CLARK CANNOT FLY. We can 
then state our constraint as follows:  
 
                                                
182 Rejecting a thought simply consists in standing in the belief-relation to the negation of that thought. 
183 V. Millikan (2000) for criticism. 
184 I borrow the phrase from Schiffer (1990, p. 252). 
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The Fregean Constraint (FC): If two concepts C1-C2 are involved in the 
contradictory beliefs of a rational subject S at time t about some object x, then C1-C2 
are not the same concept185. 
 
It’s easy to see that, once we accept the Standard Explanation as a sound explanation of 
Lois’ rationality, we will also have strong reasons to accept (FC). There are no 
significant differences between Lois’ case and other Frege cases in which someone 
rationally holds contradictory beliefs (cf. for instance Peter or Oedipus)186. So, if the 
Standard Explanation constitutes a sound explanation of Lois’ rationality, it should also 
explain why these other subjects are rational. But then, whenever a rational subject has 
contradictory beliefs about some x, we must assume that he does so in virtue of 
accepting two distinct thoughts T1-T2 constituted by distinct concepts C1-C2. This, of 
course, is exactly what (FC) amounts to: if two concepts are involved in the 
contradictory beliefs of a rational subject, then they cannot be the same concept, or we 
would not be able to use the Standard Explanation to explain the subject’s rationality.  
 
(FC) is our second constraint on a theory of concepts. Before we start analyzing its 
relation with publicity, I should note that the rationality problem is not the only puzzle 
raised by Frege cases: the behavior of subjects involved in such cases and the cognitive 
significance that certain claims will have for them also seem to call for an explanation. 
Consider Lois again: 
 
                                                
185 Several authors have (more or less explicitly) accepted some version of (FC): v. among others Salmon 
(1986), Braun (1998), Recanati (2009). My way of stating (FC) is inspired by Schiffer’s version of the 
principle: 
 
[…] Frege’s constraint has two parts. First it says that a rational person x may both believe and 
disbelieve that a certain thing or property y is such and such only if there are distinct modes of 
presentation m and m’ such that x believes y to be such and such under m and disbelieves it to be such 
and such under m’. Then it says that there are distinct modes of presentation m and m’ such that x 
believes y to be such and such under m and disbelieves it to be such and such under m’ only if x fails 
to realize that m and m’ are modes of presentation of one and the same thing. In other words, you 
can’t rationally believe and disbelieve something under one and the same mode of presentation, or 
under modes of presentation which you realize are modes of presentation of one and the same thing 
(Schiffer 1990, p. 252). 
 
(V. also Schiffer 1987, 2006). As Recanati points out in the passage quoted above, the idea behind (FC) is 
an old one: it goes back to Frege’s idea of postulating distinct modes of presentation to explain the 
cognitive significance of certain identity claims (v. Frege 1956). For an illuminating discussion of the 
Fregean appeal to modes of presentation, v. Millikan (2000); this chapter was partly inspired by 
Millikan’s penetrating remarks on this issue. 
186 This premise might be questioned; for instance, it would be rejected by Sainsbury and Tye (v. sect. 4.2 
infra for discussion). Here I’m not interested in offering a bullet-proof argument for (FC), only in spelling 
out the motivations behind it.  
  134 
• Lois will go out with Superman/Clark if he asks her “Would you like to go out for 
dinner?” while wearing his superhero outfit, but not if he asks the same question 
while wearing his reporter clothes. 
 
• Lois will find the claim “Superman is Clark Kent” informative, but she will find the 
claims “Superman is Superman” and “Clark Kent is Clark Kent” uninformative. 
 
Why does Lois behave in this way, if the person asking her out is the same in the two 
cases? And why does she find some identity claims about Superman/Clark informative 
and others uninformative, if they all ascribe exactly the same property (being identical 
to himself) to the very same guy? 
A lot would have to be said about these questions and their relation to the rationality 
problem. What matters for our purposes, however, is that many RTM theorists have 
explained these features of Frege cases by taking the subjects involved to have distinct 
coreferential concepts. For instance, many would explain Lois’ behavior by claiming 
that Lois stands in the desire-relation with the thought GOING OUT WITH SUPERMAN, but 
not with the distinct thought GOING OUT WITH CLARK KENT187. And they would explain 
the different informativeness that identity claims have for her by taking Lois to 
associate the uninformative claims with the thoughts SUPERMAN IS SUPERMAN/CLARK 
KENT IS CLARK KENT (which she accepts as self-evident), and the informative claims 
with the distinct thought SUPERMAN IS CLARK KENT (which she won’t accept until 
becoming enlightened about Clark’s secret identity)188.  
Of course, these accounts of behavior and cognitive significance assume that Lois’s 
SUPERMAN-CLARK KENT are distinct concepts: mutatis mutandis for other Frege cases. 
Besides the rationality problem, then, RTM theorists will have further reasons to ascribe 
                                                
187 Cf. for instance Fodor: 
 
If beliefs (and the like) are relations to syntactically structured mental representations, there are 
indeed two parameters of belief individuation, just as Frege requires: Morning Star beliefs have the 
same conditions of semantic evaluation as Evening Star beliefs, but they implicate the tokening of 
different syntactic objects and are therefore different beliefs with different causal powers […]. That 
believing P and believing Q may have different causal powers even if ‘P’ and ‘Q’ have the same 
semantic value shows up in all those operas where the soprano dies of mistaken identity (Fodor 1998, 
p. 39, my emphasis). 
 
188 Cf. for instance Peacocke, who defines concept sameness and distinctness in terms of cognitive 
significance: 
 
Distinctness of Concepts: Concepts C and D are distinct iff there are two complete propositional 
contents that differ at most in that one contains C substituted in one or more places for D, and one of 
which is potentially informative while the other is not (Peacocke 1992, p. 2). 
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distinct coreferential concepts to the subjects involved in a Frege case, since this will 
often be required by their accounts of behavior and cognitive significance189. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                
189 Cf. for instance Fodor (1994, 1998, 2008), who seems to be interested in problems of behavior and 
cognitive significance more than in the rationality problem. V. also Prinz (2002). 
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3. Individuation Criteria For Concepts 
 
3.1 . Some Criteria 
 
Now that our two constraints are on the table, it’s time to start examining the 
relation between them. I will consider some important theories of concepts that have 
been proposed in the recent literature and note that they all seem to present a problem. 
These theories put forward sets of “sameness conditions” (or “individuation criteria”) 
for concepts, where these conditions are of a specific form (they are what I will call 
“unrestricted” conditions). In doing so, the goal of many of these theories is to satisfy 
one or both of our constraints. As we will see in section 4.2, however, all the 
unrestricted criteria that are powerful enough to satisfy (FC) also seem to be 
inconsistent with (PUB). This is a problem: if our two constraints are consistent, we 
should be able to find an individuation criterion that can satisfy both. I will then 
consider a possible way to “patch” some of these criteria so as to make them compatible 
with publicity (sect. 4.3). As we’ll see, this solution still entails that several concepts are 
not shared; whether this consequence is compatible with the publicity principle is 
something I will discuss in the next chapter. 
 
Much of our discussion will concern “individuation criteria” for concepts that are 
“unrestricted”. In order to introduce these notions, it will be useful to look at some 
concrete examples first. We’ll start with the “originalist” theory of concepts recently 
proposed by Sainsbury and Tye190 (2011, 2012): 
 
Originalism answers the question: what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept C1 
to be the same concept as the concept C2? According to originalism, every concept has exactly one 
originating use, and every originating use of a concept is an originating use of just one concept. 
Hence we can offer the following necessary and sufficient condition for concepts to be the same: 
 
(O) Concept C1 = concept C2 iff the originating use of C1 = the originating use of C2. 
 
In this picture, each use U of a concept is a use of the unique concept that lies at the origin of the R-
linked chain of uses to which U belongs (Sainsbury and Tye 2011, p. 105). 
 
We will say more about origins later. For now, what matters is that ST are proposing an 
“individuation criterion” for concepts (a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
concept identity) which holds “unrestrictedly” (it applies to all concepts).  
ST are also explicit in taking publicity to be an important constraint on a theory of 
concepts191:   
                                                
190 From now on, “ST”. 
191 Indeed, this is supposed to be one of the main motivations behind originalism: v. sect. 4.2 infra for 
more details. 
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Concepts are public and shared. No doubt we and you think of Austin in somewhat different ways. 
But we all have the same concept AUSTIN, shown by the sameness of some of our thoughts, and 
logical relations among others. If you and we think that Austin is a cool city, we think the same 
thought, and hence share the concepts that constitute it, and hence share the concept AUSTIN. If you 
think that Austin is the music capital of the world and we disagree, we think a thought that conflicts 
with yours, and this is again explicable in terms of our sharing the concept AUSTIN. This is consistent 
with our associating the concept with different information, which is what makes us say that we think 
of Austin in different ways (Sainsbury and Tye 2012, p. 21). 
 
ST also think subjects involved in Frege cases must have distinct coreferential concepts 
in order to account for puzzles of cognitive significance: 
 
[…] the pattern exemplified by the thought that Hesperus is Hesperus is distinct from the pattern 
exemplified by the thought that Hesperus is Phosphorus. In the first, a single concept is used twice. 
In the second, two concepts are each used once. This may have an impact on informativeness. When 
a concept is used twice in an identity thought, the thought is typically uninformative, whereas a 
thought similar in point of structure and content, but using two concepts, may be informative 
(Sainsbury and Tye 2011, p. 117). 
 
(With respect to (FC), ST think difference in concepts explains rationality in some 
Frege cases, although not all of them. They would therefore deny that (FC) can be 
extended to all cases of contradictory belief. I will discuss and criticize their rejection of 
(FC) in sect. 4.2).  
 
ST’s account offers a clear example of an unrestricted individuation criterion for 
concepts, but several other RTM theorists have engaged in the same project. For 
instance, many authors subscribing to a non-Fregean ontology have tried to provide sets 
of typing conditions for concepts. This has been an especially popular programme 
among those working within the LoT framework: having identified concepts with LoT 
symbols, these theorists provide typing conditions for concepts by putting forward a 
typing criterion for LoT symbols. A typing criterion is a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions under which two token concepts will belong to the same type concept. Here, 
for instance, is a summary of three possible typing criteria discussed by Aydede (2000a, 
sect. 1): 
 
[Semantic]: two symbol tokens in different heads are of the same type if, and only 
if, they have the same semantic content.  
 
[Physicalist]: two symbol tokens in different heads are of the same type if, and only 
if, they have the same physical […] properties. 
 
[Narrow functionalist]: two symbol tokens in different heads are of the same type 
if, and only if, they have the same narrow functional role192. 
                                                
192 This can be equated with global inferential role. 
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And here is the “atomistic” typing criterion for concepts proposed by Fodor (1998), as 
it’s reconstructed by Aydede (1998, p. 289): 
 
Fodor […] distinguishes between concept identity and content identity, where content is understood 
to be broad (purely denotational). So different contents imply different concepts. But it is possible for 
two concepts to be type-distinct while identical in content (intra or interpersonally). The extra 
individuating element is what Fodor calls Modes of Presentation (MOPs), which are the vehicles that 
carry the content. 
So, according to Fodor, the individuation condition for concepts is given by an ordered pair (a 2-
tuple), whose first element is the broad content and the second a vehicle type that has the first as its 
semantic value: <denotation, vehicle type>. For present purposes we can represent concepts with 
these 2-tuples. According to Fodor, vehicles are terms in one's Language of Thought (LOT -- 
sometimes called Mentalese) realized in the brain. As such vehicles have both syntactic and semantic 
properties, and this fact can be used to answer the question raised by standard Frege cases: what 
makes co-denoting concepts type-distinct? (Aydede 1998, p. 289). 
 
Fodor’s view is well summarized by the formula: 
 
[…] a mental representation is individuated by its form and content […] (Fodor 1998, p. 27). 
 
 (Notice that Fodor and other authors in this tradition explicitly equate “typing 
conditions” and “individuation conditions”193; I will follow their usage). 
Other RTM-LoT theorists have proposed individuation criteria for LoT symbols that 
are of the same form as Fodor’s but differ radically in content: v. for instance the 
holistic account recently proposed by Schneider: 
 
[…] symbols must be individuated by their computational roles […] (Schneider 2009a, p. 545). 
 
[The Computational Theory of the Mind] requires a theory that types tokens by sameness and 
difference of total computational role, where the total computational role of a symbol is understood 
as the role it plays in the algorithms of a completed cognitive science (ibid., p. 524).	  
 
Crucially, note how all these typing criteria amount to sets of sameness conditions that 
apply to every token concept: just like ST’s originalism, they are “unrestricted 
individuation criteria” for concepts. 
Interestingly, both atomists and holists want their criteria to predict that subjects 
involved in Frege cases will have distinct coreferential concepts for the relevant objects; 
in particular, they often take this to be required for a correct explanation of these 
subjects’ behavior194: 
 
Morning Star beliefs have the same conditions of semantic evaluation as Evening Star beliefs, but 
they implicate the tokening of different syntactic objects and are therefore different beliefs with 
                                                
193 V. for instance Fodor (1998), chs. 1-2. 
194 V. especially Schneider (2009a, pp. 531-35), who is particularly explicit about this point; v. also Block 
(1993, 1995). 
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different causal powers […] That believing P and believing Q may have different causal powers even 
if ‘P’ and ‘Q’ have the same semantic value shows up in all those operas where the soprano dies of 
mistaken identity (Fodor 1998, p. 39, my emphasis)195. 
 
(Of course, holists do not also take their criteria to be subject to the publicity constraint, 
while Fodor is probably the paradigmatic example of an RTM-LoT theorist who wants 
his account to make correct predictions about Frege cases while also complying with 
(PUB)196).  
The project of offering an individuation criterion for concepts has played an 
important role in the non-Fregean tradition. But authors on the Fregean side have also 
engaged in that project. Consider for instance the general form of the account defended 
by Peacocke (1992). According to Peacocke, a correct account of the possession (or 
“grasping”) conditions of a concept will also be a complete account of its individuation 
conditions: 
 
Principle of Dependence: there can be nothing more to the nature of a concept than is determined by 
a correct account of the capacity of a thinker who has mastered the concept to have propositional 
attitudes to contents containing that concept (a correct account of “grasping the concept”) (Peacocke 
1992, p. 5). 
 
Given the Principle of Dependence, here is how an account of the individuation 
conditions for a particular concept will look like: 
 
Accepting the Principle of Dependence opens up the possibility that we can simultaneously say in a 
single account what individuates a particular concept and also what it is to possess that concept. The 
general form that could be taken by such an account is this: 
 
Simple Formulation: Concept F is that unique concept C to possess which a thinker must meet 
condition A(C) (ibid., p. 6). 
 
(For instance: the concept CONJUNCTION is that unique concept C to possess which a 
thinker must (roughly) be disposed to infer in conformity with the rules of conjunction 
introduction and elimination). Of course, a set of individuation conditions for a concept 
C will also be a set of sameness conditions for C: that is, any such set will amount to a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a concept C* to be identical with C: 
 
A statement that individuates a concept by giving its possession condition is an identity statement. 
The above statement of the possession condition for conjunction, for instance, is of the following 
logical form: 
 
Conjunction = the unique concept C such that for a thinker to possess C is for … C … (ibid., p. 9). 
 
                                                
195 V. also Fodor (1998, pp. 20-21). 
196 Aydede (1998; 2000 a,b) seems to share the same ambition. 
  140 
Peacocke’s account is thus an excellent example of an individuation criterion for 
concepts provided against the background of a Fregean ontology197. 
 
3.2. Some Terminology: Individuation, Restriction, Satisfaction 
 
Having given a few concrete examples, we can finally offer a more general 
characterization of the notions of “unrestricted individuation criterion” and “constraint 
satisfaction”. I will call an “individuation criterion” for concepts any statement of a set 
of necessary and sufficient sameness conditions for concepts. A criterion will therefore 
include: 
 
• A set of necessary conditions for two concepts C1-C2 to be the same concept. 
• A set of sufficient conditions for two concepts C1-C2 to be the same concept. 
 
(For instance: two concepts C1-C2 are the same concept iff they have same origin; two 
concepts C1-C2 are the same concept iff they have same reference and same syntactic 
properties; two concepts C1-C2 are the same concept iff they have same global inferential 
role; etc…). The conditions provided can of course take a number of different forms: 
 
• The criterion might state a single necessary and sufficient condition for concept 
sameness (e.g. having same origin, according to ST). 
 
• Alternatively, it might state a set of (two or more) individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions. (On Fodor’s account, for instance, having same reference and 
same syntactic properties are two individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for concept sameness). 
 
• The conditions provided might also take disjunctive rather than conjunctive form: 
for instance, a criterion might state that two concepts C1-C2 are the same concept iff 
they have properties [F, G, H] or properties [I, J, K] or properties [F, G, K] or … 
 
• Crucially, the conditions provided might be specific to a particular concept rather 
than general. One might for instance provide the following necessary condition for a 
particular concept CX198: 
                                                
197 Peacocke explicitly holds that a correct individuation criterion should account for puzzles of cognitive 
significance; v. for instance the already quoted “Distinctness of Concepts” principle (fn. 188 supra). He 
also subscribes to the idea that concepts are routinely shared by ordinary thinkers (Peacocke 1992, p. 3); 
this requirement is stressed even more by another Fregean, Georges Rey (v. Rey 1983, 1985, 1994, 
2009a). 
198 A word about notation: I will generally use “C1” and “C2” as variables ranging over concepts in 
general, and “CX” whenever I want to refer to a specific arbitrary concept. 
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A concept C is the same concept as CX → concept C has property/properties […] 
 
(This is the kind of condition that will be provided on Peacocke’s account. For instance, 
Peacocke holds that a concept C will be the same concept as CONJUNCTION just in case C 
has the possession conditions mentioned earlier. According to Peacocke, providing 
individuation conditions for specific concepts is one of the main tasks for a theory of 
concepts. His account is thus partially different from those previously examined, which 
all put forward general sets of sameness conditions199). 
 
A (necessary or sufficient) condition for concept sameness will be “unrestricted” 
just in case it applies to all concepts; an individuation criterion will be unrestricted just 
in case all of its sameness conditions are. The criteria examined in the previous section 
were all unrestricted: for instance, ST hold that, for any two concepts C1-C2, they are the 
same concept iff they have same origin; the holist holds that, for any two concepts C1-
C2, they are the same concept iff they have same global inferential role; and so on. A 
restricted condition would be one in which the quantifier was restricted to a particular 
class of concepts, as in: for any two concepts C1-C2 that are had by the same subject at 
the same time, C1-C2 are the same concept iff they have same origin/global inferential 
role/etc… . Notice that this condition would be significantly weaker than the first. (We 
will say a lot more about restricted conditions in the next chapter. For now, I will 
simply take it for granted that all the conditions we’ll examine are unrestricted).  
Given the way I defined the relevant notions, an unrestricted individuation criterion 
(K) might consist of necessary and sufficient sameness conditions of the following 
form: 
 
(K1) For any two concepts C1-C2: (C2 is the same concept as C1 → C2 has 
property/properties […]) 
(K2) For any two concepts C1-C2: (C2 has property/properties […] → C2 is the same 
concept as C1)  
 
For instance, on ST’s proposal: 
 
(K1) For any two concepts C1-C2: (C2 is the same concept as C1 → C2 has same 
origin as C1) 
(K2) For any two concepts C1-C2: (C2 has same origin as C1 → C2 is the same 
concept as C1) 
 
In addition to general conditions of this kind, or in alternative to them, the criterion 
might include specific conditions for a particular concept CX, of the form: 
 
                                                
199 V. Peacocke (1992, ch. 1) for more details. 
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(K1x) For any concept C: (C is the same concept as CX → C has property/properties 
[…]) 
(K2x) For any concept C: (C has property/properties […] → C is the same concept as 
CX)200 
 
(Cf. Peacocke’s account. In this chapter I will mostly examine conditions of the first 
kind, i.e. the general conditions proposed by ST, Fodor, Schneider… ; later on, I will 
also consider conditions of the second kind). 
Crucially, notice that since the expression “same concept” can be taken to express 
different kinds of “sameness relations”, an individuation criterion can be interpreted 
differently depending on what its proponent means by “same concept”. Suppose our 
theorist means “numerically identical concepts”: under this interpretation, his 
individuation criterion will state a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for two 
concepts to be numerically the same. (For instance, a Fregean theorist might provide a 
set of conditions under which two abstract concepts will be numerically identical). 
Alternatively, our theorist might mean “type-identical token concepts”: under this 
interpretation, his individuation criterion will state a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for two token concepts to belong to the same type, e.g. for two token LoT 
symbols to belong to the same LoT symbol-type. (This is how we should interpret the 
criteria proposed by non-Fregeans like Fodor, Schneider, Block etc…)201. In what 
follows we will discuss individuation criteria of both kinds; whenever we examine a 
certain criterion, I will therefore make clear whether it should be interpreted in the 
numerical-identity or the type-identity sense.  
 
We have now spelled out what an “unrestricted individuation criterion” for concepts 
amounts to202. As anticipated, my main thesis is that, if it satisfies (FC), a criterion of 
this form will: 
 
 
                                                
200 Notice that the specific sameness conditions (K1x)-(K2x) are also unrestricted, just like the general 
conditions (K1)-(K2). The distinction between general/specific conditions should not be confused with 
the distinction between unrestricted/restricted conditions. 
201 It’s not entirely clear whether ST intend to provide a set of identity conditions or just a set of typing 
conditions; fortunately, we need not decide the issue here, since my objections against their account go 
through on both readings.  
202 We might also add some further requirements: for instance, we might want our criterion to be 
“minimal”. If it’s true that “C2 is the same as C1 only if C2 has property/properties […]”, then it’s also true 
that “C2 is the same as C1 only if C2 has property/properties […] and 2 + 2 = 4”. By requiring the account 
to be minimal, such intuitively irrelevant conditions would be ruled out. We might also require the 
account to be “informative” and maybe include some further constraints as well. I am unable to spell out 
in detail what these requirements could amount to; I hope the examples considered in section 3.1, together 
with the general characterization offered in this section, will be enough to give the reader an intuitive 
sense of the kind of sameness conditions we are interested in.  
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• Either violate (PUB); 
• Or at any rate entail that several concepts (those involved in Frege cases) are not 
shared. 
 
But what do I mean by “satisfying (FC)”? Before offering a more precise 
characterization of the notion, let me give you a more intuitive one. A sameness 
condition (and the individuation criterion embedding it) will satisfy one of our 
constraints just in case it makes the right predictions about concept sameness and 
difference in all the cases covered by that constraint. That is: whenever the publicity 
constraint entails that, in a certain specific case, two concepts CX-CY are the same 
concept, it should follow from our individuation criterion that CX-CY are indeed the 
same; and whenever the Fregean constraint entails that, in a certain specific case, two 
concepts CX-CY are different concepts, it should follow from our individuation criterion 
that CX-CY are indeed different. This means that, in order for an individuation criterion to 
satisfy a constraint, it will have to include one or more sameness conditions that make 
the right predictions about the relevant cases (so I’ll talk about sameness conditions and 
individuation criteria “satisfying” a constraint more or less interchangeably).  
Let’s give an example. (FC) entails that the concepts involved in Lois’ contradictory 
beliefs about Superman/Clark are different; as usual, we will call these two concepts 
SUPERMAN and CLARK. Since it follows from (FC) that these two concepts are distinct, 
an individuation criterion (K) will satisfy (FC) only if it follows from (K) that Lois’ 
SUPERMAN is a different concept from Lois’ CLARK. This means that, in order for (K) to 
satisfy (FC), it must include a necessary condition for concept sameness which is not 
met by Lois’ two concepts, in which case it will indeed follow from (K) that the two 
concepts are distinct. For instance: if (K) included the necessary condition “C1 = C2 only 
if they have same global inferential role”, then it would clearly follow from (K) that 
Lois’ concepts are distinct. Similarly for all other “Frege cases” covered by (FC): an 
individuation criterion (K) will satisfy (FC) iff, for each of these cases, (K) entails that 
the concepts involved in the subject’s contradictory beliefs are different203. (The same 
holds for publicity, although my focus in the next chapters will be on (FC))204. 
We can now offer a more formal definition of the notion of “satisfaction” (I will 
only define the notion with respect to (FC)): 
 
                                                
203 Notice that (FC) can also be satisfied through a set of concept-specific conditions rather than a general 
one. For instance, to satisfy (FC) in Lois’ case, our criterion could include the specific condition “If a 
concept C = SUPERMAN, then C is inferentially connected to [HAS SUPERPOWERS]”: since this condition is 
not met by Lois’ CLARK, our criterion would satisfy (FC) in this case. Further specific conditions would 
then have to be given for every other Frege case. 
204 Notice that “satisfying” a constraint is not the same as being consistent with it; a sameness condition 
can be consistent with a constraint but fail to satisfy it, i.e. fail to make the right predictions about the 
cases covered by that constraint. We will consider several instances of this later. 
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Satisfying (FC): A necessary condition for concept sameness (K1) satisfies (FC) 
iff, for any world w in which two concepts CX-CY are involved in the contradictory 
beliefs of a rational subject S at t about some x, it follows from (K1) plus a complete 
description of w that CX is a different concept from CY.  
 
(An individuation criterion will then satisfy (FC) just in case it includes a necessary 
condition, or a set of necessary conditions, which satisfies (FC)). Consider a world w in 
which two concepts CX-CY are involved in the contradictory beliefs of a rational subject 
S at time t about some object x (e.g. the world in which SUPERMAN and CLARK are 
involved in Lois’ contradictory beliefs about Superman/Clark). If a necessary condition 
doesn’t entail that CX is different from CY (given a complete description of w), then it 
doesn’t satisfy (FC): we now have a case in which it follows from (FC) that two 
concepts are distinct, but in which (K1) doesn’t entail that they are. If on the other hand 
our necessary condition does entail that CX is different from CY (given a complete 
description of w), then it does satisfy (FC) in w; and if it also satisfies (FC) in all the 
other worlds in which (FC) applies, then it just satisfies (FC) in general. Going back to 
our usual example, the necessary condition: “C1 = C2 only if they have same global 
inferential role” clearly satisfies (FC) in Lois’ case: w is a world in which Lois’ two 
concepts do not have same global inferential role, so it follows from our condition + w’s 
description that Lois’ SUPERMAN is different from Lois’ CLARK, which is just what (FC) 
requires. 
 
  145 
4. A Tension Between Constraints 
 
4.1 . The Double Superman Case 
 
In this section, I will consider a case in which: 
 
• (FC) requires two concepts CX-CY to be distinct;  
• But all the unrestricted necessary conditions which correctly predict that CX is 
distinct from CY also violate (PUB)205. 
 
The case raises a puzzle: can we find an unrestricted criterion that satisfies (FC) while 
being consistent with publicity? At the end of this section, I will consider a first possible 
solution to the puzzle and note how that solution still entails that many concepts are not 
shared; whether this is consistent with publicity is something I will discuss in the next 
chapter.  
The case I’ll discuss is a simple variant of our standard Frege case involving Lois 
and Superman/Clark. As we’ll see, the case is not at all far-fetched or extraordinary: 
analogous Frege cases arise all the time in our everyday cognitive lives. In Lois’ case, a 
rational subject has two concepts that are involved in contradictory beliefs and are 
respectively associated with the “standard” Superman-ish role and the “standard” Clark-
ish role: Lois believes of Superman/Clark that he can fly under the first concept, and 
that he cannot fly under the second. What makes the inferential roles “standard”, of 
course, is the fact that most inhabitants of Metropolis possess concepts having the roles 
in question (the superhero called “Superman” and the reporter called “Clark Kent” are 
both well-known characters). 
Things are a bit different in our case: here, a rational subject has two concepts that 
are involved in contradictory beliefs about Superman/Clark and are both associated with 
the standard Superman-ish role. Each concept refers to Superman/Clark and is 
inferentially connected to [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN FLY, HAS 
SUPERPOWERS…]; just like Lois, however, our subject rationally ascribes to 
Superman/Clark the property of being F under the first concept, and the contradictory 
property of being not-F under the second.  
It’s easy to imagine a case like this. Suppose Edmund is a rational, normal subject 
under all relevant respects. Like Lois and most other inhabitants of Metropolis, he 
believes there is a superhero called “Superman” who wears a red cape, can fly, has 
superpowers and so on. At some point, Edmund hears on the news that, within a few 
minutes, someone fitting his Superman-description captured a bank robber and saved a 
kitten in two very distant parts of Metropolis. As a result, he concludes (reasonably, but 
mistakenly) that there must be two distinct people who are both called “Superman”, 
                                                
205 By “violate” I simply mean “are inconsistent with”. 
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wear a red cape, can fly etc… : one of them captured the bank robber, the other saved 
the kitten. So Edmund believes, of the person who appeared in zone A of Metropolis, 
that he captured the robber; at the same time, he believes of the person who appeared in 
zone B that he did not capture the robber. Therefore, Edmund believes of Superman that 
he both did and did not capture the robber.  
Clearly, Edmund is not irrational in his contradictory de re beliefs. If so, then (FC) 
entails that the concepts involved in those beliefs must be distinct concepts (if they 
weren’t, we could not apply the Standard Explanation to account for Edmund’s 
rationality). Let’s call the two concepts SUPERMAN1/SUPERMAN2. Given our description 
of the case, it follows that: 
 
• Both concepts have the standard Superman-ish role [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, 
WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN FLY…]. 
• However, SUPERMAN1 is also connected with [CAPTURED THE BANK ROBBER, DID 
NOT SAVE THE KITTEN]. 
• While SUPERMAN2 is connected with [DID NOT CAPTURE THE BANK ROBBER, 
SAVED THE KITTEN].  
 
(You can also think of the two concepts as two “mental files”: each file “contains” the 
standard Superman-description, but it also contains some information about Superman 
which contradicts the information contained in the other file206). Since (FC) entails that 
SUPERMAN1 is different from SUPERMAN2, an individuation criterion that satisfies (FC) 
must include a necessary condition for concept sameness which, together with a 
complete description of the case, entails that SUPERMAN1 is indeed different from 
SUPERMAN2. We must therefore look for an unrestricted necessary condition which is 
not met by Edmund’s two concepts: this condition will entail that SUPERMAN1 is 
different from SUPERMAN2, and (FC) will be satisfied. While looking for this condition, 
our driving question will be: can we find an unrestricted condition which entails that 
SUPERMAN1 is different from SUPERMAN2 and is at the same time consistent with (PUB)? 
As we will see in the next section, all the major individuation criteria examined so far 
seem to fail on at least one of these scores. 
 
4.2 . Satisfying (FC) Vs. Respecting (PUB) 
 
In this section, I will consider four unrestricted conditions for concept sameness, 
and note that each of them will either fail to satisfy (FC) in Edmund’s case or violate 
publicity:  
 
                                                
206 Cf. Recanati (1993, 2009) and Perry (2000) for an overview of the mental files framework. 
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a) For any two concepts C1-C2: (C2 is the same concept as C1 → C2 has same 
reference as C1) 
 
Clearly, (a) is a plausible condition on concept sameness: many RTM theorists hold 
that concepts are at least partially individuated by their reference. While we might well 
want to include (a) in our individuation criterion, however, this will clearly not be 
enough to satisfy (FC) in Edmund’s case (or indeed in any Frege case): SUPERMAN1-
SUPERMAN2 have same reference, so (a) fails to entail that they are distinct. We must 
therefore look for some further necessary condition which entails that SUPERMAN1 is 
distinct from SUPERMAN2 without flouting (PUB). This is what will prove hard; to see 
why, let’s turn to the individuation criteria examined in section 3.1. 
 
b) C2 is the same concept as C1 → C2 has same origin as C1 207 
 
To determine whether ST’s account can deal with our case, we must say a bit more 
about the notion of an “origin”. According to ST, concepts “come into existence”: they 
are “non eternal continuants” (2011, p. 102). A concept can be created in at least two 
ways. First, someone might introduce a new term in public language to refer to some 
object x: he thereby creates a concept C which refers to x and can be acquired by other 
subjects when they learn the term associated with C. Acquiring a concept in this way 
will involve deferring to previous users: “deference takes the form of intending to use 
the concept as it has been used by oneself or others on previous occasions” (ibid., p. 
103). A thinker might also create a concept without associating it with a public term. 
This “private” concept might be introduced through an “explicit intentional 
introduction”, but in many cases it will simply be the product of subpersonal processes: 
this will be the case for most of the concepts infants acquire in the course of their 
development. Crucially, however, ST think that “the concepts infants form on their own 
are typically supplanted by public concepts when they become full members of their 
surrounding linguistic community […] as the child becomes a member of his conceptual 
community, [his private concept for cats] will be supplanted by one or more public 
concepts, for example the concept CAT […]” (ibid., p. 104). 
As it stands, ST’s originalist theory seems to flagrantly violate the publicity 
constraint; moreover, the account doesn’t even satisfy (FC) in all the relevant Frege 
cases. Let me address each of these points in turn. The problem with publicity is easily 
seen: if sameness of origin is necessary for concept identity, then whenever two 
concepts are associated with terms introduced by different linguistic communities they 
will be different concepts. If my current concept CAT is the one I acquired through 
linguistic immersion, by deferring to uses of previous speakers who employed the 
English term “cat”, then it is not the same concept as the one associated with the 
                                                
207 Throughout the rest of this section, I’ll leave the quantifier “for any two concepts C1-C2” implicit when 
stating sameness conditions. 
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Spanish word “gato”. So, assuming I don’t speak Spanish and have never come across 
the word “gato”, I don’t have the concept GATO. Therefore, a Spanish speaker who is in 
the same position with respect to the English word “cat” will not have any concept for 
cats in common with me. Notice, however, that me and my Spanish counterpart are 
certainly covered by many of the same cat-related generalizations, and that we 
genuinely agree about many features of cats. Therefore, (PUB) entails that we do have a 
concept for cats in common: ST’s necessary condition for concept sameness is too strict 
and makes wrong predictions about speakers belonging to different linguistic 
communities. This is ironic, since the main motivation for claiming that public concepts 
supplant the infant’s private concepts is to allow for concept publicity within a certain 
linguistic community208: unfortunately, (PUB) also requires concepts to be shared 
across different communities.  
Not only is ST’s necessary condition for concept sameness too fine-grained for 
publicity purposes; it also seems too coarse-grained for Fregean purposes. There are 
cases in which (FC) requires certain concepts to be distinct, even though they have the 
same origin: in all these cases, ST’s account will fail to make the right predictions. 
Admittedly, originalism will satisfy (FC) in some Frege cases. For instance: if James 
believes that Cicero was a Roman orator and that Tully was not a Roman orator, his 
beliefs will presumably involve two distinct concepts CICERO/TULLY, which are 
associated with different public names and which therefore have distinct origins209; 
similarly for Hesperus/Phosphorus cases and other analogous ones. In some scenarios, 
however, the concepts involved in a subject’s contradictory beliefs will not have 
different origins. For instance, ST hold that, in Kripke’s Paderewski case, Peter accepts 
the thought PADEREWSKI HAS MUSICAL TALENT and also accepts the negation of the very 
same thought, i.e. PADEREWSKI DOES NOT HAVE MUSICAL TALENT (v. Sainsbury and Tye 
2012, pp.131-138). When Peter becomes acquainted with Paderewski at the concert, he 
learns the proper name “Paderewski”, acquires the public concept PADEREWSKI and 
comes to accept a thought involving that concept, i.e. PADEREWSKI HAS MUSICAL 
TALENT. Later, at the political rally, Peter encounters the same name “Paderewski” and 
comes to accept a thought involving the same public concept, i.e. PADEREWSKI DOES 
NOT HAVE MUSICAL TALENT. Edmund’s case is analogous. When Edmund hears the 
news about Superman’s deeds in zone A and then about his deeds in zone B, one and 
the same public name (“Superman”) is used twice by the news reporter. So, on ST’s 
account, Edmund will come to accept a thought (SUPERMAN CAPTURED THE ROBBER) and 
the negation of the very same thought (SUPERMAN DID NOT CAPTURE THE ROBBER).  
 In cases like Peter and Edmund’s, (FC) entails that different concepts are involved 
in the subject’s thoughts, while ST hold that one and the same concept is involved. 
Now, ST do not take this to be a problem for their account, since they would reject 
                                                
208 As noted earlier, ST explicitly accept standard RTM arguments in support of publicity: v. the passage 
quoted in sect. 3.1 supra. V. also Sainsbury and Tye (2012, p. 87-88), where they argue that their view is 
superior to Millikan’s in its allowing for shared concepts. 
209 Sainsbury and Tye (2012, pp. 12-13). 
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(FC). In some cases involving contradictory de re beliefs, a subject’s rationality is 
indeed explained by his accepting thoughts involving distinct concepts; v. for instance 
the Cicero/Tully and Hesperus/Phosphorus cases described above. In cases such as 
Peter or Edmund’s, however, a subject is rational even though his contradictory beliefs 
involve the same concept: these cases show (FC) to be false.  
How, then, will ST explain Peter/Edmund’s rationality, if not by appealing to the 
distinctness of their concepts? ST’s strategy is to appeal to their beliefs about their own 
concepts: “Peter thinks, at the rally, that he has learned a new concept PADEREWSKI, 
different from the PADEREWSKI concept he had earlier acquired at the concert. He is 
wrong. But if this is a reasonable mistake, it is one that makes it reasonable for him to 
believe that his thoughts are not contradictory. He reasonably believes that it is not the 
case that the one thought consists in the other embedded in a concept for negation” 
(ibid., p. 134, my emphasis). 
I cannot make full justice to ST’s argument here. My main purpose in this section is 
to show that certain individuation criteria will violate (PUB), even when they do satisfy 
(FC); and I have already shown ST’s account to be inconsistent with publicity. Let me 
note, however, that there are at least two problems with ST’s strategy. First, it seems 
strange to offer different accounts of rationality in some Frege cases but not others, 
depending on how many public names are involved. Why would James’ rationality be 
explained by the fact that his contradictory beliefs involve distinct concepts 
CICERO/TULLY, while Peter’s rationality is explained by his meta-conceptual beliefs 
about his PADEREWSKI-concept? For this asymmetry to be justified, the fact that a single 
public name “Paderewski” is involved in Peter’s case should somehow make a 
difference. But why would the fact that Paderewski only happened to have one name, 
while Cicero had two, determine a difference in what makes Peter and James rational? 
To put things differently: if what explains James’ rationality is the fact that his beliefs 
involve distinct concepts, it seems that the same fact should also explain Peter’s 
rationality. At the very least, the resulting account would have the advantage of being 
more unified than ST’s. 
An even more serious worry is that, contra ST, Peter simply doesn’t seem to have 
any beliefs about the identity of his concept PADEREWSKI. Prima facie, Peter does not 
believe that he acquired a concept at the concert and a second, distinct concept at the 
rally, nor that these concepts are involved in the thoughts he formed on those occasions. 
Peter certainly never makes claims about the identity of his own concepts, and we might 
suppose he is an entirely unsophisticated thinker. More generally, it seems implausible 
and ad hoc to claim that all subjects who find themselves in a Paderewski-like case 
must have meta-conceptual beliefs like those invoked by ST210.  
In reply, ST could try to weaken their claim: perhaps all that’s needed to explain 
Peter’s rationality is that he doesn’t believe his two thoughts involve the same concept, 
not that he positively believes they don’t. But this seems too weak. Suppose Peter learns 
                                                
210 Interestingly, ST seem to agree: v. Sainsbury and Tye (2012, p. 136). 
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of the identity between the pianist and the politician, thus coming to accept claims like 
“The man called ‘Paderewski’ who was at the concert is the same person as the man 
called ‘Paderewski’ who was at the rally”. Suppose, however, that Peter also retains his 
contradictory beliefs after becoming enlightened: for instance, suppose he keeps saying 
things like “The man called ‘Paderewski’ who was at the concert has musical talent” 
and “The man called ‘Paderewski’ who was at the rally lacks musical talent”. Clearly, 
Peter would be irrational in these circumstances. But, if Peter didn’t believe that his 
inconsistent thoughts involved the same concept before becoming enlightened (e.g. 
because he is an unsophisticated thinker), there is no reason why he should have 
acquired that belief now: being unsophisticated, Peter will lack meta-conceptual beliefs 
at any time. So the weakened version of ST’s account incorrectly predicts that Peter is 
still rational after he learns the identity: after all, he still doesn’t believe that his 
thoughts involve the same concept PADEREWSKI. 
I conclude that ST’s originalist condition on concept sameness violates (PUB); that 
it fails to satisfy (FC) in some Frege cases; and that ST’s rejection of (FC) forces them 
to adopt a problematic account of rationality in those cases. 
 
c) C2 is the same concept as C1 → C2 has same inferential role as C1 
 
This is the sameness condition endorsed by Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) 
theories of concepts. To determine what kind of predictions it will make in our case, we 
must of course give a definition of “inferential role” first. As we have seen in chapter 
2211, there are two options here, and therefore two possible ways to decline (c). First, we 
considered a holistic definition of “inferential role”, on which the role of a concept C is 
the set of all the inferential connections in which C stands at a time t for a subject S. On 
a holistic construal, (c) clearly satisfies (FC) in Edmund’s case, since his SUPERMAN1-
SUPERMAN2 differ in many of their inferential connections. However, it’s equally clear 
that (c) will then violate (PUB), for the usual reasons: on a holistic definition of 
“inferential role”, two subjects won’t have any concepts in common unless they share 
all of their beliefs. 
A second possibility would be to give a non-holistic, or “localist” construal of 
inferential roles212:   
 
Localist definition of inferential roles: the inferential role of a concept C is the set 
of some (but not all) the inferential connections in which C stands at a time t for a 
subject S. 
                                                
211 Sect. 2.3. 
212 Localist theories of concepts are defended by (among others): Weiskopf (2009 a,b), Devitt (2006), 
Pereboom (1995), Rey (1983, 1985, 2005), Peacocke (1992, 1998a, 2007). The formulation in the text 
simplifies some of the differences between localist views, but not in a way that matters here. In chapter 6 
I will discuss different varieties of localism in more detail. 
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Of course, our necessary condition (c) will now be a lot less strict than on the holist’s 
reading. Suppose the local inferential role of BACHELOR is [UNMARRIED MAN]. The 
localist will then hold that, even if I happen to believe that all bachelors are lonely and 
you don’t, we can still share the same concept BACHELOR. As long as we are both 
disposed to infer from BACHELOR to UNMARRIED MAN (and vice versa), our two concepts 
will be the same even if they differ in some of their connections (e.g. BACHELOR → 
LONELY). For this reason, localist versions of IRS seem better equipped to deal with 
publicity (arguably, one of the main motivations for the view). But can they also satisfy 
(FC)? 
Before discussing Edmund’s case, notice that localism does seem to satisfy (FC) in 
more “standard” Frege cases like Lois’. For instance, suppose we identify the inferential 
role of the concept SUPERMAN with the standard Superman-ish role: on this view, a 
concept C will be the concept SUPERMAN only if it stands in an inferential connection to 
[CALLED “SUPERMAN”, WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN FLY…]. This would enable the localist 
to satisfy (FC): Lois has a concept C1 for Superman/Clark which is associated with 
[CALLED “SUPERMAN”, WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN FLY…] and a concept C2 which is not (it 
is associated with [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…]). It thus follows from 
localism that Lois’ C2 is not the same concept as her C1, since the two concepts have 
different local roles. 
At the same time, a localist necessary condition does not seem to violate (PUB) in 
Lois’ case. Given that most people associate the same description with the name 
“Superman”, they all have a concept C that has the inferential role of SUPERMAN; 
therefore, they all meet the localist necessary condition on concept sameness. Whenever 
publicity requires two subjects to share SUPERMAN for purposes of communication, 
agreement and so on, the localist condition will be respected. Localism thus seems to 
give us the best of both worlds: it cuts concepts finely enough to satisfy (FC), and 
without violating (PUB) at the same time! 
Now, I believe this is a mistaken diagnosis determined by some exceptional features 
of Lois’ case, most notably the fact that the inferential role of Lois’ two concepts 
happens to be widely shared by many other inhabitants of Metropolis. As Edmund’s 
case shows, however, other Frege cases will be very different. By hypothesis, Edmund’s 
SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2 are both inferentially connected with [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, 
WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN FLY…]. Unlike Lois’ SUPERMAN-CLARK, then, Edmund’s 
concepts share the standard Superman-ish role: they only differ in certain other, “non-
standard” inferential connections ([CAPTURED THE ROBBER/DID NOT CAPTURE THE 
ROBBER]; [DID NOT SAVE THE KITTEN/SAVED THE KITTEN]213). Therefore, Edmund’s 
concepts do not seem to violate our necessary condition (c). If we define “inferential 
role” as the localist proposes, the two concepts seem to have the same inferential role, 
                                                
213 Of course, Edmund will make various inferences from these features, which will result in further 
differences between the inferential connections of the two concepts.  
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i.e. the inferential role of the (widely shared) concept SUPERMAN. If so, our localist 
condition (c) will not satisfy (FC) in Edmund’s case. 
A first possible localist reply would be that we have mischaracterized the inferential 
role of Edmund’s concepts; that role is a lot more specific than the standard Superman-
ish role. For instance, we could describe the role of the two concepts as follows: 
 
i. Inferential role of SUPERMAN1: [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN 
FLY, HAS SUPERPOWERS…, CAPTURED THE ROBBER, DID NOT SAVE THE KITTEN] 
 
ii. Inferential role of SUPERMAN2: [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN 
FLY, HAS SUPERPOWERS…, DID NOT CAPTURE THE ROBBER, SAVED THE KITTEN] 
 
Clearly, the inferential role of Edmund’s SUPERMAN1 is now different from the 
inferential role of his SUPERMAN2. It will then immediately follow from our necessary 
condition (c) that SUPERMAN1 is not the same concept as SUPERMAN2, since they have 
different inferential roles. And, crucially, this will be compatible with a localist 
definition of “inferential role”, since the roles in (i)-(ii) need not include all the 
inferential connections in which Edmund’s concepts stand. So the inferential role of the 
two concepts is not holistic. Conclusion: (c) does satisfy (FC), even assuming a localist 
reading of the condition. 
The problem with the localist’s response is easy to see. To distinguish between 
SUPERMAN1 and SUPERMAN2, the localist must include very specific information (such as 
[CAPTURED THE ROBBER]) in their inferential roles. Once we do that, however, we will 
run into trouble with publicity again: if the inferential role of my concepts is that 
specific, then there will almost certainly be a subject covered by (PUB) whose concepts 
do not have the same inferential role as mine. To see why, let’s elaborate on our case a 
bit more. Suppose the inferential role of Edmund’s two concepts is the one described 
above, and consider Verna, who hasn’t heard the news about the last deeds of the 
superhero called “Superman” (she doesn’t know Superman captured the robber, she 
doesn’t know Superman saved the kitten, etc…). Verna does have one or more concepts 
of Superman with the standard inferential role [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, WEARS A RED 
CAPE, CAN FLY…]. Because she hasn’t heard the news, however, none of these concepts 
is inferentially connected to [DID NOT CAPTURE THE ROBBER, SAVED THE KITTEN] or to 
[SAVED THE KITTEN, DID NOT CAPTURE THE ROBBER]. So (c) entails that none of Verna’s 
concepts for Superman is the same as any of Edmund’s concepts. But, surely, (PUB) 
does require Verna and Edmund to have a concept for Superman in common; after all, 
Verna and Edmund can agree/disagree about Superman, successfully exchange 
information about him, be covered by the same Superman-related generalizations, and 
so on. Conclusion: the localist response might enable (c) to satisfy (FC), but it also 
makes (c) incompatible with (PUB).  
Before we consider a further reply that’s available to the localist (sect. 4.3 infra), I 
would like to discuss one last candidate. 
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d) C2 is the same concept as C1 → C2 belongs to the same symbol-type in the 
Language of Thought (LoT) as C1 
 
This is the necessary condition for concept sameness proposed by non-Fregean 
ontologists such as Fodor and Schneider. On their version of RTM, SUPERMAN1-
SUPERMAN2 are two token symbols in Edmund’s LoT. This claim can be roughly fleshed 
out as follows: Edmund’s two concepts are token mental representations realized by 
neurological states of his brain; in turn, these states have a set of physical-neurological 
properties to which thought processes involving the two concepts are sensitive.  
If Edmund’s two concepts belong to different LoT symbol-types, it will follow from 
(d) that they are not the same concept. But what are the typing criteria for LoT symbols? 
This is a controversial issue: as we have seen, different options are available214. A first 
possibility would be to type LoT tokens by their global computational role, i.e. by their 
global set of inferential connections with other concepts, as well as perceptual inputs 
and behavioral outputs. This is the “holistic” typing criterion suggested by Schneider: 
needless to say, this criterion would entail that different subjects almost never have 
token concepts of the same type, which would constitute a straightforward violation of 
(PUB)215.  
A second possibility would be to type LoT tokens by their reference and their 
syntactic properties, as suggested by Fodor (1998, 2008). But this creates a new 
dilemma: what are the syntactic properties of a token LoT symbol? We seem to have 
two main options: we can either identify the syntactic properties of a symbol with its 
physical-neurological properties, or with its computational properties. Unfortunately, 
no matter which option we choose, Fodor’s account will raise just the same problems as 
the candidates we already discussed216.  
Suppose we identify the syntactic properties of a LoT token with its physical-
neurological properties. This would not be unmotivated: one of the central tenets of the 
LoT hypothesis is that computational processes are defined over the syntactic properties 
of the symbols on which they operate. But if computations must be implemented by a 
physical mechanism (be it a Turing machine or a brain), the operations of that 
mechanism can only be sensitive to the physical properties of the symbols on which the 
mechanism operates. In particular, the mechanism will operate differently on two token 
symbols A-B only if they differ in some of their physical properties; if they didn’t, there 
would be no way for the mechanism to “read” their difference and treat them differently 
in its computations. Once we conjoin these central tenets of the LoT hypothesis, it 
follows that we should identify the syntactic properties of a token symbol with its 
                                                
214 V. Schneider (2009 a,b, 2011) for discussion. 
215 V. ch. 3 (sect. 4.2) for discussion of Schneider’s account. 
216 V. Aydede (1998, 2000 a,b), who offers a detailed argument against Fodor along the same lines. My 
critique of a “neurological” account of syntactic properties is based on Aydede’s argument; more 
generally, many of the ideas in chs. 2-5 were inspired by Aydede’s careful treatment of these topics. V. 
also Millikan (2011, pp. 128-129). 
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physical properties. This seems to yield the right predictions about our case, as well: 
presumably, Edmund is in different brain states when thinking thoughts involving 
SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2, so this version of Fodor’s proposal does satisfy (FC). 
Unfortunately, however, it also violates (PUB). When thinking about some object x, 
different thinkers will almost invariably be in brain states that differ in some of their 
physical-neurological properties (not to mention the fact that this proposal would block 
the possibility of sharing concepts with young infants, silicon computers, aliens and so 
on217). And even if we could show that some intentional subjects are indeed in the same 
brain state when thinking certain thoughts, it would be clearly absurd to maintain that 
two thinkers will be in exactly the same brain state whenever they are covered by the 
same generalizations, communicate successfully, or agree/disagree on something. 
One might then be tempted to move to a “functionalist” account and hold that the 
syntactic properties of a token symbol must be identified with its computational 
properties, i.e. with the property it has of standing in certain computational connections 
with other concepts, perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. It will then follow from 
Fodor’s account that two token concepts belong to the same LoT symbol-type only if 
they have the same computational role218. Clearly, however, our necessary condition (d) 
will then collapse into the previously discussed condition (c), since the computational 
role of a concept just is its inferential role219. The same dilemma will then arise. On a 
holistic definition of “computational/inferential role”, (d) will violate (PUB) (notice that 
Fodor’s typing criterion would collapse into Schneider’s holism on this version of the 
account); on a localist definition, it will simply fail to satisfy (FC), since it will not 
predict that Edmund’s concepts are distinct. Ironically enough, Fodor’s account seems 
to face exactly the same problems as IRS theories once we try to get clearer on what the 
“syntactic properties” of a concept amount to.  
 
4.3 . A Solution? 
 
I have considered four plausible necessary conditions for concept sameness and 
shown that they either violate publicity or fail to satisfy the Fregean constraint in 
Edmund’s case: it seems impossible to find an individuation criterion for concepts that 
satisfies (FC) while being consistent with (PUB).  
Now, there is at least one possible solution I haven’t discussed. To get an idea of 
how the solution might go, consider the following “modified localist” proposal. The 
localist, recall, accepts the IRS condition (c) on concept sameness (“If C2 is the same 
concept as C1 → C2 has same inferential role as C1”) and combines it with a localist 
definition of “inferential role”. To satisfy (FC), our localist might hold that the local 
                                                
217 Fodor 2008, p. 90. 
218 Schneider (2009 a,b) proposes various arguments in defense of a functionalist account of LoT syntax. 
219 In fact, computational roles are even more specific than proper inferential roles, since they also include 
computational connections to perceptual inputs/behavioral outputs. 
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inferential role of Edmund’s SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2 is the very specific one described 
previously: 
 
i. Inferential role of SUPERMAN1: [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN 
FLY, HAS SUPERPOWERS…, CAPTURED THE ROBBER, DID NOT SAVE THE KITTEN] 
 
ii. Inferential role of SUPERMAN2: [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN 
FLY, HAS SUPERPOWERS…, DID NOT CAPTURE THE ROBBER, SAVED THE KITTEN] 
 
In response to my objection, however, the localist might hold that not all concepts have 
equally specific roles. For instance, there might be a third concept (which we can 
simply call “SUPERMAN”) whose inferential role is much less specific than that of 
Edmund’s SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2. In particular, we might suppose that SUPERMAN’s 
inferential role only includes the standard Superman-ish features [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, 
WEARS A RED CAPE, CAN FLY…]. By hypothesis, Verna does have such a concept, since 
she does believe, of the guy called “Superman”, that he satisfies the standard Superman-
description. So Verna does have a concept that has same inferential role as one of 
Edmund’s concepts. Therefore, the two subjects can share the concept SUPERMAN and 
there is no violation of publicity. At the same time, however, our localist condition (c) 
will make the right predictions about SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2 being different, since the 
two concepts have the very specific inferential roles described above. In a nutshell, a 
localist might hold that, while concepts are indeed individuated by their local inferential 
roles, there is no reason to think that all roles will have the same degree of specificity; 
some of them (SUPERMAN) will be more coarse-grained, while others (SUPERMAN1-
SUPERMAN2) will be more fine-grained220. 
As you might have noticed, this solution can in fact be applied not only to localism, 
but to pretty much all the individuation criteria examined in this section. For instance, a 
holist could adopt the following position: Edmund’s concepts SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2 
are holistically individuated and not shared, so as to satisfy (FC); at the same time, 
however, the concept SUPERMAN is not holistically individuated and can be shared by 
                                                
220 As usual, the move will have to be declined differently depending on our background ontology for 
concepts. A Fregean can simply hold that Edmund has two abstract concepts SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2 
with the inferential roles described above; at the same time, he also has a third abstract concept 
SUPERMAN, whose inferential role is the standard Superman-ish one and which is therefore shared 
between him and Verna. A non-Fregean could instead hold that there are two distinct type concepts 
SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2, where the inferential role of SUPERMAN1 includes [… CAPTURED THE ROBBER, 
DID NOT SAVE THE KITTEN] and the inferential role of SUPERMAN2 includes [… DID NOT CAPTURE THE 
ROBBER, SAVED THE KITTEN]. A token concept will then belong to one of these types just in case it has the 
inferential role individuating that type; since only one of Edmund’s token concepts for Superman has the 
former inferential role, and only one of them has the latter, the two concepts belong to distinct types and 
(FC) is satisfied. In addition to SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2, however, there is also a third type concept 
SUPERMAN: this concept’s inferential role is just the standard Superman-ish one, and both Verna and 
Edmund have a token concept with that role. 
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Edmund and Verna, so that publicity is respected221. Mutatis mutandis for other 
individuation criteria: all we will have to do is combine our favored individuation 
method with the idea that concepts are individuated in different ways, some 
(SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2) more finely and some (SUPERMAN) more coarsely.  
In the next chapter, we will say a lot more about how to apply this solution to an 
account of concept individuation/possession. For now, let me just note that the solution 
still has the consequence that several concepts are not shared: on the strategy I just 
sketched, Edmund’s SUPERMAN will be shared by Verna, but his SUPERMAN1-
SUPERMAN2 will not. More generally, many concepts involved in contradictory beliefs 
will be individuated so finely that several intentional subjects will not have them, even 
though these subjects communicate, agree etc… with the owner of the concepts in 
question. So our solution still entails that there are several concepts which certain 
intentional subjects do not share, even though these subjects are all covered by (PUB). 
Whether this would be compatible with the publicity principle is a question I will go 
back to in the next chapter. 
                                                
221 Notice that this is the “weakened” holistic view described in ch. 3 (sect. 4.1): we will go back to this in 
the next chapter. 
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 Chapter 5 
 
Solving The Tension
  159 
1. Introduction  
 
Let’s take stock. In the previous chapter I introduced a new constraint on a theory of 
concepts and showed that, once we accept this constraint, a problem will arise: 
unrestricted individuation criteria for concepts that satisfy the constraint also appear to 
violate publicity. I examined several existing criteria for concept individuation and 
argued that they all have to face this worry. Then, I considered a possible way to 
“patch” some of those criteria (sect. 4.3). I remarked that, even when patched, our 
criteria would still entail that several concepts are not ordinarily shared, i.e. those 
concepts that are involved in the contradictory beliefs of subjects in Frege cases; I left 
open, however, whether this consequence would be compatible with the principle of 
publicity. 
I will soon go back to the solution sketched at the end of chapter 4, comparing it 
with other possible strategies and trying to determine whether it would be consistent 
with (PUB). Before we discuss how to solve our problem, however, there are two points 
that need to be addressed: 
 
• First (sect. 2), I want to analyze in more detail the implications of (FC). I will show 
in a principled way that, once we accept (FC), we will be forced to adopt a very 
fine-grained sameness conditions for concepts. This is something we will have to 
take into account when looking for an individuation criterion that can respect our 
two constraints. 
 
• Second (sect. 3), I will try to identify the causes of the problem described in chapter 
4. I will show why an unrestricted individuation criterion is very likely to either 
violate publicity (as the candidates in sect. 4.2) or at any rate entail that the concepts 
involved in Frege cases are not shared (as the “patched” candidates in sect. 4.3). 
This will give us principled reasons to think that any unrestricted criterion would 
have one of these consequences, not just those examined in chapter 4. 
 
After our discussion in sections 2-3, we will be in a better position to find a solution to 
our problem. In section 4, I will examine two possible ways to solve the tension 
between publicity and (FC). My main goal will not be to determine which one is better 
(although I will express a preference for one of the two). I will rather try to provide 
support for my two main theses; as you might recall, these theses are: 
 
• A suitably modified version of holism can have an important role to play in our best 
theory of concepts. 
 
• The most plausible version of the publicity principle is the contextualist one 
developed in chapter 3. 
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As we will see, once we examine the range of possible ways to solve the (PUB)-(FC) 
tension these theses become hard to resist, since: 
 
• On both of our solutions, a modified holistic condition will look like the best way to 
satisfy (FC). 
 
• The least problematic of our solutions seems to require a contextualist version of 
publicity. 
 
I will then conclude the chapter by sketching my own picture of concept individuation 
and possession; this, I think, is the picture of concepts that emerges as a clear winner in 
light of our arguments in chapters 1-5.  
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2. The Implications Of (FC) 
 
2.1 . What (FC) Demands 
 
In this section, I will analyze the Fregean constraint and its implications in more 
detail. In particular, I will argue that (FC) entails a certain necessary condition for 
concept sameness and that this condition is a very fine-grained one.  
Here is how I propose to proceed. (FC) holds that, whenever two concepts are 
involved in the contradictory beliefs of a rational subject, those concepts must be 
distinct; this, recall, is a necessary assumption if we want to explain the subject’s 
rationality. But now suppose we can show that, whenever two concepts C1-C2 have 
certain properties (e.g. whenever they stand in a certain relation r), C1-C2 will be 
involved in contradictory beliefs. It will then follow immediately from (FC) that, if two 
concepts C1-C2 stand in r, then they are distinct concepts: a sufficient condition for 
concept difference, which is of course equivalent to a necessary condition for concept 
sameness222. By finding out the conditions under which two concepts will be involved 
in contradictory beliefs, then, we will also find out what conditions for concept 
sameness are entailed by (FC); we will find out, roughly speaking, “how finely” (FC) 
requires us to “cut” concepts. 
In this section I will argue that, by standard RTM principles, whenever two concepts 
stand in certain inferential connections they will also be involved in contradictory 
beliefs. I will then go on to examine (sect. 2.2) the condition on concept sameness that 
results from this; as we will see, that condition is an extremely fine-grained one, 
something we will have to keep in mind when developing our individuation criterion in 
the last section of this chapter. 
 
As we have seen, an important tradition within RTM holds that, in order to explain 
how someone can rationally have contradictory de re beliefs about some object, we 
must assume that the concepts involved in those beliefs are distinct. This commits the 
RTM theorist to the constraint we examined in chapter 4:  
 
The Fregean Constraint (FC): If two concepts C1-C2 are involved in the 
contradictory beliefs of a rational subject S at time t about some object x, then C1-C2 
are not the same concept. 
 
Now, what we are looking for are the conditions under which (FC) will entail that two 
concepts C1-C2 are distinct. To find out what these conditions are, I will analyze a certain 
hypothetical case. In fact, the case is already familiar to the reader, since it is simply a 
                                                
222 (It follows from our sufficient condition that not standing in r is necessary for two concepts C1-C2 to be 
the same concept). 
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general “template” for specific Frege cases such as Lois’, Edmund’s, Peter’s and so on: 
each of these cases satisfies the assumptions holding in our case and can therefore be 
considered as one of its instances. 
Suppose there are two concepts C1 and C2 such that: 
 
1) C1 and C2 are had by a rational subject S at time t. 
 
2) C1 and C2 refer to x. 
 
3) C1 has [IS F], but not [IS NOT F], among its inferential connections. 
 
4) C2 has [IS NOT F], but not [IS F], among its inferential connections. 
 
Assumptions (1)-(2) do not require much clarification. What we are imagining is a 
subject like Lois or Edmund, who is normal under all relevant respects, appears rational 
in his doxastic behavior, and has two coreferential concepts for some object x at some 
time t. Assumptions (3)-(4) concern the specific inferential connections in which S’s 
two concepts stand. What we are imagining is a subject who: 
 
• Is disposed to infer from X IS IDENTICAL TO C1 to X IS F; that is, he accepts the 
thought C1 IS F223.  
 
(On the other hand, he is not disposed to infer from X IS IDENTICAL TO C1 to X IS NOT F; 
that is, he does not also accept the thought C1 IS NOT F. If he did, he would arguably be 
irrational). 
 
• Is disposed to infer from X IS IDENTICAL TO C2 to X IS NOT F; that is, he accepts the 
thought C2 IS NOT F. 
 
(On the other hand, he is not disposed to infer from X IS IDENTICAL TO C2 to X IS F; that is, 
he does not also accept the thought C2 IS F. Again, he would arguably be irrational if he 
did). 
 
S’s situation is, of course, perfectly familiar. S is just like Lois, who has: 
 
• A concept SUPERMAN having [CAN FLY] (but not [CANNOT FLY]) among its 
inferential connections; 
                                                
223 By standard RTM principles, whenever we say that a concept “stands in a certain inferential 
connection” we can also say that the owner of the concept accepts the corresponding thought: to say that 
S is disposed to infer from X IS IDENTICAL TO C1 to X IS F is just to say that S accepts the thought C1 IS F.  
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• A concept CLARK having [CANNOT FLY] (but not [CAN FLY]) among its inferential 
connections. 
 
All other subjects in Frege cases also fall under the general template constituted by S’s 
case: cf. for instance Edmund, whose SUPERMAN1 is connected to [CAPTURED THE 
ROBBER] while his SUPERMAN2 is connected to [DID NOT CAPTURE THE ROBBER]. If you 
want, you can also think of the relevant concepts as “mental files” storing information 
about their referents224. Lois’ SUPERMAN-file contains [CAN FLY] but not [CANNOT FLY]; 
vice versa, her CLARK-file contains [CANNOT FLY] but not [CAN FLY]. Similarly, S’s C1-
file contains [IS F] but not [IS NOT F], and his C2-file contains [IS NOT F] but not [IS F]. 
Again, if one the two files contained both [IS F] and [IS NOT F], S would arguably be 
irrational; that would amount to accepting both C IS F and C IS NOT F at the very same 
time.  
 
Assuming that (1)-(4) are true of two concepts C1-C2, our driving question will be 
very simple: given (FC), are C1 and C2 different concepts? If they are, we have found out 
a sufficient condition for concept difference: (FC) entails that, if (1)-(4) are true of two 
concepts, then those concepts are different. 
Now, if we took “different concepts” to mean numerically distinct concepts, the 
answer to our question would be trivial. By the indiscernibility of identicals, if two 
objects have different properties then they are numerically distinct. But, by hypothesis, 
our two concepts have different inferential connections: for instance, C1 is inferentially 
connected to [IS F] while C2 is not. Therefore, our two concepts have different properties 
and must be numerically distinct. So, if by “different concepts” we mean numerically 
different concepts, C1-C2 will clearly count as different; indeed, this follows from (1)-(4) 
even if we don’t assume (FC) at all! 
Suppose on the other hand that we take “different concepts” to mean not 
numerically distinct but, for instance, belonging to distinct concept types. Under this 
assumption, it’s clearly not trivial to show that (FC) requires C1-C2 to be “different 
concepts”: C1-C2 might well belong to the same concept type even if they are 
numerically different. Here is a different way to put the same point. A non-Fregean 
ontologist who was looking for a set of typing conditions225 would accept as trivial the 
claim that two token concepts satisfying (1)-(4) must be numerically distinct. At the 
same time, however, he certainly won’t find it trivial that, if (FC) is true, then two token 
concepts satisfying (1)-(4) must also belong to different concept types. After all, it’s at 
least not obvious that a set of typing conditions which counted those two tokens as 
falling under the same type would be inconsistent with (FC)226.  
                                                
224 V. Recanati (1993, 2009), Perry (2000). 
225 V. e.g. the typing criteria by Fodor and Schneider discussed in ch. 4. 
226 Objection: “By hypothesis, C1-C2 differ in some of their properties. Therefore, we can trivially show 
that they belong to distinct types once we identify type concepts with classes of concepts, as you did in 
ch. 3 (sect. 4.1)”. Reply: non-Fregeans like Fodor and Schneider think a concept can only belong to one 
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In what follows, then, my aim is not just to prove the (trivial) claim that two 
concepts satisfying (1)-(4) will be “different concepts” in the numerical-difference 
sense. What I want to defend is the (non-trivial) claim that, if (FC) is true, then C1-C2 are 
“different concepts” even if we take the phrase to express difference in type; a 
consequence that, as we will see later, has very important implications for our general 
goal of finding a satisfactory individuation criterion for concepts. 
 
My argument is very simple and rests on a single premise:  
 
• Since S’s concept C1 has [IS F] among its inferential connections, C1 is involved in 
S’s belief, of x, that x is F. 
• And since S’s concept C2 has [IS NOT F] among its inferential connections, C2 is 
involved in S’s belief, of x, that x is not-F. 
 
I take this premise to be entirely uncontroversial for anyone who endorses the standard 
RTM framework. When introducing (FC)227, I defined involvement” as follows: if S has 
a de re belief about some x in virtue of accepting a thought that is partially constituted 
by some concept C, then C is involved in S’s belief. (So SUPERMAN-CLARK are involved 
in Lois’ contradictory beliefs about Superman/Clark). Given this definition, it’s easy to 
show that the above premise follows from RTM plus our description of the case: 
 
• Since S’s C1 has [IS F] among its inferential connections, S accepts the thought C1 IS 
F; and since S’s C2 has [IS NOT F] among its inferential connections, S accepts the 
thought C2 IS NOT F.  
 
(On RTM, to accept the thought C1 IS F just is to have a concept C1 which is inferentially 
connected to [IS F]; mutatis mutandis for C2).  
 
• But to accept C1 IS F is to stand in the belief-relation to C1 IS F, and to accept C2 IS NOT 
F is to stand in the belief-relation to C2 IS NOT F 228. 
 
• Finally, according to RTM229, to stand in the belief-relation to C1 IS F is to believe, of 
the referent of C1, that it is F. And to stand in the belief-relation to C2 IS NOT F is to 
believe, of the referent of C2, that it is not-F. 
                                                                                                                                          
type at a time. This becomes apparent once we note that, according to these theorists, there is only one 
correct typing criterion for concepts (cf. ch. 4, sect. 3.1). Obviously, then, these theorists do not identify 
type concepts with classes (a token concept can belong to more than one class at the same time); 
therefore, my argument will not be trivial for them. I will criticize their view of type concepts in sect. 4.3 
infra, but I’m not presupposing my theory of types at this stage.  
227 Ch. 4, sect. 2.2. 
228 “Accepting a thought” was introduced as an abbreviation for “standing in the belief-relation to a 
thought” in sect. 2.1, ch. 2.  
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• So C1 is involved in S’s belief, of x, that x is F, and C2 is involved in S’s belief, of x, 
that x is not-F. 
 
Clearly, no one who accepts RTM, and particularly a proponent of (FC), could reject 
this conclusion. Given RTM, it’s almost true by definition that, if [IS F] is among the 
inferential connections of some concept C, then the owner of C believes of C’s referent 
that it is F; mutatis mutandis for [IS NOT F]. Our argument will then go as follows: 
 
• We have just shown that (by assumptions (2) to (4)) C1 is involved in S’s belief, of x, 
that x is F, and C2 is involved in S’s belief, of x, that x is not-F. 
 
• So C1-C2 are involved in the contradictory beliefs of a subject S at time t about some 
object x. 
 
• By assumption (1), S is rational. 
 
• So C1-C2 are involved in the contradictory beliefs of a rational subject S at time t 
about some object x. 
 
• Therefore, it follows from (FC) that C1-C2 are not the same concept.  
 
• Conclusion: (FC) entails that, if assumptions (1)-(4) are true of two concepts C1-C2, 
then C1-C2 are not the same concept.  
 
We have found a sufficient condition for concept difference entailed by (FC). In less 
formal terms, how does the argument go? Let’s say that when two concepts satisfy 
assumptions (3)-(4) they have “contradictory inferential connections” (C1 has [IS F] but 
not [IS NOT F], C2 has [IS NOT F] but not [IS F], and nothing can be both F and not-F, so 
their inferential connections are “contradictory”). As we have seen, it’s almost true by 
definition that, when two coreferential concepts have contradictory connections, they 
will be involved in contradictory de re beliefs. This will raise our familiar Rationality 
Problem: how can someone rationally have contradictory beliefs? According to (FC), 
answering this question requires assuming that the concepts involved in those beliefs 
are distinct: if we didn’t make this assumption, we would have no explanation of the 
subject’s rationality. So (FC) entails that two coreferential concepts with contradictory 
connections must be different concepts. If they weren’t, there would be no way to 
explain the rationality of their owner. 
Crucially, notice that this is true whatever kind of difference relation is expressed by 
“different concepts” here. If the relation expressed is one of numerical difference, then 
it will be trivial to show that concepts standing in contradictory connections are 
                                                                                                                                          
229 V. RTM’s principle (I) in sect. 2.1, ch. 2. 
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“different”. Even if the relation expressed is one of type-difference, however, (FC) will 
still entail that concepts with contradictory connections are “different”: that is, it will 
entail that two such concepts must belong to distinct types. And this is not trivial. 
 
2.2 . A Fine-Grained Condition 
 
Let’s summarize our argument so far. I have argued that (FC) entails the following 
conditional: 
 
(C) If assumptions (1)-(4) are true of two concepts C1-C2, then C1-C2 are different 
concepts. 
 
Assumptions (1)-(4) were: 
 
1) C1-C2 are had by a rational subject S at time t. 
2) C1-C2 refer to x. 
3) C1 has [IS F], but not [IS NOT F], among its inferential connections. 
4) C2 has [IS NOT F], but not [IS F], among its inferential connections. 
 
We can therefore restate (C) as follows: 
 
(C) If two concepts C1-C2 are had by the same rational subject S at the same time t 
(= (1)) and they are coreferential (= (2)), then if they have contradictory inferential 
connections (= (3)-(4)) they are different concepts230. 
 
Now, (C) states a sufficient condition for concept difference. But, of course, a sufficient 
condition for concept difference is a necessary condition for concept sameness. So let’s 
restate (C) as a necessary condition: 
 
(C) If two concepts C1-C2 are had by the same rational subject S at the same time t 
and they are coreferential, then if they are the same concept they do not have 
contradictory inferential connections. 
 
In slightly more formal terms: 
 
(C) (two concepts C1-C2 are had by the same rational subject S at the same time t and 
they are coreferential) → (they are the same concept → they do not have 
contradictory inferential connections) 
 
                                                
230 Recall that “having contradictory inferential connections” has been defined as “satisfying assumptions 
(3)-(4)” (v. end of sect. 2.1). 
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Which is of course equivalent to: 
 
(C) (two concepts C1-C2 are had by the same rational subject S at the same time t and 
they are coreferential and they are the same concept) → (they do not have 
contradictory inferential connections) 
 
In sum: our argument in the last section shows that (FC) entails a certain necessary 
condition on concept sameness, which is stated by our conditional (C). Before we 
analyze the implications this has for our problem, notice that (C) is a “restricted” 
condition on concept sameness. (C) only applies to pairs of concepts had by the same 
subject at the same time, and only if the subject is rational and the concepts 
coreferential. Suppose two concepts C1-C2 fail to satisfy one of these assumptions; for 
instance, suppose they don’t belong to the same subject. Clearly, it won’t follow from 
(C) that C1-C2 are different, even if they happen to stand in contradictory connections; 
for all (C) says, C1-C2 might still be the same concept. This point can also be seen by 
noting that (C) is equivalent to: 
 
(C) For any two coreferential concepts C1-C2 had by the same rational subject S at 
the same time t: (C1-C2 are the same concept → they do not have contradictory 
inferential connections) 
 
Where the quantifier is restricted to a specific set of concepts, instead of ranging over 
all concepts as in unrestricted conditions. In conclusion, (C) does impose a necessary 
condition on concept sameness (not having contradictory connections), but only on 
coreferential concepts had by the same subject at the same time: using our terminology 
from the last chapter, (C) is a “restricted” condition. 
An important caveat: to simplify our discussion, from now on I will ignore two of 
the restrictions built into (C). These are the restrictions which require C1-C2 to be 
coreferential and belong to a rational subject. I will therefore treat (C) as equivalent to: 
 
(C) (two concepts C1-C2 are had by the same subject S at the same time t and they 
are the same concept) → (they do not have contradictory inferential connections)  
 
The simplified version is still restricted, as it only applies to pairs of concepts had by 
the same subject (it only applies intrapersonally) at the same time (it only applies 
synchronically). While the simplified version does not in fact follow from the original 
one, the restriction on subjects/times is the only one that really matters for our purposes, 
and all of my arguments in what follows would go through a fortiori on the original 
version. Since the new version simplifies things significantly, I will stick to it in what 
follows. (For now, I must simply ask the reader to trust me on this score; once my 
arguments are on the table, he will be able to check for himself whether this 
simplification is legitimate or not). 
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Having clarified (C)’s status, we can finally see its relevance for our problem. I have 
shown that there is a condition on concept individuation which: 
 
• Follows from an important constraint on a theory of concepts, namely (FC); 
• Only applies to certain concepts, i.e. those had by a single subject at the same 
time; 
• “Slices” concepts very finely. 
 
Each of these points should be easy to see at this stage. Regarding the first point, my 
argument has shown that (FC) entails condition (C) on concept sameness. Regarding the 
second, we have seen that this condition only applies to concepts had by the same 
subject at the same time, and holds that two of these concepts are identical only if they 
don’t have any contradictory connections. 
The third thing to note is that our condition is an extremely fine-grained one. If (C) 
is true, then the presence of any contradictory connections is enough for certain 
concepts to be different. (FC) thus requires individuating concepts had by a single 
subject at the same time in a very fine way. For any two such concepts, it doesn’t matter 
whether they have same reference, same origin, how many inferential connections they 
have in common, and so on; as long as there is even only one contradictory connection 
in their inferential roles, that’s enough for them to be distinct. In a nutshell: given (FC), 
our intrapersonal and synchronic individuation criteria for concepts must be extremely 
fine-grained. 
To see just how fine-grained our necessary condition is, it will be useful to see what 
happens once we eliminate all restrictions to subjects/times in (C). What would happen 
if we took (C) to apply to all concepts, not just those had by a single subject at the same 
time? The following is the unrestricted version of (C): 
 
(C*) Two concepts C1-C2 are the same concept → they do not have contradictory 
inferential connections 
 
(C*) simply holds that, for any two concepts, if some of their inferential connections are 
contradictory then the two concepts are distinct. But this cuts concepts too thin: the 
unrestricted version of (C) is straightforwardly incompatible with (PUB). The following 
is a consequence of (C*): whenever I ascribe F to x and you ascribe not-F to x, our two 
concepts of x are not the same concept. So suppose I believe that tomatoes were present 
in Europe before year 1492, while you believe they were not. Our two concepts for 
tomatoes have contradictory connections: my concept TOMATO1 is connected to 
[PRESENT IN EUROPE BEFORE 1492], while your concept TOMATO2 is connected to [NOT 
PRESENT IN EUROPE BEFORE 1492]. According to (C*), this suffices for our two concepts 
to be distinct. Even worse, the same will be true of two time-slices of the same person: 
when I learn that tomatoes were not present in Europe before 1492, my future time-slice 
will have a concept TOMATO2 which is not the same concept as my current concept 
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TOMATO1. But, of course, publicity entails that you and I have a concept for tomatoes in 
common; similarly for me and my future, more knowledgeable time-slice. Since (C*) 
entails that our concepts for tomatoes are different, the unrestricted version of (C) is 
straightforwardly incompatible with (PUB). (Of course, the same problem will arise for 
many other shared concepts like WATER, DOG, SUPERMAN etc…). 
Of course, we must keep in mind that (FC) does not entail the unrestricted (C*), but 
only the restricted (C); and (C) is consistent with publicity. ((C) only applies to 
concepts had by a single subject, while (PUB) only applies to concepts had by different 
subjects231. So (C) is guaranteed to be compatible with (PUB). We will go back to this 
point at length in sect. 4.1 infra). Therefore, the moral of our discussion is not that (FC) 
is inconsistent with (PUB). It is, rather, that (FC) entails a very fine-grained sameness 
condition for a certain class of concepts, i.e. those had by a single subject, at a specific 
time. That condition is so fine-grained that, if applied at the interpersonal/diachronic 
level, it would clearly make it too hard for different thinkers to have the same concepts.  
 
Let’s take stock. I have argued that (FC) entails a certain necessary condition (C). 
Once we accept (FC), this means that (C) must be included in our individuation 
criterion for concepts (together with other necessary/sufficient conditions for concept 
sameness, of course). More specifically, (FC) requires that we individuate a specific 
class of concepts (those had by the same subject at the same time) in a very fine-grained 
way: we must treat such concepts as different whenever some of their inferential 
connections are contradictory. As we will see in section 4, this has crucial 
consequences: in particular, it helps make other fine-grained sameness conditions such 
as holism a lot more plausible, given that our individuation criterion will have to 
include a fine-grained condition anyway. Our results in this section will thus have an 
important role in establishing one of my main theses in this chapter.  
 Before we discuss this point in more detail, however, I want to go back to the 
problem raised in the last chapter: I believe we are now in a better position to see why 
unrestricted individuation criteria tend to run into trouble with publicity. This is what 
the next section is about. 
                                                
231 As we have already noted on several occasions, different time-slices of the same person count as 
different subjects for our purposes (cf. e.g. ch. 2, sect. 2.2). For this reason, I will often use the expression 
“different subjects” to cover different time-slices of the same person, as well as different people; and I 
will use the expression “same subject” to mean not only “same person”, but also “same time-slice of the 
same person”.  
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3. The Source Of The Problem 
 
In chapter 4, we discussed various (unrestricted) individuation criteria that have 
been put forward by some of the major theories of concepts on the market. We noted 
that these criteria seem to face a dilemma: some of them simply fail to satisfy (FC) in 
Frege cases such as Edmund’s, while others do satisfy (FC) but face the following 
problematic consequences: 
 
a) They are straightforwardly inconsistent with (PUB) (cf. condition (b) (originalism); 
condition (c) in its holistic version; condition (d) in both its physicalist and its 
holistic versions). 
 
b) Or, at any rate, they have the potentially problematic consequence that many 
concepts involved in Frege cases (e.g. Edmund’s SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2) are not 
widely shared across ordinary intentional subjects (cf. the “modified” criteria 
discussed in ch. 4, sect. 4.3). 
 
Now, one might reasonably complain that I have only examined some possible 
unrestricted conditions: no doubt, other candidates are available, so why think that 
every unrestricted condition will have one of the above consequences? This section will 
try to answer this question: more specifically, my aim is to: 
 
• Explain why the problem arises, i.e. why unrestricted conditions that satisfy (FC) 
have the consequences described above. 
 
• Provide principled reasons to think that any such condition will have the same 
consequences: we can’t solve the problem by simply looking for a more 
sophisticated account.  
 
To see why our problem arises, it will be useful to reflect on what an individuation 
criterion that satisfies (FC) will look like. Consider the set of all cases in which two 
concepts are had by the same (rational232) subject and are involved in contradictory 
beliefs: for any such case, an individuation criterion that satisfies (FC) will have to 
include a suitable necessary condition. In particular, take an arbitrary case c in which 
two concepts CX-CY are involved in contradictory beliefs. For every such case, our 
individuation criterion will include a specific necessary condition of the following form: 
 
(K1c) A concept C is the same concept as CX → concept C has property/properties 
[…] 
                                                
232 As usual, I will omit this qualification in what follows.  
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If our criterion does satisfy (FC), then (K1c) will include on its right hand side some 
property F which CY does not have: it will then follow from (K1c) that CY is different 
from CX, which is just what’s needed to satisfy (FC) in that particular case. (As usual, 
(K1c) might simply follow from a more general sameness condition, as with all the 
major candidates examined in ch. 4. Alternatively, one could provide a specific 
condition for every possible Frege case, where the conditions provided might vary from 
case to case233). Going back to Edmund’s example: if a criterion satisfies (FC), then it 
must include a necessary condition like: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is the same concept as SUPERMAN1 → concept C has 
property/properties […] 
 
We will then have to fill in the brackets with some property F which SUPERMAN1 has 
and SUPERMAN2 lacks234. 
In sum: for every Frege case c in which two concepts CX-CY are involved in 
contradictory beliefs, there will have to be some condition (K1c) specifying, on its right 
hand side, some property F which CX has, and CY lacks. How does this help explain the 
problems that unrestricted criteria seem to face? Suppose that, in order to satisfy (FC) in 
a case c, we include in our criterion a condition (K1c) which is not restricted to concepts 
had by the same subject. It will then follow from (K1c) that any concept which lacks F 
is different from CX, no matter whether it’s had by the same subject as CX (like CY) or by 
a different subject. Consider for instance the modified localist account from chapter 4 
(sect. 4.3), which puts forward the unrestricted condition: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is the same concept as SUPERMAN1 → concept C has same 
inferential role as SUPERMAN1 
 
Given how the localist construes SUPERMAN1’s role, this condition is equivalent to: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is the same concept as SUPERMAN1 → concept C is 
inferentially connected to [CALLED “SUPERMAN”, WEARS A RED CAPE, … DID NOT 
SAVE THE KITTEN, CAPTURED THE ROBBER] 
                                                
233 V. ch. 4, sect. 3.2 for more details. 
234 As usual, the condition provided will be interpreted differently depending on our background 
ontology. On a Fregean ontology, (K1Edmund) will amount to: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is numerically identical to SUPERMAN1 → concept C has property/properties 
[…] 
 
On a non-Fregean ontology: 
 
(K1Edmund) A (token) concept C belongs to the same type as (token) concept SUPERMAN1 → concept C 
has property/properties […] 
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It thus follows from (K1Edmund) that any concept which is not connected to [CAPTURED 
THE ROBBER] is different from SUPERMAN1. This, of course, results in SUPERMAN1 not 
being shared by ordinary subjects like Verna235, who just don’t have a concept meeting 
that condition. Similar consequences ensue with the other unrestricted criteria we 
examined, resulting either in a violation of publicity or, at any rate, in the non-
shareability of those concepts which are involved in a subject’s contradictory beliefs.  
We can now see why unrestricted criteria have this consequence. Consider the 
general features of the cases we are considering. In each of them, two concepts CX-CY 
are involved in contradictory beliefs, and we must find a property F which only CX has, 
so that we can include it in (K1c). This property could be: being inferentially connected 
to [CAPTURED THE ROBBER]; having a certain origin o; having a certain set s of physical-
neurological properties; and so on. Be that as it may, it is very likely that CY will not be 
the only concept lacking F. Presumably, many concepts had by other subjects will also 
fail to instantiate that property; indeed, there will be several subjects who don’t have 
any concepts with F (cf. Verna again). Because our condition is unrestricted, then, it 
will follow that the subjects in question don’t have CX. (If our condition was restricted, 
i.e. if it only applied to concepts belonging to the same subject as CX, the problem would 
not arise: concepts belonging to other subjects could still be the same as CX even if they 
lacked F, since (K1c) would not apply to them).  
Here, then, is my explanation of the problem from chapter 4 in brief: 
 
a) For every two concepts CX-CY involved in a Frege case, an unrestricted condition 
(K1c) that satisfies (FC) will specify a property F which CX has, and CY lacks. 
 
b) For many Frege cases, concepts had by other intentional subjects are also likely 
to lack F. 
 
c) Because (K1c) is unrestricted, it will follow that these subjects do not have a 
concept that is the same as CX. 
 
d) Conclusion: for many Frege cases, an unrestricted condition that satisfies (FC) 
will also entail that the concepts involved in those cases are not shared. 
 
Which, of course, is precisely what happens with the all the conditions examined in 
chapter 4.  
While steps (a) and (c) of the explanation are entirely uncontroversial, one might 
wonder what kind of argument can be offered for the crucial premise (b). Why think 
that F (= the property which differentiates the concepts involved in a Frege case) will 
not be widely shared? Answer: it’s hard to imagine what kind of property F might be, 
such that it could play these two roles: 
                                                
235 Cf. ch. 4, sect. 4.2. 
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• Being instantiated by CX, but not by CY; 
• Being widely instantiated across concepts had by other intentional subjects. 
 
If CY lacks F, why think that this will be a unique feature of that concept? What is 
special about CY, so that it fails to instantiate a property which concepts had by other 
subjects are guaranteed to have? To see the point more clearly, imagine what would be 
required for F to be widely shared in all Frege cases. The following would then have to 
obtain: for every Frege case, there is a property F which is not instantiated by one of the 
concepts involved, but which is guaranteed to be shared by concepts had by other 
subjects. Clearly, a principled argument would be needed to show that, for every Frege 
case, there is always going to be such a property. But, first, it’s hard to imagine what 
that argument might look like and, second, our previous discussion gives us good 
reasons to think that such an argument won’t be available. In a paradigmatic Frege case 
such as Edmund’s, all the candidate properties we examined (having such-and-such 
inferential role; having such-and-such origin; etc…) fail to satisfy one of our two 
desiderata: to the extent that SUPERMAN2 lacks one of them, concepts had by other 
intentional subjects also do. Since it seems possible to devise countless other cases that 
are structurally analogous to Edmund’s, we have all reasons to believe that, in many 
Frege cases, F is not going to be widely shared. 
Now, there clearly are some properties which could play the two roles above. For 
instance, suppose that: 
 
F = being connected to [CAPTURED THE ROBBER] or belonging to a different subject 
from SUPERMAN1  
 
This property is indeed special: Edmund’s SUPERMAN1 has it, his SUPERMAN2 lacks it, 
and it is guaranteed to be shared by concepts had by other subjects (e.g. Verna). This is 
because, of course, these concepts don’t belong to the same subject as SUPERMAN1, so 
they all instantiate our disjunctive property F in virtue of satisfying its second disjunct. 
Problem is, F would make our necessary condition (K1Edmund) restricted. Once we fill in 
the brackets with F, the condition becomes: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is the same concept as SUPERMAN1 → concept C is 
inferentially connected to [CAPTURED THE ROBBER] or it belongs to a different 
subject from SUPERMAN1 
 
Which is equivalent to:  
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C belongs to the same subject as SUPERMAN1 and it is the 
same concept as SUPERMAN1 → concept C is inferentially connected to [CAPTURED 
THE ROBBER]  
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Which is a condition that only applies to concepts had by the same subject as 
SUPERMAN1, i.e. a restricted sameness condition236. I am of course happy to grant that 
such a condition would satisfy (FC) without entailing that SUPERMAN1 is not shared. My 
claim, however, is that unrestricted conditions will cause SUPERMAN1 to be non-shared, 
and such conditions cannot help themselves to disjunctive properties like the above. 
 
I have tried to explain why unrestricted criteria that satisfy (FC) have the 
consequence that concepts involved in Frege cases are not shared, thus running into 
troubles with publicity. This shows that the problem examined in chapter 4 was not an 
accident: there are principled reasons to think that more sophisticated criteria will have 
exactly the same consequence. Bottom line: if we try to satisfy (FC) through an 
unrestricted condition, we will have to accept that many concepts are not shared by 
ordinary intentional subjects. With this conclusion in mind, we can finally start looking 
for a solution to our problem.  
 
                                                
236 To see this more clearly, notice that the condition is equivalent to: 
 
(K1Edmund) For every concept C that belongs to the same subject as SUPERMAN1: (C is the same 
concept as SUPERMAN1 → C is inferentially connected to [CAPTURED THE ROBBER]) 
 
Where the quantifier is restricted to concepts had by the same subject as SUPERMAN1. (V. sect. 2.2 supra 
for more details about restricted sameness conditions).  
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4. Concepts: A Pluralist-Contextualist Picture 
 
4.1 . Two Solutions 
 
Our discussion in chapter 4 began with two constraints and a problem: every 
unrestricted individuation criterion that could satisfy (FC) also seemed to violate (PUB). 
Several major theories of concepts were discussed, and none of them appeared to escape 
the dilemma (ch. 4, sect. 4.2). Then, we considered a possible way to “patch” those 
theories (ch. 4, sect. 4.3): one could offer two different sets of unrestricted conditions, a 
more fine-grained one for the non-shared concepts involved in Frege cases, and a more 
coarse-grained one for the shared concepts covered by (PUB). While this still entails 
that many concepts are not shared, we left open whether this consequence could after all 
be accepted as compatible with publicity. It’s now time to go back to our “patch”, re-
assess it and compare it with some alternative strategies. Our first goal (sect. 4.1) will 
then be: 
 
Goal n. 1: Examine various possible solutions to our problem, that of finding an 
individuation criterion for concepts that satisfies (FC) without violating (PUB). 
 
I will first develop in more detail the solution sketched in chapter 4; then, I will 
compare it with one main alternative, which consists in offering a restricted 
individuation criterion that can satisfy (FC) while avoiding the commitment to unshared 
concepts237.  
Having briefly compared our two solutions, I will proceed to my second goal (sects. 
4.2-4.3): 
 
Goal n. 2: Use my solution to the original problem to defend two main theses: that a 
(suitably modified) form of holism should “have a place” in a theory of concepts, 
and that the best version of the publicity principle is the “contextualist” one 
developed in chapter 3. 
 
More specifically, I will argue that on both of our solutions we will have excellent 
reasons to include a modified holistic condition in our individuation criterion, and that 
on the most plausible of those solutions we will also have excellent reasons to adopt a 
contextualist version of publicity. 
Having defended my main theses, I will conclude on my final goal (sect. 4.3): 
 
                                                
237 While other solutions might be available, these appear to be the most promising ones in light of our 
previous discussion. 
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Goal n. 3: Sketch the general picture of concept individuation and possession that 
best fits with the general results of our discussion so far. 
 
I believe our arguments in chapters 1-5 support a specific picture of concept 
individuation/possession, one which emerges as overwhelmingly plausible in light of 
the various conclusions we have reached. That picture integrates all the main theses I 
defended along the way and, for reasons that will be obvious later, it can aptly be called 
a “pluralist-contextualist” theory of concepts. 
 
Let us now turn to our first goal and examine two possible ways to develop an 
individuation criterion for concepts that satisfies (FC) without violating (PUB). 
 
First Solution: Living With Unshared Concepts 
 
Our first solution was sketched in chapter 4 (sect. 4.3), where I noted how some of 
the conditions we examined could be modified so as to satisfy (FC) without 
immediately violating (PUB). There, I focused on a modified version of localism to 
give the reader an idea of how the solution might go. We can now describe the solution 
in more general terms and then proceed to assess its merits. 
The solution goes as follows. First, we provide an unrestricted necessary condition 
in order to satisfy (FC): for every case in which two concepts CX-CY are involved in 
contradictory beliefs, our individuation criterion will then include a necessary condition 
of the form: 
 
(K1c) A concept C is the same concept as CX → concept C has property/properties 
[…] 
 
Where, of course, CY will lack whatever property F appears in brackets (analogous 
unrestricted conditions will then be provided for every other Frege case). Here is a 
familiar example of the kind of condition I have in mind: a “modified localist” view (ch. 
4, sect. 4.3) will satisfy (FC) in Edmund’s case through the unrestricted: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is the same concept as SUPERMAN1 → concept C has same 
inferential role as SUPERMAN1 
 
Where SUPERMAN1’s inferential role includes the inference to [CAPTURED THE ROBBER], 
so that the account can yield the right predictions in Edmund’s case. 
Now, we have seen that there are both “inductive” (ch. 4) and “principled” (sect. 3 
supra) reasons to think that, for several Frege cases, our unrestricted condition will 
entail that CX-CY are not shared. For instance, all the individuation criteria examined in 
chapter 4 (including modified localism) had precisely this consequence in Edmund and 
Verna’s case: once we decide to satisfy (FC) through an unrestricted criterion, we must 
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grant that the concepts involved in Edmund’s beliefs (SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2) are not 
shared by subjects like Verna, even though these subjects can engage with Edmund in 
Superman-related communication, fall under the same Superman-related generalizations 
etc… . Mutatis mutandis for other Frege cases that have the same features. 
In sum: if the criterion we use to satisfy (FC) is unrestricted, we must concede the 
following: those concepts which are involved in contradictory beliefs (e.g. SUPERMAN1-
SUPERMAN2) are often not shared by other intentional subjects. We will then have to 
show that this consequence of our unrestricted criterion is in fact compatible with 
publicity; for instance, we must show that publicity doesn’t require Edmund’s 
SUPERMAN1 to be shared by Verna. Fortunately, there is a strategy we can use for this 
purpose238. As usual, this strategy will have to be declined differently, depending on 
whether we adopt a Fregean or a non-Fregean ontology; I will consider each of them in 
turn239.  
A Fregean might hold that publicity does not require Verna to have a concept which 
is numerically identical to Edmund’s SUPERMAN1: Edmund and Verna can successfully 
communicate, agree/disagree about Superman etc… as long as they have some concept 
of Superman in common. For instance, there might be a concept SUPERMAN which is 
less finely individuated than Edmund’s SUPERMAN1, and which both subjects have. (This 
concept might e.g. be individuated by the standard Superman-ish role, in which case 
Verna and Edmund would both have it). Bottom line: publicity is not violated, even 
though some of Edmund’s Superman-concepts are not shared by Verna.  
A non-Fregean ontologist has two strategies available (both are structurally similar 
to the Fregean one). First, he could interpret (K1c) as a condition for numerical identity 
of token concepts, rather than a condition for type identity. For instance, our modified 
localist view could hold that a token concept C is numerically identical to Edmund’s 
token concept SUPERMAN1 only if they have same inferential role. This would satisfy 
(FC), since SUPERMAN2 would then be numerically distinct from SUPERMAN1. Of course, 
it would also follow that none of Verna’s token concepts is numerically identical with 
Edmund’s SUPERMAN1. This is unproblematic, however, since Verna’s concepts can still 
belong to the same type as SUPERMAN1. For instance, we could adopt a coarse-grained 
typing condition like: two token concepts belong to the type concept SUPERMAN iff they 
have the standard Superman-ish role. Verna and Edmund would then have numerically 
distinct Superman-concepts belonging to the same type, and publicity would be 
respected. 
                                                
238 The reader will note that this is the strategy I employed in ch. 3 (sect. 4.1) while developing my 
“modified holistic” view; more on this soon. 
239 I will ignore those solutions that couldn’t be accepted within a certain ontology or that simply appear 
downright implausible.  
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Alternatively, the non-Fregean might decide to satisfy (FC) through a condition for 
type identity, while holding that a concept can belong to multiple types240. For instance, 
he might put forward the following condition: 
 
(K1Edmund) A token concept C belongs to the same type concept T1 as SUPERMAN1 
→ concept C has same inferential role as SUPERMAN1 
 
The idea behind this condition is that there is a type-concept T1 whose membership 
conditions are extremely fine-grained: a token concept must have SUPERMAN1’s 
inferential role in order to belong to T1. (As usual, we will assume [CAPTURED THE 
ROBBER] is part of SUPERMAN1’s role). Again, our condition makes the right predictions 
about Edmund’s concepts, since only one of them belongs to T1: the two concepts are 
type-different. Of course, the condition also entails that none of Verna’s concepts 
belongs to T1. If a concept can belong to multiple types, however, this need not violate 
publicity, since there might be a further type T to which both Edmund and Verna’s 
concepts belong. As usual, T’s membership conditions will be coarse-grained: for 
instance, T might be simply individuated by the standard Superman-ish role, in which 
case our two subjects will both have token concepts belonging to it. Even though T1 is 
not shared, then, publicity is respected because T is. 
 
Clearly, these three versions of our solution closely parallel each other. Setting aside 
ontological subtleties, they all make the same claim: each of us has a stock of shared 
concepts, and a stock of unshared ones. The unshared ones are those involved in the 
Frege cases that arise all the time in our cognitive lives; the shared ones are those that 
account for our ability to communicate, agree/disagree, fall under the same 
generalizations and so on. All publicity requires is that we share some of our concepts 
with other intentional subjects; we are therefore free to provide unrestricted criteria for 
concept sameness, even though this will have the consequence that many concepts (such 
as Edmund’s SUPERMAN1) aren’t public.  
 
Second Solution: Restricted Individuation Conditions 
 
Let us now consider a radically different solution to our problem. Since we started 
looking for an individuation criterion that could satisfy (FC), we only considered 
criteria of a certain type, which I have called “unrestricted”; as we have seen in chapter 
4, all the leading theories of concepts currently on the market have proposed 
individuation criteria of this kind. Given a Frege case involving two concepts CX-CY, 
these criteria hold that, in order for any concept to be the same as CX, that concept must 
have a certain property (e.g. being inferentially connected to [CAPTURED THE ROBBER]; 
                                                
240 V. ch. 3 (sect. 4.1) for discussion of some possible objections against the appeal to multiple types.   
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having CX’s origin; having CX’s physical-neurological properties; and so on). The 
sameness condition provided will therefore have the following form: 
 
(K1c) A concept C is the same concept as CX → concept C has property/properties 
[…] 
 
There is, however, an alternative way to satisfy (FC): instead of providing unrestricted 
sameness conditions, we could have restricted conditions that only apply 
intrapersonally and synchronically. That is, we could satisfy (FC) through a weaker 
condition of the following form: 
 
(K1c) A concept C is the same concept as CX → concept C has property/properties 
[…] or it is had by a different subject from CX 
 
(As usual, “different subject” also covers different time-slices of the same subject). The 
second, weaker version of our condition will still satisfy (FC) if the first one does: by 
hypothesis, CY belongs to the same subject as CX, so CY won’t be the same concept as CX 
if it doesn’t have the property/properties in brackets.  
While both of the above conditions satisfy (FC), however, a restricted condition has 
an important advantage: it does not entail that CX isn’t shared by other subjects! For 
consider some subject (other than the one involved in the Frege case) whose concepts 
don’t have the property in brackets. Clearly, all his concepts meet the restricted 
condition, since they all belong to a different subject from CX. So restricted conditions 
are guaranteed to be compatible with the publicity of concepts, since they just don’t 
apply at the interpersonal/diachronic level. 
An example will be helpful. Consider again the localist condition: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is the same concept as SUPERMAN1 → C has same inferential 
role as SUPERMAN1 
 
(where, as usual, the inferential role of SUPERMAN1 includes [CAPTURED THE ROBBER]). 
As it stands, this condition entails that SUPERMAN1 is not shared by someone like Verna, 
who hasn’t heard the news about Superman. But suppose we restrict the condition as 
follows: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is the same concept as SUPERMAN1 → C has same inferential 
role as SUPERMAN1 or it is had by a different subject from SUPERMAN1 
 
Obviously, all of Verna’s concepts meet this condition, since they satisfy the second 
disjunct. Therefore, Verna could still have Edmund’s SUPERMAN1, even though she 
hasn’t heard the news and doesn’t know about the robber’s capture! At the same time, 
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the condition will still satisfy (FC), since SUPERMAN2 does belong to the same subject 
(Edmund) as SUPERMAN1.  
Restricted conditions seem to have all the advantages of unrestricted ones, without 
any of the costs: they are just as good at satisfying (FC), but they are guaranteed to be 
consistent with publicity. Nor is the solution ad hoc and unmotivated. By its very 
nature, (PUB) only applies to concepts had by different subjects: communication, 
agreement/disagreement and intentional generalizations are essentially interpersonal 
phenomena. Conversely, (FC) only applies to concepts had by the same subject at the 
same time: the puzzle of rationality in Frege cases is essentially intrapersonal and 
synchronic. It’s not puzzling that two thinkers can respectively ascribe F and not-F to 
the same x; nor is it puzzling that I can ascribe F to x at t1 and then, having changed my 
mind, ascribe not-F to the same x at t2! Since (PUB) only applies to concepts had by 
different subjects and (FC) only applies to concepts had by the same subject, we might 
have good reasons to provide different sets of sameness conditions corresponding to our 
two constraints: the first set will apply interpersonally and diachronically, the second 
intrapersonally and synchronically.  
The possibility of a restricted individuation criterion should certainly have received 
more attention in the literature241: as I previously noted, all the criteria reviewed in 
chapter 4 were unrestricted. Nevertheless, I think our first solution is preferable: the 
idea that a concept can have restricted sameness conditions appears metaphysically 
dubious. The worry will be declined differently depending on the ontology we are 
targeting. A Fregean must hold that a concept can have restricted identity conditions: 
Edmund’s SUPERMAN1 is numerically identical to one of Verna’s concepts, but not to 
SUPERMAN2, even though neither of these concepts has the same inferential role as 
SUPERMAN1. Does it make sense for a condition on numerical identity with an object x 
(in this case, the concept SUPERMAN1) to be restricted in this way? If having a certain 
inferential role is necessary for SUPERMAN2 to be numerically identical to SUPERMAN1, 
then it seems that condition should also apply to Verna’s concepts.  
A parallel worry arises for the non-Fregean, who must grant that there are restricted 
conditions on being type-identical with SUPERMAN1. More precisely: the non-Fregean 
must hold that there is a type T, such that Verna’s concepts can belong to T even if they 
don’t have SUPERMAN1’s role, while Edmund’s concepts cannot. Being connected to 
[CAPTURED THE ROBBER] is thus necessary for T-membership, but only for concepts had 
by Edmund at the same time as SUPERMAN1. Again, allowing for such restricted typing 
conditions might seem metaphysically dubious, although admittedly the worry appears 
more serious for the Fregean. After all, the non-Fregean could respond that we can type 
concepts any way we like: we can simply stipulate that some typing conditions for T 
only apply intrapersonally/synchronically, but not interpersonally/diachronically.  
                                                
241 But v. the discussion of intrapersonal/interpersonal typing criteria in Schneider (2011, pp. 126-132); v. 
also Block (1995, pp. 185-187). 
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Since the non-Fregean reply seems more promising, the appeal to restricted 
sameness conditions might require adopting a non-Fregean ontology for concepts. 
Given that our first solution does not have potentially troublesome metaphysical 
consequences and can be accepted on both of our ontologies, I believe it is preferable on 
balance. Fortunately, we need not decide the issue here: my goal in the next section is to 
convince you that holism should have a place in your individuation criterion for 
concepts, and my arguments for this claim will go through no matter which of the two 
solutions you prefer. 
 
4.2. A Place For Holism 
  
As you will recall, in chapter 3 I defended a version of the publicity principle for 
intentional generalizations and noted how the original Block-Schneider version of 
holism would be inconsistent with that principle. Then (sect. 4.1), I suggested 
weakening holism so as to make it compatible with publicity: the holist could abandon 
the claim that all concepts are individuated by their global inferential role, holding 
instead that only some of them are. This gave rise to a worry: maybe we can make a 
holistic criterion compatible with publicity, but that doesn’t show we also have positive 
reasons to accept such a criterion. Why think that any concepts are holistically 
individuated? And, more generally, why should the modified holistic picture I sketched 
“have a place” in our best theory of concepts? 
In this section, I will argue for the inclusion of a modified holistic condition in our 
individuation criterion for concepts. First, I will try to convince you that the condition in 
question would in fact be compatible with publicity; then, that we also have strong 
positive reasons to accept such a condition. I will then conclude with some general 
remarks about the role of holism in a theory of concepts. 
 
Holism and other criteria 
 
The first thing to note is that, even in the original Block-Schneider version, holism 
does no worse than many of its competitors: as noted in chapter 4, several other 
individuation criteria that satisfy (FC) will also end up violating (PUB). In particular, 
Fodor’s “Conceptual Atomism” seems to present the very same problem as holism242. If 
concepts are individuated by their reference plus their syntactic properties qua LoT 
symbols, no two subjects will have any concepts in common: on both “physicalist” and 
“functionalist” accounts of LoT syntax, token symbols belonging to different systems 
will almost always differ in their syntactic properties. Ironically enough, then, Fodor’s 
atomism falls prey of his own arguments against holism, and so do the other views we 
                                                
242 V. condition (d) in ch. 4 (sect. 4.2) for discussion. 
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examined (v. e.g. ST’s originalism). In conclusion, holism is no worse than other 
unrestricted criteria when it comes to dealing with publicity.   
 
A problem for everyone 
 
Not only is holism on the same boat as other theories of concepts; more importantly, 
it can be made compatible with the publicity principle by employing one of the two 
solutions described in the last section. Holists and non-holists alike face the following 
problem: finding an individuation criterion that can satisfy (FC) while being consistent 
with (PUB). I suggested two ways to develop such a criterion:  
 
First Solution (Living With Unshared Concepts) 
 
• To satisfy (FC), provide unrestricted conditions for concept sameness. 
 
• These conditions will entail, for many concepts involved in contradictory 
beliefs, that they are not shared (cf. Verna and SUPERMAN1). 
 
• But this is compatible with the publicity principle, since many other concepts 
(e.g. SUPERMAN) are still widely shared. 
 
Second Solution (Restricted Individuation Conditions) 
 
• To satisfy (FC), provide restricted conditions for concept sameness. 
 
• Since the conditions are restricted, they will not entail that concepts involved in 
contradictory beliefs are not shared. 
 
• Since they are just as fine-grained as unrestricted conditions, however, they will 
still entail that such concepts (e.g. SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2) are distinct, thus 
satisfying (FC). 
 
Crucially, everyone will have to employ one of these solutions in his individuation 
criterion: everyone must grant either that many concepts are not shared, or that they are 
shared but have fine-grained, restricted sameness conditions. Once we apply one of the 
above solutions to the original Block-Schneider account, then, we will get a version of 
holism that’s guaranteed to be consistent with (PUB), as the anti-holist himself must 
recognize243! 
                                                
243 I will be brief in my treatment of this point, as I have already given details about how to implement 
each solution in the previous section. 
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If we decide to apply the first solution, the resulting holistic view will go as follows. 
We will abandon the original Block-Schneider thesis that all concepts are individuated 
by their global inferential role. Some concepts will still be individuated in this way, 
most notably those concepts that are involved in the contradictory beliefs of rational 
subjects. For instance, Edmund’s SUPERMAN1 will be individuated by: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is the same concept as SUPERMAN1 → C has same global 
inferential role as SUPERMAN1 
 
It follows that any concept which doesn’t have that role is different from SUPERMAN1, 
which is therefore not shared by other intentional subjects (e.g. Verna). This, however, 
does not constitute a violation of publicity, for other concepts are individuated in a non-
holistic way. For instance, there might be a concept SUPERMAN which is not 
individuated by its global inferential role and which Edmund and Verna do share. (That 
concept might e.g. be individuated by the standard Superman-ish role). Bottom line: 
concepts involved in Frege cases are holistically individuated and not shared (to satisfy 
(FC)), while other concepts are non-holistically individuated and shared (so (PUB) is 
respected)244. (As you might have noted, this is just the modified holistic theory 
sketched at the end of chapter 3). 
If we apply the restriction solution, the original Block-Schneider picture will be 
modified in a different way. We will now drop the claim that, for any two concepts C1-
C2, C2 is the same as C1 only if it has C1’s global role; we will instead take this condition 
to apply only if C1-C2 belong to the same subject. If C1-C2 are had by different subjects, 
C2 can be the same as C1 even if the two concepts differ in some of their connections. 
Edmund’s SUPERMAN1 will then be individuated by the restricted holistic condition: 
 
(K1Edmund) A concept C is the same concept as SUPERMAN1 → C has same global 
inferential role as SUPERMAN1 or it is had by a different subject from SUPERMAN1 
 
As noted in the previous section, this condition will be just as effective as an 
unrestricted one in satisfying (FC), but it will not entail that SUPERMAN1 is not shared by 
other subjects. Once we modify the original Block-Schneider account in this way, then, 
we can take all concepts to be individuated by holistic conditions, as long as the 
conditions in question only apply intrapersonally and synchronically.  
I have described two ways to weaken the Block-Schneider account in order to make 
it compatible with publicity. Again, notice that the anti-holist himself will have to apply 
one of these strategies to his own individuation criterion in order to make it consistent 
with publicity. Therefore, he’ll have to recognize that, once the holist applies one of the 
two strategies to his account, the result will also be compatible with (PUB). In 
                                                
244 V. sect. 4.1 supra and ch. 3 (sect. 4.1) for details about how to decline this solution on Fregean/non-
Fregean ontologies. 
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conclusion, everyone must grant that a suitably modified holistic view will not violate 
publicity after all. 
 
Satisfying (FC) 
 
We have shown that a holistic criterion is no worse than many of its competitors, 
and (more importantly) that we can modify it to make it consistent with (PUB). But 
what positive reasons can be offered for accepting such a criterion? 
A first reason is that holism will do a great job at satisfying (FC). Subjects involved 
in Frege cases typically have pairs of concepts that differ in some of their inferential 
connections: cf. Edmund, Lois, Peter and so forth. If having different connections is 
enough for the concepts in question to be distinct, as the holist maintains, then (FC) will 
be satisfied in all these cases. 
Indeed, we can show in a principled way that holism will satisfy (FC) in all the 
cases covered by the principle. Suppose for reductio that holism does not satisfy (FC) in 
a case c. Then there are two concepts C1-C2 such that:  
 
1) C1-C2 are involved in the contradictory beliefs of a rational subject S at time t 
about some object x. 
 
2) C1-C2 stand in exactly the same inferential connections for S at t. 
 
This would be the only kind of case in which (FC) requires C1-C2 to be distinct (since 
they are involved in contradictory beliefs) but a holistic account does not entail that they 
are (since they have the same connections). The case, however, is not only hard to 
imagine; it is downright impossible, as the following argument shows: 
 
a) C1-C2 are involved in contradictory beliefs (by (1)). 
 
b) So C1 is inferentially connected to [IS F], and C2 is inferentially connected to [IS 
NOT F] (from (a)).  
 
(By definition, if the two concepts are “involved” in contradictory beliefs, the subject 
accepts the thoughts C1 IS F and C2 IS NOT F. So he will also be disposed to infer from C1 
to [IS F] and from C2 to [IS NOT F]). 
 
c) C1-C2 have the same inferential connections (by (2)).  
 
d) But then C1 is inferentially connected to [IS NOT F], and C2 is inferentially 
connected to [IS F] (from (b), (c)). 
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e) So C1 is inferentially connected to both [IS F] and [IS NOT F], and C2 is inferentially 
connected to both [IS NOT F] and [IS F] (from (b), (d)). 
 
f) But if C1-C2 have such inferential connections, our subject will arguably be 
irrational, contra assumption (1). 
 
Our subject would be accepting both C1 IS F and its negation C1 IS NOT F; similarly, he 
would be accepting both C2 IS F and its negation C2 IS NOT F. But, according to the 
principles of rationality presupposed by our account of Frege cases, this would be an 
irrational doxastic behavior (cf. the “Standard Explanation” in ch. 4, sect. 2.2). 
Conclusion: there are no two concepts of which assumptions (1)-(2) are both true: 
holism satisfies (FC) in all the cases covered by the principle. 
 
The best account of Frege cases? 
 
Maybe holism is good enough to satisfy (FC), but why think it will be superior to 
the other candidate conditions examined in chapter 4? After all, those conditions can 
also be patched by employing one of the two strategies considered above. So they can 
also be made compatible with (PUB), and they might be just as effective as holism in 
satisfying (FC).  
I won’t be able to make a detailed comparison between holism and every other 
condition examined in chapter 4, so I will limit myself to some general remarks. We 
already know that some of the conditions discussed in chapter 4 fail to satisfy (FC) in at 
least some Frege cases. For instance, ST’s originalist view cannot account for 
Paderewski-like cases: Peter has contradictory de re beliefs about Paderewski, but the 
concepts involved in those beliefs are not distinct, since they have exactly the same 
origin (they are associated with the same public name). Clearly, then, holism will be 
superior to originalism, and to all the other accounts that make mistaken predictions 
about some of the relevant Frege cases. 
More generally, holism presents a clear advantage over its rivals. While we have a 
principled argument showing that a holistic condition will satisfy (FC) in all the 
relevant cases (cf. supra), no such argument is available for other conditions, such as 
physicalist accounts of LoT symbols (v. condition (d) in ch. 4)245. So we have no 
guarantee that a physicalist account will make the right predictions about all the cases 
covered by (FC); ceteris paribus, this gives us good reasons to go for holism.  
What about the other condition examined in chapter 4, i.e. the modified localist 
account sketched in section 4.3 246 ? On that view, a concept’s inferential role does not 
include all of its inferential connections; however, some concepts have a more fine-
grained role than others. For example, [CAPTURED THE ROBBER] will be part of 
                                                
245 Sect. 4.2. Recall that the other possible version of (d), a functionalist one, simply collapses into 
condition (c). 
246 Recall that the unmodified localist account could not satisfy (FC): v. condition (c), ch. 4 (sect. 4.2). 
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SUPERMAN1’s inferential role, but not of SUPERMAN’s role. So the account is consistent 
with (PUB) (SUPERMAN is still shared by Edmund and Verna) and it satisfies (FC) 
(Edmund’s SUPERMAN1 is still distinct from his SUPERMAN2). Moreover, a similar 
strategy can presumably be extended to other Frege cases. Why should we prefer a 
modified holistic condition to a modified localist one? 
The problem with the localist account is that its notion of inferential role is too 
flexible, so flexible that it collapses into holism! The localist, recall, endorses the 
following two theses:  
 
Localist definition of inferential roles: the inferential role of a concept C includes 
some (but not all) the inferential connections in which C stands at a time t for a 
subject S 
 
Necessary condition (c): C2 is the same concept as C1 → C2 has same inferential role 
as C1 
 
Now consider an arbitrary Frege case involving two concepts CX-CY. The localist will 
have to find some inferential connection IX such that CX, but not CY, has IX: he will then 
take IX to be part of CX’s role, so that the two concepts come out different. At the same 
time, however, not all of CX-CY’s connections can be part of their roles, or the account 
would be holistic. For instance: in Edmund’s case, [CAPTURED THE ROBBER] will be part 
of SUPERMAN1’s role, while other inferences (e.g. [IS HEROIC]) will be among the 
concept’s connections without being included in its role. 
We can now see why a modified localist picture would simply collapse into holism. 
In many Frege cases, the connection IX which distinguishes CX from CY might not be 
“special” in any way: it might be just like all the other connections in which CX stands, 
in which case there won’t be any principled reason to include IX in the concept’s role 
while leaving the other connections out. This is precisely the case with Edmund. His 
disposition to go from SUPERMAN1 to CAPTURED THE ROBBER is one he has only recently 
acquired, which is no way a “core” component of his concept of Superman, and which 
he would quickly drop if his evidential situation were to change. Moreover, it is a very 
“specific” inferential disposition, one based on information that other Superman-
thinkers might well fail to have (v. Verna). Why, then, would that inference be included 
in the concept’s role, and the inference from e.g. SUPERMAN1 to HEROIC be left out? Why 
not include the latter and leave the former out, for instance? The localist faces a version 
of the notorious “principled basis” worry247: his account seems entirely arbitrary. To 
avoid the charge of arbitrariness, the only option would be to embrace holism and 
simply include all of SUPERMAN1’s connections in its role. 
The worry is made even deeper by noting that the localist has already conceded that 
concepts involved in contradictory beliefs (e.g. Edmund’s SUPERMAN1) are often not 
                                                
247 V. Fodor (1987, ch. 3), and Fodor and Lepore (2002). We will go back to this in ch. 6 infra.  
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shared by subjects covered by (PUB) (e.g. Verna). But then why should we only 
include some of their connections in their role, if this will not guarantee their 
shareability? The localist commits to an unprincipled distinction between 
individuating/non-individuating inferences without gaining any advantages over the 
holist. I conclude that, when compared with modified localism and the other sameness 
conditions examined in chapter 4, a suitably modified holistic condition will still be the 
best way to satisfy (FC). 
 
The demands of (FC) 
 
There is one final consideration favoring the inclusion of a holistic condition in our 
individuation criterion for concepts. In section 2.1, I showed (FC) to entail the 
following sameness condition: 
 
(C) (two concepts C1-C2 are had by the same subject S at the same time t and they 
are the same concept) → (they do not have contradictory inferential connections)  
 
I then went on to show how fine-grained this condition is (section 2.2): the presence of 
any two contradictory connections will be sufficient for two concepts had by the same 
subject to be distinct, no matter how many other connections they might have in 
common. To illustrate the point further, I also noted how the unrestricted version (C*) 
of condition (C) would be straightforwardly inconsistent with publicity, since it would 
individuate concepts had by different subjects too finely. 
Since (FC) entails (C), we know our individuation criterion will have to include a 
fine-grained condition anyway: that condition being (C) itself, of course. In fact, notice 
that (C) is very close to being holistic. Like a holistic condition, it is extremely fine-
grained, and it would be incompatible with publicity if applied unrestrictedly to all 
concepts. It is also an “inferentialist” condition, since it takes the presence/absence of 
certain inferential connections to be relevant for a concept’s identity. The only 
difference between holism and (C) is that, according to holism, two concepts are 
different whenever they have different connections. Condition (C), on the other hand, 
only claims that two concepts are different whenever they have contradictory 
connections: if C1 is connected to [IS F] and C2 is connected to neither [IS F] nor [IS NOT 
F]248, it doesn’t follow from (C) that C1 is different from C2249.  
                                                
248 (In this case, the subject is simply agnostic about whether C2 is F or NOT F). 
249 In fact, I believe a plausibly stronger version of (FC) might well entail a holistic condition for concept 
sameness. In particular, I suspect a holistic condition will be required if we want to give an account of 
certain further problems arising in Frege cases, especially puzzles of behavior and cognitive significance; 
I plan to explore the issue in future work. V. Block (1995) and Schneider (2009a, pp. 531-535; 2011, pp. 
104-109 and 118-120), who both offer principled arguments for holism along these lines. (Schneider’s 
argument partially inspired the arguments in sects. 2.1-2.2, although I’m not sure I understand all its 
details). 
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While strictly speaking weaker, (C) is analogous to a holistic condition in all the 
relevant respects: it would be incompatible with (PUB) if applied unrestrictedly, it is 
very fine-grained, and it has an “inferentialist” component. This has important 
consequences, since I have shown (C) to be directly entailed by (FC): anyone who 
accepts the Fregean constraint (not only those with holistic sympathies!) will have to 
include (C) in his individuation criterion. On everyone’s account, then, our best theory 
of concepts will comprise a condition that is quasi-holistic. In light of this, including a 
fully holistic condition should seem more appealing: after all, I have already offered 
several reasons to do so, and we are already committed to a fine-grained inferentialist 
condition like (C) in any case. 
 
I have argued that holism should “have a place” in our best theory of concepts. 
More specifically: depending on which of our two solutions we adopt, an individuation 
criterion should either include unrestricted holistic conditions for some concepts, or 
restricted holistic conditions for all concepts. I will conclude with two brief remarks. 
First: once we realize that the Block-Schneider account can be modified in one of these 
two ways, the debate over holism “deflates” as insubstantial. On both of our solutions, 
holism will be compatible with other theories of concepts. On our first solution, we can 
still individuate several concepts in a non-holistic fashion (e.g. by their reference, or by 
their local inferential role). On our second solution, we can provide non-holistic 
sameness conditions for concepts had by different subjects, while having holistic 
conditions for concepts had by the same subject, at the same time. The two sets of 
conditions will be entirely compatible: being restricted, the first set will only apply 
interpersonally/diachronically, while the second set will only apply 
intrapersonally/synchronically. Once we modify our holistic account in one of these two 
ways, every appearance of conflict with non-holistic views disappears: both of them can 
be incorporated in our best theory of concepts (more on this soon). 
Second remark: if concepts are to play the “mode of presentation” role, then they 
must be individuated holistically250. According to a venerable tradition in philosophy of 
mind, the rationality of subjects involved in Frege cases is explained by their having 
distinct modes of presentation for the same object x251. Once we also identify modes of 
presentation with concepts, it follows that every subject involved in a Frege case must 
have distinct concepts for the same x: indeed, this is what (FC) amounts to. To build a 
theory of concept individuation that can account for this, I have suggested individuating 
modes of presentation/concepts by their global inferential role; this “cuts” concepts 
finely enough to predict, for every subject involved in a Frege case, that he does have 
distinct concepts for the same object. Conclusion: if concepts are to “play the mode of 
presentation role”252 and account for certain facts about rationality, then they should be 
                                                
250 Again, v. Schneider (2009a, 2011), who arrives at the same conclusion through a different route. 
251 Ch. 4, sect. 2. 
252 The expression is in Schiffer (1990). 
  189 
individuated holistically. Our venerable tradition is committed to a form of holism 
about concepts. 
 
4.3 . A Picture Of Concepts 
 
I have argued that holism should have a place in our best theory of concepts; this 
was one of my two goals in chapters 4-5. My other goal was to provide independent 
support for the contextualist version of publicity developed in chapter 3: more precisely, 
to convince you that, if intentional generalizations do require concepts to be shared by 
intentional subjects, such requirements will differ depending on the context of the 
generalization, and speakers’ intentions will play a crucial role in determining which 
concepts have to be shared in a given context. In this final section, I will show how this 
picture of publicity becomes extremely plausible on at least one of the two solutions I 
proposed in section 4.1. I will then conclude by sketching my own picture of concept 
individuation and possession. 
Throughout chapters 4-5 I have been assuming a generic, “non-contextualist” 
version of the publicity principle: I have been presupposing that intentional 
generalizations will require the subjects they cover to have certain specific concepts in 
common, but not that contextual features will play any role in determining what 
concepts must be shared253. This is because I wanted to convince you of the following: 
if you find the principle of publicity attractive, then you should endorse a contextualist 
version of it. In light of our discussion of (FC) and (PUB), I hope you will now find this 
claim plausible; as I will now argue, on at least one of our two solutions (the most 
plausible one indeed) we are almost forced to give a contextualist reading of (PUB). 
Recall what our first solution (sect. 4.1) amounted to: (PUB) only requires some 
concepts (those involved in intentional generalizations) to be shared, but this is 
compatible with other concepts (those involved in contradictory beliefs) not being 
shared. For instance, this is what happens with Edmund and Verna, who share 
SUPERMAN but not SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2. But now the question arises: what concepts 
must be shared by the subjects to which a generalization applies? If unshared concepts 
like SUPERMAN1 are involved in our intentional generalizations, then such 
generalizations will not be interpersonally applicable! What guarantees that this won’t 
happen?  
Our contextualist picture provides a convincing answer to this question. (This point 
was discussed extensively in chapter 3 (sect. 4.1), so my discussion will be brief). In 
short: speakers will generally not make reference to holistically individuated, unshared 
concepts in their normal uses of intentional generalizations. Suppose an ordinary 
speaker utters: 
 
                                                
253 Here I will ignore other aspects of the publicity principle, having to do with communication, 
agreement/disagreement etc… , to focus on generalizations alone.  
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G5) If a subject S believes that Clark can fly and believes that Clark just jumped off 
a skyscraper, then other things being equal S will not be worried. 
 
On our first solution, there are several concepts of Superman/Clark that our speaker 
might be “providing” in his utterance of (G5). For instance, he might be referring to a 
concept with the same global inferential role as Edmund’s SUPERMAN1, in which case 
(G5) will only apply to Edmund (he is the only one to have that concept). Clearly, 
however, there is no reason for ordinary speakers to refer to such ultra-specific concepts 
in their ordinary folk-psychological practices. Much more plausibly, our speaker is 
referring to a more coarsely individuated concept SUPERMAN; he might for instance 
intend the generalization to apply to anyone who has a concept with the standard Clark-
ish role, or indeed to anyone who has a concept referring to Clark at all. In both cases, 
someone will satisfy (G5)’s antecedent as long as he believes <Superman, can fly> 
under the coarsely individuated SUPERMAN. Clearly, then, (G5) will be widely 
applicable, since several subjects other than Edmund have the concept in question. 
In sum: our solution does presuppose that several concepts are holistically 
individuated, but (thanks to contextualism) these concepts will not be the ones involved 
in our intentional generalizations. Ordinary speakers have no reason to refer to such 
concepts when uttering a generalization like (G5); they will rather refer to widely shared 
concepts like SUPERMAN. Assuming a contextualist version of publicity, then, speakers’ 
intentions will ensure that only non-holistic concepts are required in order for someone 
to fall under a generalization like (G5). 
Now, in some contexts a speaker might decide to refer to holistically individuated 
concepts: consider for instance a sophisticated theoretical context in which we explicitly 
postulate the existence of such concepts to answer certain theoretical needs, such as 
accounting for (FC). Someone might then decide to refer to such concepts when uttering 
an intentional generalization; he might e.g. decide to refer specifically to Edmund’s 
SUPERMAN1, in which case the generalization will not apply to anyone but Edmund. 
Notice, however, that if a generalization was uttered by a speaker with this kind of 
intention, it would be intuitively correct to treat it as non-interpersonally applicable! If 
someone (say, Edmund himself) intends to refer to Edmund’s “holistic” concept of 
Superman/Clark when uttering (G5), why should we take the antecedent of (G5) to be 
satisfied by anyone but him? Contexts in which a speaker refers to holistically 
individuated concepts pose no threat, since it would be mistaken to treat the 
corresponding generalizations as interpersonally applicable. 
In conclusion: I have shown that, once we assume our first solution to the tension 
between (FC) and (PUB), we will also have strong reasons to endorse a contextualist 
version of the publicity principle. Since the alternative solution, which appeals to 
restricted conditions, has problematic metaphysical consequences, this gives us good 
reasons to go for contextualist publicity. (Also, notice that, while the restriction solution 
might not motivate contextualist publicity, it is certainly consistent with it). Bottom line: 
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if you like the publicity principle, you should like the contextualist version of it that was 
developed in chapter 3. 
 
My general aim in chapters 4-5 was to provide further support for two views that 
were developed in chapter 3: a modified version of holism and a contextualist model of 
publicity. I hope my discussion of the relationship between (FC) and (PUB) has made 
these views look more attractive to the reader. To conclude our discussion, I would now 
like to integrate those two views in a more general picture of concept individuation and 
possession. This is the picture that emerges from my arguments in chapters 1-5; I call it 
a “picture” since it is partly a substantive theory about the individuation/possession 
conditions of certain concepts, and partly a framework within which one can develop 
such a theory. In lack of a better term, I will call it a “pluralist-contextualist” picture of 
concepts. (A “pluralist-localist” theory has recently been defended by Daniel Weiskopf 
(2009 a,b), from whom I borrow the term “pluralism”. I am much indebted to some of 
Weiskopf’s insights, although my view rejects his localism and is a lot more radical: v. 
ch. 6 (sect. 2.3) for a comparison). 
We started our discussion with two questions: what are the individuation conditions 
of concepts? And what are their possession conditions? On my picture, there is no 
single answer to these questions: concepts are individuated in a variety of ways. In 
particular, some concepts should be individuated holistically, by their global inferential 
role, in order to satisfy the Fregean constraint: these, of course, are the concepts 
involved in the contradictory beliefs of rational subjects, like Edmund’s SUPERMAN1-
SUPERMAN2. Other concepts, however, must be individuated more coarsely. According 
to our best theory of attitude ascriptions, we often make reference to other people’s 
concepts in our reports. If no concepts were shareable, generalizations embedding such 
reports would not apply to more than one subject; there must be some shared concepts 
for ordinary speakers to refer to in their intentional generalizations. And, luckily, there 
are: these are the concepts that are not individuated by their global inferential role, like 
Edmund and Verna’s SUPERMAN 254,255. 
How, then, are shared concepts individuated? This is a difficult question, and not 
one I will be able to answer in full. Again, I don’t think there is a single answer. Some 
                                                
254 I am presupposing something like our first solution here. However, my pluralist-contextualist picture 
could also be developed along the lines of our second solution. We could then say that concepts are 
individuated in multiple ways: different sets of sameness conditions apply at the intrapersonal/synchronic 
and interpersonal/diachronic level. More specifically, the sameness conditions applying 
intrapersonally/synchronically are holistic, while those applying interpersonally/diachronically are 
coarser (for instance, they might simply require sameness of local inferential role. V. sect. 4.1 for more 
details about the appeal to restricted sameness conditions). We could then draw analogous “pluralist” 
conclusions regarding the conditions for concept possession (v. infra). While differing in some of their 
details, our two solutions push towards the same general picture of concepts.  
255 As usual, all these claims will be declined differently depending on our background ontology. For 
reasons of space, I must leave it to the reader to construe a Fregean and a non-Fregean version of the 
picture (v. sect. 4.1 supra for instructions on how to do this). 
  192 
concepts might be individuated by their local inferential role. When speakers make 
ascriptions of the form “S believes that Clark can fly” and use generalizations 
embedding that ascription, they will sometimes refer to a concept CLARK which is 
individuated by the standard Clark-ish role. But it would be wrong to assume that this 
will happen in all, or even most contexts256. Some thinkers might not have a concept 
with the standard Clark-ish role; for instance, they might ignore that the shy reporter 
with glasses is called “Clark”. Yet, a speaker could intend his generalizations to cover 
these “abnormal” thinkers as well as more ordinary ones. In these contexts, the speaker 
might simply refer to a concept (call it CLARK*) which is individuated by part of the 
standard Clark-ish role (e.g. only by [SHY REPORTER WITH GLASSES]): his generalizations 
will then apply more widely, covering abnormal thinkers as well as ordinary ones. In 
other contexts, a speaker might even intend his generalizations to apply to anyone who 
has some concept referring to Superman/Clark, no matter what his inferential 
dispositions are. In these contexts, our speaker will make reference to a concept (call it 
CLARKREF) which is purely individuated by its reference, i.e. by its referring to 
Superman/Clark: here, any subject who is capable of having thoughts about 
Superman/Clark will fall under the relevant generalizations, no matter how “deviant” 
his inferential dispositions towards Superman/Clark might be257.  
On our picture, then, there will be a multitude of concepts “in the vicinity” of the 
concept CLARK; while that concept might be individuated by the local Clark-ish role, 
there will also be concepts (CLARK*, CLARK**…) which are individuated by parts of 
that role, and even concepts (CLARKREF) which are simply individuated by their reference 
and thus shared even more widely. But the heterogeneity of concepts does not stop here. 
On many views, concepts are at least partially individuated by their reference: two 
concepts C1-C2 cannot be the same concept unless they refer to the same 
object/property258. Unfortunately, this widely endorsed position makes it impossible to 
account for the shareability of indexical concepts such as the first-person concept: 
clearly, my I-concept and your I-concept refer to different individuals. And yet, the 
same arguments that move us to recognize the publicity of non-indexical concepts also 
apply to indexical ones. Consider the generalization: 
 
If a subject S believes that he is going to be attacked by a bear, then other things 
being equal S will be scared259. 
 
                                                
256 This is one of the main differences between my picture and standard localist views: v. ch. 6 for more 
details. 
257 In these contexts, “S believes that Clark can fly” will be true of anyone who believes <Superman, can 
fly> under some concept or other: the truth conditions of attitude reports and intentional generalizations 
will then be extensionally equivalent to those provided by the Millian.  
258 Fodor’s account is a case in point: v. ch. 4 (sects. 3.1-3.2).  
259 V. Perry (2000) for the original bear-example. 
  193 
You and I both satisfy this generalization: under certain circumstances, each of us 
would have the belief that he was going to be attacked by a bear, feeling scared as a 
result. In turn, it seems that, when we have the belief in question, we will both think the 
same thought I AM GOING TO BE ATTACKED BY A BEAR. Similar considerations apply to 
communication: when I say “I am going to be attacked by a bear” you should be able to 
grasp the same thought I express, even though that thought will pick out a different 
individual when entertained by you. This is a huge topic260, of course, and one might 
well resist the idea that we are deploying the same I-concept. I bring this up only to note 
that a pluralist picture can account for the shareability of indexical concepts, by holding 
that some concepts are not individuated by their reference but, say, by their Kaplanian 
character (which is of course the same for our respective I-concepts).  
A pluralist picture of concept individuation brings with it a pluralist picture of 
concept possession: there is just no single answer to the question “What does it take for 
a thinker to have a concept”? Some concepts have more demanding possession 
conditions, while others have less demanding ones. To have Edmund’s SUPERMAN1, 
Verna would not only need to share the information Edmund got from the news, but his 
global set of beliefs about the world; to have his SUPERMAN, she only needs to know 
about a few notorious features of the famous superhero. If some concepts are 
individuated by their reference, then their possession only requires the ability to form 
propositional attitudes about the relevant object/property; mutatis mutandis for 
indexical concepts and other classes of concepts, whose possession conditions might be 
different yet from those examined so far. 
Analogous considerations apply to questions like: “When do two thinkers have the 
same concept of… (some object/property: Superman, time, justice…)?” This question 
wrongly presupposes that there will be a unique concept for every object/property261: on 
my picture, there is a multitude of concepts individuated in several different ways, and 
the conditions for two thinkers to have a concept of x in common will vary from 
concept to concept. Edmund and Verna will have the same concept SUPERMAN just in 
case they share certain ordinary beliefs about Superman; to have the same concept 
SUPERMAN1, however, they would have to share Edmund’s global set of beliefs. As we 
have seen262, context will play a crucial role in making certain concepts more salient 
than others, thus making it possible for us to say that two thinkers have “the same 
concept”. For instance, in most contexts we would say that Edmund and Verna have 
“the same concept” of Superman. However, once someone remarks how Verna hasn’t 
heard the news and doesn’t share all of Edmund’s information, we will recognize that 
“in some sense” their concepts differ. This can be straightforwardly captured by our 
picture: Verna and Edmund do have the same concept SUPERMAN, but they don’t have 
the same concept SUPERMAN1. (The phenomenon is of course ubiquitous: the claim that 
                                                
260 V. Frege (1956), Evans (1982), Kaplan (1989). 
261 V. Weiskopf (2009b). 
262 Cf. ch. 3 (sect. 4.1). 
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two people have “the same car” will sound true in context c1 (they have cars of the same 
type) but false in context c2 (someone remarked that the two cars differ in color)).  
In light of these considerations, the project of providing a unique set of sameness 
conditions for concepts seems misguided. In particular, the attempt of Fodor, Schneider 
and others to develop a single typing criterion for LoT symbols appears doomed to fail. 
Concepts should be typed in a variety of different ways: typing by global inferential role 
is useful for certain theoretical purposes (satisfying (FC)) but not others (respecting 
(PUB)), for which a coarser typing criterion will be appropriate. It’s only by helping 
ourselves to a plurality of typing criteria that we can fulfill the conflicting demands 
imposed on our theory of concepts by constraints like publicity and (FC).  
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Chapter 6 
 
Two Dilemmas For Localism 
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1. Introduction  
 
My goal in this chapter is to discuss an important family of views about concept 
individuation and possession. This approach to concepts, which I have called 
“localism”263, has already been examined in the context of our broader discussion (v. 
especially chs. 4-5). My goal here will be to analyze in more detail some of the main 
localist theories on the market, to compare them to the picture of concepts that was 
sketched in chapter 5, and to highlight those aspects of localism that I find most 
problematic.  
Here is how I propose to proceed. Having summarized the basic principles of 
localism, I will raise a first dilemma for localist views (sect. 2): the localist must decide 
whether to count all the structured mental representations that psychologists call 
“concepts” as properly individuating concepts “in the philosophical sense of the word”, 
or hold instead that only some of those representations actually individuate concepts and 
are required for their possession. I will then examine a view that chooses the first horn, 
the “pluralist-localist” theory recently defended by Daniel Weiskopf. I will highlight the 
main points of contact between Weiskopf’s pluralism and my own pluralist picture, as 
well as their main differences. As we’ll see, pluralist accounts have a great virtue: they 
can incorporate some important recent findings from cognitive psychology in their 
theory of concept individuation/possession. At the same time, however, Weiskopf takes 
psychological theories to provide correct individuation conditions for all concepts; I 
will suggest that this results in an inadequate theory of concept individuation/possession 
and offer reasons to prefer my own model, on which we only use psychology as our 
guide to the individuation conditions of some concepts.  
In section 3, I will move on to discuss those localist views on which the only 
inferential dispositions that individuate concepts are those fundamental dispositions that 
we would manifest under certain ideal conditions. Such views have to face a second 
dilemma: they must decide whether incorrect dispositions are also allowed in the 
individuating set. Having noted a few reasons why localist views generally answer in 
the negative, I will examine the consequences of choosing this horn of the dilemma. In 
particular, I’ll note that the localist faces a problem of psychological plausibility: if 
concepts are only individuated by correct dispositions, it becomes hard to account for 
the fact that ordinary thinkers actually have concepts, since the “folk theories” that 
those thinkers accept are often incorrect!   
In reply, many localists will hold that folk theories fix the reference of our concepts 
and are thus guaranteed to be correct. In section 4, I will examine the problems with this 
response by focusing on a specific localist view, the “descriptivist” theory of concepts 
recently defended by Frank Jackson. Once we take reference to be fixed by our 
inferential dispositions, it becomes hard to account for those “deviant” subjects whose 
                                                
263 V. Devitt (1996), Weiskopf (2009a). The view is sometimes referred to as “molecularism” (Fodor and 
Lepore 2002).  
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inferential dispositions are radically different from ours; Jackson’s view predicts that 
these subjects’ concepts have different reference from ours, a prediction that will be 
plainly unacceptable in number of important cases. Having considered and rejected 
some possible replies that could be offered in Jackson’s defense, I will conclude my 
discussion of localism with some more general considerations about the conditions for 
concept individuation and possession. 
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2. The Dilemma From Cognitive Psychology 
 
2.1 . Localism And Its Virtues 
 
As you will recall264, I defined localism as the conjunction of265: 
 
Concept individuation/possession (IRS): a concept C is partially individuated by 
its inferential role; therefore, a subject S will have C only if he has some mental 
representation with the same inferential role as C266. 
 
Localist definition of inferential roles: the inferential role of a concept C is the set 
of some (but not all) the inferential connections in which C stands at a time t for a 
subject S. 
 
To illustrate, consider our usual example: a localist might plausibly take the inference X 
IS A BACHELOR ↔ X IS AN UNMARRIED MAN to individuate BACHELOR, and a disposition 
to perform that inference to be necessary for its possession. So, among all the inferences 
that a possessor of BACHELOR might be disposed to draw, some (BACHELOR ↔ 
UNMARRIED MAN) will individuate the concept and will be required for its possession, 
while others (e.g. BACHELOR → LONELY) will not.  
Following common usage267, we can also say that, on a localist view, the concept 
BACHELOR is a “structured” entity which is “constituted” by the concepts UNMARRIED 
and MAN. This is a useful metaphor, but it must not be misinterpreted: the intended 
reading of “inferential structure” is a very weak one. The localist need not claim that 
concepts are syntactically structured (e.g. that BACHELOR is a complex LoT symbol 
constituted by the symbols UNMARRIED and MAN). He also need not claim that they are 
semantically structured (e.g. that UNMARRIED MAN is the content of BACHELOR). In what 
follows, the claim that concepts have “local inferential structure” will thus simply 
amount to the claim that a concept is individuated by some of its inferential 
connections, and that the corresponding inferential dispositions are required for its 
possession. 
 
                                                
264 V. ch. 2 (sect. 2.3) for a definition of IRS, and ch. 4 (sect. 4.2) for a first definition of localism. 
265 Localist theories have been defended by: Weiskopf (2009 a,b), Devitt (2006), Pereboom (1995), Rey 
(1983, 1985, 2005), Peacocke (1992, 1998a, 2007), Jackson (1998). Some important differences between 
these views will be extensively discussed in what follows.  
266 Notice that this claim can be accepted on both Fregean and non-Fregean ontologies: the Fregean will 
take the mental representation in question to express concept C, while the non-Fregean will take that 
representation to be concept C itself. 
267 Cf. Weiskopf (2009a). 
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Localism is an appealing position. First, as noted in chapter 4, the view seems to 
offer a safe middle ground between atomistic and holistic theories of concept 
individuation. Holistic views like those defended by Block or Schneider seem to slice 
concepts too finely, thus precluding publicity. On the other hand, atomistic theories like 
Fodor’s seem to slice concepts too coarsely268: if concepts are not individuated by their 
inferential roles, what distinguishes coreferential concepts like SUPERMAN/CLARK or 
WATER/H2O? On a localist view, these concepts will be distinct (their local inferential 
roles are different) and yet widely shared (local roles only include a small number of 
inferences). 
As anticipated in our general Introduction, localism also seems to provide a solid 
foundation for the “conceptual analysis” project. If concepts have inferential structure, 
then our practice of conceptual analysis will consist in discovering what that structure 
is, for a number of philosophically interesting concepts (TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE, 
JUSTICE…)269. Localism might also support a more ambitious version of the project. 
Suppose conceptual structure is “reference-fixing”: x falls under a concept C just in case 
it falls under the concepts which constitute C’s structure. It will then follow that we can 
derive substantive conclusions about real-world philosophical kinds from our 
knowledge of conceptual structure. Once we find out that the inferential role of 
BACHELOR is [UNMARRIED MAN], we can conclude that something is a bachelor just in 
case it is an unmarried man. This is a conclusion about bachelors, not about our concept 
of them. It is a substantive claim about the world270. 
Finally, localism seems to capture both the “commonsense” and the “scientific” 
notion of a concept. In everyday discourse, we often talk about the “concept” of (say) 
knowledge, God, state etc… that a certain person or community has. When we do this, 
we seem to ascribe a “theory” or “conception” constituted by a small set of beliefs, and 
this is precisely what the localist identifies with concepts. Even more importantly, 
localism seems to fit well with the psychologist’s usage of the term “concept”. 
Cognitive scientists are constantly positing structured mental representations to explain 
a large body of experimental data concerning categorization, induction, concept 
learning and so on271. These representations, which psychologists call “concepts”, have 
local structure: they include some, but not all the beliefs that a subject has about the 
relevant category, and they are usually identified with small, well defined sets of 
specific inferences. For this reason, neither atomists nor holists can count the structured 
mental representations posited by psychologists as “concepts”. In turn, this has led 
many localists to claim a further advantage: the view is explanatorily superior to 
                                                
268 Atomistic theories have also been defended by: Millikan (1998, 2000), Margolis (1999), Edwards 
(2009, 2010). 
269 V. Peacocke (1998a) and Rey (2005); v. also Goldman (1998, 2007) for a different version of the 
project. 
270 V. Jackson (1998) for a version of the ambitious project. We will go back to this in sect. 4 infra.  
271 More on this soon.  
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atomism and holism, since it can appeal to a concept’s local structure to explain 
experimental data about categorization and other cognitive tasks272. 
 
2.2 . What Does Psychology Tell Us About Concepts? 
 
While localism seems to present some advantages, it is also affected by a problem 
that neither atomists nor holists have to face. Among the many inferential connections 
in which a given concept will happen to be involved, how do we select the individuating 
ones? What is our “principled basis”273 in excluding some inferences (e.g. BACHELOR → 
SAD) as “collateral” while including some others (e.g. BACHELOR → UNMARRIED) as 
individuating?  
Our considerations in the last section seem to suggest a straightforward response. 
Unlike atomists and holists, localists can count the locally structured representations 
posited by psychology as genuine concepts. For any concept C, then, a localist might 
simply identify the inferences which individuate C and are required for its possession 
with those that the psychologist will include in his model of C274. For instance: the set of 
inferences that individuate BIRD and are required for its possession just is that set of 
inferences which is identified with the concept BIRD by our best psychological theory. 
But what picture of concepts would emerge if the localist decided to follow the 
psychologist in his account of concept individuation/possession? To answer this 
question, we must briefly look at the models of concepts that have been proposed by 
recent cognitive science in the attempt to explain data about categorization and other 
cognitive competences. We can identify four main models275: 
 
Definitions: A concept with definitional structure consists of a set of features which are 
taken to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient for category membership: an 
object will fall under the concept just in case it has each feature on the list. The once 
dominant “classical theory”, which identified concepts with definitions, has today been 
entirely replaced by other models due to its inadequacy in explaining experimental data. 
 
Prototypes: A concept with prototypical structure consists of a set of features which are 
taken to be typical of category members. Features are assigned a certain weight 
depending on their degree of typicality. For instance, a prototype for BIRD will include 
highly typical features such as FLIES, NESTS IN TREES, LAYS EGGS… : an object x will 
then be categorized as a bird just in case it “scores” a sufficient degree of similarity to 
the prototype in virtue of instantiating some combination of those features. For this 
                                                
272 Weiskopf (2009a), Prinz (2002). 
273 V. Fodor (1987, ch. 3), and Fodor and Lepore (2002). The worry can be traced back to Quine’s (1951) 
attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. V. ch. 5 (sect. 4.2) for some discussion.  
274 The move is suggested by Pereboom (1995) and Weiskopf (2009a). 
275 V. Murphy (2002), Machery (2009) for an overview. 
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reason, prototypes are “similarity-based” structures: they differ sharply from definitions, 
since none of the features is individually necessary for category membership and any 
combination of them is enough for x to fall under the concept. 
 
Exemplars: A concept with exemplar structure consists of a set of features which have 
been stored in long-term memory after encounters with specific members of the 
category (my dog, my neighbor’s dog…). An object will be categorized as falling under 
the concept just in case it shares enough features with stored representations of concrete 
exemplars. Like prototypes, exemplar concepts are “similarity-based”: an item will be 
categorized as falling under the concept as long as it has a sufficient number of features 
in common with stored exemplars, so none of the features is individually necessary. 
Unlike prototypes, however, exemplar concepts do not encode a general representation 
which is statistically abstracted from instances of the category, but only specific 
representations of particular category members276.  
 
Mini-theories: Mini-theories encode “theoretical” information about the relations 
holding between the properties of category members. In particular, causal relations are 
represented, so that greater weight is assigned to “essential” and “deep” properties, on 
which less essential and more superficial properties causally depend. Unlike exemplars 
and prototypes, which simply encode sets of features that are “matched” with the target 
item to determine its similarity score, the kind of information that is embedded in mini-
theories can be quite sophisticated and result from complex reasoning about whether a 
certain property is more or less causally central. 
 
Now, while traditional theories of concepts tended to subsume concepts under a 
single structural model (“concepts are prototypes”; “concepts are mini-theories”…), it is 
more and more recognized that the mental representations we use to categorize, perform 
inductions, reason deductively and so on can take a variety of formats. A strong 
pluralist trend is emerging in psychology: each of the structures described above can be 
deployed by ordinary thinkers in the appropriate circumstances277. For any given 
category, one and the same subject will create, store and employ representations of very 
different kinds: in most cases, a subject will be able to make use of a prototype, a set of 
exemplars and a mini-theory278. For instance, each of us will have a prototype and a set 
of exemplars he can use to categorize birds, as well as a mini-theory representing those 
                                                
276 Note that, just like the other psychological models described here, exemplar concepts will also have 
inferential structure. Simplifying: suppose I have only encountered three birds and encoded in long-term 
memory the following information: BIRD1 [F, G]; BIRD2 [H, I]; BIRD3 [J, K]. Now suppose I am disposed to 
categorize something as a bird just in case it has any three features in common with my exemplars. We 
might then represent my exemplar concept BIRD as the following set of inferential dispositions: X IS A 
BIRD ↔ X HAS (F, G, H) OR (F, H, J) OR … (and so on for all the other possible combinations). 
277 For a review of the evidence, v. Machery (2009), Weiskopf (2009 a,b). 
278 Rips (1989), Piccinini and Scott (2006). 
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“hidden”, essential properties that causally underlie a bird’s superficial features. Which 
representation is used will depend, among other things, on the cognitive task at hand, on 
the nature of the real-world category involved, and on the experimental setting in which 
the subject operates. 
There is also evidence for other kinds of conceptual variation. Within the same 
experimental setting, different subjects will use representations with different structures: 
some subjects might opt for exemplars, others for prototypes279. And even when two 
subjects employ representations of the same kind, there are still going to be 
interpersonal variations: my prototype or exemplar for dogs might be significantly 
different from yours depending on the kind of dogs I have encountered280.  
The emergence of pluralism creates a first dilemma for localism. Do all of the 
heterogeneous mental representations posited by psychologists individuate 
corresponding concepts? Each of these mental representations has local inferential 
structure, and to each of them the psychologist applies the label “concept”. Will the 
localist acknowledge that the psychologist’s use of the term is correct, and that for each 
of these locally structured representations there is a corresponding concept which is 
individuated by that structure? Depending on how they answer this question, two 
radically different versions of localism can be distinguished; let’s discuss each of them 
in turn. 
 
2.3 . Weiskopf’s Pluralist Localism 
 
When confronted with pluralist data, the localist might decide to take psychological 
theories at face value and continue to use them as a principled basis to select 
individuating inferences; this localist will count as concepts all the structured mental 
representations to which our best psychological theories apply the label “concept”. 
More precisely, let “pluralist localism” (PL) designate any theory of concepts that 
endorses our basic set of localist assumptions (sect. 2.1) plus: 
 
Pluralism: For any structured mental representation that our best psychological 
theory of concepts calls a “concept”, there is a concept that is individuated by that 
mental representation. 
 
A sophisticated (PL) view has recently been developed by Daniel Weiskopf 
(Weiskopf 2009 a,b)281; in this section, I will compare Weiskopf’s pluralist localism 
with the contextualist-pluralist view I developed in chapter 5282. I will first examine 
                                                
279 Malt (1989), Smith and Minda (1998). 
280 Barsalou (1989, 1993). 
281 Since Weiskopf’s view exemplifies well all the relevant features of (PL), I will use it as my target in 
what follows. 
282 V. sect. 4.3. 
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some common features of the two views: in particular, both of them have the advantage 
of being able to accept psychological models of concepts as correct, thus giving an 
empirically informed account of concept individuation and possession. I will then note 
two main differences. First, Weiskopf takes all concepts to be individuated by the local 
representations described by cognitive psychology. Going back to some of the 
arguments from chapter 5, I will note how this makes it hard for a theory of concept 
individuation to satisfy the Fregean constraint. This gives us reasons to prefer my own 
pluralist picture, on which some concepts are locally individuated in the way suggested 
by the psychologist, while others are individuated differently (e.g. holistically) to satisfy 
constraints such as (FC). I will then note a second difference between Weiskopf’s view 
and mine, arguing that (for those concepts which are inferentially individuated) we 
should not take their inferential role to be part of their content, but simply an essential 
component of their individuation conditions. 
 Let’s say a bit more about Weiskopf’s (PL). According to Weiskopf, a concept C 
has two types of content: a referential content (RC), which is the category/individual to 
which C refers, and a conceptual content (CC), which is the set of semantic features 
posited by our best psychological model for that concept. For instance: a good 
psychological theory will ascribe to me a certain bird-prototype to explain my 
categorization behavior with respect to birds. This prototype will be (more or less) 
different from the one you employ. Having prototype structure, it will also be different 
from my exemplar and mini-theoretic representations for birds. On Weiskopf’s view, 
these structured representations are all concepts: I have a prototype-concept BIRD with a 
different CC from both your BIRD-prototype and my other concepts for birds 
(exemplars, mini-theories…). There will then be a plurality of locally structured bird-
concepts, each corresponding to one of the bird-representations posited by the 
psychologist.  
Three aspects of Weiskopf’s picture will be especially important here: 
 
1) Concepts are individuated by both their CC and their RC. Crucially, a concept’s CC 
will only incorporate some of the information associated with that concept; 
therefore, a concept is always individuated by some but not all of its inferential 
connections283.  
 
2) The inferences which individuate a concept constitute part of its content (its 
conceptual content or CC). For instance, the set of inferential dispositions which 
constitute my bird-prototype are part of the content of one of my bird-concepts.  
 
3) Concepts with different CCs will often pick out the same category. This is an 
essential aspect of Weiskopf’s pluralism: for one subject to have multiple concepts 
                                                
283 V. especially pp. 134-38, where Weiskopf argues that psychological models are local and non-holistic 
(all quotes are from Weiskopf (2009a)). 
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of the same category, it must be possible for those concepts to have different CC but 
same RC. Similarly for concepts had by different subjects. This constraint has a 
further important consequence: the CC of a concept cannot fix its reference. If it did, 
many concepts which should have the same RC would end up referring to different 
categories. Suppose I have both a mini-essentialist and a prototype concept for 
birds. If their CCs were reference-fixing, these two concepts would have different 
RCs: the first one would pick out a category whose members share the deep 
essential features of birds, while the second one would pick out a category whose 
members share the superficial bird-features. The latter (but not the former) would 
include robot-birds that behave and look exactly like prototypical birds, and it would 
not include a penguin that lost its beak and wings. For these two concepts to 
represent the same category, their RC must be fixed by something other than their 
CC. For this reason, Weiskopf takes reference to be determined by a “purely 
externalist” mechanism (e.g. a causal chain or a deferential mechanism); indeed, 
conceptual content is so radically “disconnected” from reference that, in some cases, 
a concept’s CC will be entirely false of its RC (pp. 142-43)! 
 
We now have a better sense of what a localist view will look like if it decides to 
embrace the first horn of our dilemma. What are the points of contact between (PL) and 
the pluralist view I sketched in chapter 5? What are the main differences284? 
Like Weiskopf, I also take several concepts to be individuated by their inferential 
connections: v. for instance the holistically individuated concepts described in chapters 
4-5, or the locally individuated concept CLARK introduced in chapter 3 during our 
discussion of contextualism. Even more importantly, I also allow for concepts to be 
individuated in multiple ways and to have heterogeneous structures. This is an 
important advantage for pluralist pictures, since it allows them to count those mental 
representations that psychologists call “concepts” as proper concepts “in the 
philosophical sense of the word”. When the psychologist claims that prototypes, 
exemplars and theories are all “concepts”, pluralists like Weiskopf or me need not take 
the psychologist to be making a false claim, nor do we need to interpret him as referring 
to a different kind from the philosopher. As previously noted, this brings further 
advantages: for a large class of concepts, the pluralist can offer an empirically informed 
account of their individuation conditions and use that account to explain a wide range of 
empirical data. 
This leads us to a first difference between my view and Weiskopf’s: the problem 
with (PL) is that it is not pluralist enough! While some concepts are to be identified 
with the locally structured representations described by psychology, I have also given 
reasons to think that not all concepts are individuated in this way. In particular, I have 
argued that some concepts (those involved in contradictory beliefs, such as Edmund’s 
                                                
284 Weiskopf’s (PL) has been a major source of inspiration for my view. I have also been influenced by 
Machery (2009) and Prinz (2002), but I cannot discuss their views here. 
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SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2) should be individuated by their global inferential role: this is 
what’s needed to satisfy (FC) in every possible Frege case285. 
Now, as you might recall, one possible alternative to holism was a “modified 
localist” view286, on which the inferential role of concepts like SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2 
is: 
 
• Very specific (it includes inferences like [CAPTURED THE ROBBER]).  
• But not holistic (it does not include all of the concept’s connections, e.g. it 
leaves out [IS HEROIC]). 
 
In reply, I argued that: 
 
a) The localist cannot include the former inferences in the concept’s role without 
also including the latter: there is no “principled basis” he can use to distinguish 
the former inferences as the only individuating ones.  
 
b) The view would be unmotivated. Once we include very specific inferences such 
as [CAPTURED THE ROBBER] in SUPERMAN1’s role, there will be several subjects 
(e.g. Verna) who do not share that concept. Therefore, we won’t gain anything 
in terms of publicity by individuating concepts like SUPERMAN1-SUPERMAN2 
locally rather than holistically! 
 
Can Weiskopf’s (PL) respond to (a)-(b) and save the localist proposal? I believe not. 
In response to (a), Weiskopf would claim that psychology should be our principled 
basis in selecting the individuating inferences. But I see no reason why our best 
psychological theory should include [CAPTURED THE ROBBER] in its description of 
SUPERMAN1, while leaving [IS HEROIC] out. Moreover, suppose we do use psychology as 
our basis in individuating the concepts involved in contradictory beliefs: we will then be 
unable to account for those cases in which two concepts C1-C2 are described in exactly 
the same way by our best psychological theory (they are associated with the same 
prototype/set of exemplars/mini-theory), but are nevertheless involved in contradictory 
beliefs. Suppose for instance that, at t1, I learn about an animal that is called “cat” in 
English and has certain prototypical features (meows, has whiskers, is four-legged 
etc…). Later, at t2, I learn about an animal called “chat” in French that has those very 
same features; however, I also come to believe (perhaps because of reliable testimony) 
that the two terms designate different species which happen to have certain prototypical 
features in common. According to (FC), I must have two distinct concepts CAT and 
CHAT; on Weiskopf’s view, however, the two concepts would not be distinct, since they 
                                                
285 V. ch. 5 (sect. 4.2). 
286 V. ch. 4 (sect. 4.3) and ch. 5 (sect. 4.2). 
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are associated with the same prototype287. This shows that (PL) is not fine-grained 
enough to individuate concepts as required by (FC) in every possible Frege case288. 
(PL) is also vulnerable to (b). It’s an immediate consequence of (PL)’s pluralism 
that several concepts are not shared. As Weiskopf notes (pp. 149-50), a doctor’s cancer-
concept has a complicated causal theory as its CC; therefore, it is not shared by Beth, 
whose cancer-concept has the CC [DISEASE MY UNCLE HAD]; nor is either of these 
concepts shared by Ada, who only knows of cancer as [DISEASE SMOKERS GET]. In 
addition, Weiskopf himself recognizes that many of the concepts involved in Frege 
cases are individuated very finely and not widely shared289. But if the localist agrees 
that such concepts are not shared, what motivation is left for not individuating them 
holistically? 
Weiskopf might respond that this is not how psychologists individuate concepts: 
when providing a model for concept C, they only include in its content a part of the 
information that the subject associates with C (pp. 134-38). But there is no reason to use 
psychology as our principled basis in individuating all concepts! Locally structured 
representations might be especially useful for some theoretical purposes, such as 
explaining data about categorization, induction etc… , while being unsuitable for others, 
such as accounting for rationality in Frege cases. Weiskopf writes:  
 
In general, when we have a model that is capable of accounting for some range of psychological 
phenomena, we should take it to be at least a provisional guide to the structure of the psychological 
mechanisms that underlie the production of those phenomena. […] cognitive models that enjoy a 
significant degree of empirical validation are prima facie likely to be accurate descriptions of the 
psychological states, processes, and mechanisms underlying the task in question (p. 135). 
 
I agree; but there might be psychological phenomena other than those investigated by 
psychologists, whose explanation requires assuming the existence of different 
mechanisms that are not correctly described by current empirical models. For instance, 
explaining rationality in Frege cases might require assuming that the subjects involved 
have coreferential concepts whose structure is not local, but holistic. These subjects will 
                                                
287 The localist might reply that features like [CALLED “CAT”]-[CALLED “CHAT”] will be included in the 
two prototypes, thus making the concepts distinct. I find this reply ad hoc; at any rate, we could always 
devise a Paderewski-version of the case, where the same English term “cat” is employed at t1-t2 and I 
form the belief that two different species go by that same name.  
288 V. Schiffer (1990). Interestingly, Weiskopf agrees: 
 
[…] there are cases in which concepts appear to be distinct despite having identical cognitive and 
referential content (p. 154). 
Weiskopf’s solution is to claim that the concepts have different formal properties, since they are 
associated with distinct mental files (v. Recanati 1993, 2009). I cannot discuss the proposal here: note, 
however, that if files are individuated by their global inferential role Weiskopf’s view will collapse into a 
form of holism; if not, we need to know what individuates files to establish whether the view can deal 
with Frege cases. (Weiskopf doesn’t address the problem in his (2009a)).  
289 P. 153. 
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then have both the local representations described by psychology and the holistic 
representations needed to satisfy (FC)290. Psychology is one guide to the structure of 
concepts, but it need not be the only one.  
 
There is a second aspect of Weiskopf’s view that I reject. Weiskopf takes the 
inferences which individuate a concept C to constitute a layer of C’s content, which he 
calls “conceptual content” (CC). When conjoined with other aspects of his picture (v. 
points (1)-(3) supra), this gives rise to some bizarre consequences. Suppose it’s part of 
my mini-theory of glass that glass is a solid. The CC of one of my glass-concepts will 
then include the feature [SOLID]. Now consider my thought IF SOMETHING IS A SAMPLE 
OF GLASS, THEN IT IS A SOLID291. This thought expresses two different propositions, 
which are compositionally constructed from the CCs and the RCs of its components: 
 
CC proposition: If something is [C1, C2 … Cn] and it is a solid, then it is a solid 
 
(where [C1, C2 … Cn] is the set of features encoded in the CC of my concept GLASS). This 
proposition is true; indeed, it is analytically true on a “containment” conception of 
analyticity. 
 
RC proposition: If something is a sample of glass, then it is a solid 
 
This proposition is false, since glass is not a solid (it is a super-cooled liquid).  
 
As Weiskopf recognizes, then, our thought is both true and false, since it expresses 
two propositions which are respectively true and false. In fact, the thought is both 
analytically true and (non-analytically) false, given the analytic nature of the CC 
proposition (pp. 156-60)!  
Since a concept’s CC does not fix its reference, many other thoughts will express 
analytically true CC propositions while also expressing false RC propositions292. This 
problematic consequence would be avoided if we stopped taking CC to be part of a 
concept’s content: there would then be no proposition expressed other than the RC one. 
Indeed, Weiskopf’s decision to call CC “content” seems no more than an arbitrary 
terminological stipulation. If CC does not fix reference (and can sometimes be entirely 
false of the RC! 293 ), what is it that makes it “content”? Surely, the fact that 
psychologists often talk this way doesn’t give us sufficient reason to treat CC as 
genuine content, especially if this gives rise to the problems described in the previous 
                                                
290 As usual, this claim will have to be declined differently depending on our ontology: a Fregean will 
postulate the existence of different abstract concepts (local and holistic), while a non-Fregean will simply 
claim that different types are involved. V. ch. 5 (sects. 4.1-4.2). 
291 Note that, as usual, I identify thoughts with mental representations (this follows Weiskopf’s usage).  
292 This could not happen if the CC fixed the RC: v sect. 4 infra. 
293 Pp. 142-43. 
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paragraph. My suggestion, then, is that, for those concepts that are individuated by a set 
of inferences (local or holistic), we simply take such inferences to be what individuates 
the concept and is required for its possession, without also taking them to constitute a 
further level of content over and above the concept’s reference.   
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3. The Correctness Dilemma 
 
3.1. A Dual Theory Of Concepts 
 
In the last section, I examined a version of localism that responds to our first 
dilemma by simply identifying concepts with the structured mental representations 
posited by psychology. For most localists, however, this would be the wrong response 
to the dilemma: clearly, such localists would claim, not all of the mental representations 
that psychologists call “concepts” actually individuate corresponding concepts in the 
philosophical sense of the term294! The reason can be easily seen by looking at some 
well-known studies on categorization. For instance: in a famous experiment, Armstrong 
et al. (1981) showed that subjects find it natural to rank odd numbers for typicality, and 
that the typicality value assigned to a given number correlates with increased 
recognition speed and other analogous effects. This seems to show that subjects have a 
prototype representation for odd number. Surely, however, that representation does not 
have the same structure as the concept ODD NUMBER, which is presumably definitional! 
Similar considerations apply to natural kind concepts: while we certainly have 
prototype or exemplar representations for skunks, these representations do not constitute 
the structure of the corresponding concepts. We do not judge painted raccoons to be 
skunks, even though they have strong superficial similarity with prototypical skunks295. 
Since we assign greater weight to “hidden” essential features than to superficial ones 
when categorizing these items, so the localist reasons, the structure of SKUNK should be 
identified with a mini-essentialist theory rather than a prototype or exemplar. 
Clearly, once the localist rejects some of the mental representations posited by 
psychologists as non-individuating, our original “principled basis” problem will arise 
again: we now need a new criterion to select individuating inferences. The natural move 
to make at this point will be to identify individuating inferential dispositions with 
fundamental ones, thus adopting a “dual theory” of concepts296. On this view, the 
individuating inferences will be those that constitute the “core” of a concept. 
Conceptual cores are the “ultimate arbiters” of categorization: they include all and only 
those categorization rules that determine a subject’s categorization judgments under 
ideal conditions (unlimited time, complete information about the target object and so 
on). On the contrary, the “periphery” of a concept will be identified with those “rough 
and ready” categorization procedures that we employ when we have limited time or 
incomplete information. For instance, we often use prototypes/exemplars to make quick 
categorization decisions based on superficial properties, but our most reflective 
                                                
294 V. e.g. Rey (1983, 1985) and Weatherson (2003), who both take this line. 
295 Cf. Keil (1989). 
296 Osherson and Smith (1981).  
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judgments will be based on whether an object has enough essential properties in 
common with other members of the category. 
Most leading localist views can be seen as dual theories. For instance, on the localist 
view defended by authors like Rey and Peacocke, a subject S will have a concept C just 
in case he has that implicit conception which individuates C and is required for its 
possession297. An implicit conception is a subdoxastic state with propositional content. 
It consists of a set of (subpersonal) beliefs about the referent of the corresponding 
concept298: for instance, the implicit conception for the concept CHAIR will have the 
content [HAS A BACK, IS A SEAT…]; the implicit conception for DISJUNCTION will have 
the content [TRUE IFF AT LEAST ONE DISJUNCT IS TRUE]; and so on299. Possession of an 
implicit conception is analogous to possession of a competence with a certain syntactic 
rule, as in Chomsky’s theory of “Universal Grammar”300. On Chomsky’s view, we 
often make “performance errors” and fail to follow the subpersonal rules embedded in 
our language module. Still, we are “competent” with such rules, since we would follow 
them under idealized conditions where performance limitations were absent. Similarly, 
on the Rey-Peacocke view we are disposed to follow our implicit conceptions under 
ideal conditions, i.e. when we have enough time, information and so on. Under non-
ideal conditions, however, we rely on rough and ready categorization procedures like 
prototypes or exemplars. Such procedures often determine categorization judgments 
that we would not make under ideal conditions: if I don’t have any information about 
x’s essential properties, I might well judge it to be a skunk even though it is a painted 
raccoon, since it satisfies my skunk prototype. If I did have that information, however, I 
would follow my “essentialist” implicit conception and make the correct judgment.  
As our brief overview makes clear, Peacocke and Rey’s implicit conceptions are the 
“ultimate arbiters” of categorization: they are those fundamental rules that would 
determine our categorization judgments under ideal conditions301. They can therefore be 
identified with the “conceptual cores” that individuate concepts and are required for 
their possession according to dual theories. My discussion of dual theories will thus take 
the implicit conceptions view as its main target, and I will talk interchangeably of cores 
and conceptions throughout: as the following sections will show, my arguments against 
the Peacocke/Rey view would also apply to other dual theories as such. 
 
                                                
297 V. Peacocke (1998 a,b, 2007); Rey (2005, 2009b). Rey does not employ the notion of “implicit 
conception”, but his picture can be assimilated to Peacocke’s for the purpose of our discussion. V. also 
Jackson (1998), who seems to endorse both a dual theory and an implicit conceptions view. 
298 Conceptions are sets of beliefs rather than inferences, but (as usual) we can move freely between talk 
of inferences and talk of beliefs. Given any inference of the form X IS F → X IS G which is allegedly 
required for possession of a concept C, that inference will correspond to the belief ALL FS ARE G: both the 
inference and the belief will thus be required for possession of the concept. 
299 V. Peacocke (1998a), especially pp. 44-64. 
300 V. Rey (2005), Peacocke 2007 (chs. 4-5). 
301 Rey (2009b) especially insists on this point.  
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3.2. Plausibility And Correctness: A Trade-Off 
 
According to the localist view under examination, not all the structured mental 
representations posited by psychology count as concepts, but only the fundamental ones 
which constitute conceptual cores and form our subpersonal conceptions. Despite its 
popularity, this version of localism invites a second dilemma: if concepts are 
individuated by implicit conceptions, should we identify such conceptions with sets of 
correct inferences, or will incorrect inferences also be allowed in the individuating set?  
 
We do have concepts: this, the localist cannot deny. A localist theory must not make 
the constraints on concept possession too stringent, or intentional agents will lack a 
number of concepts that they seem to employ all the time in their cognitive lives. So, if 
implicit conceptions are required for concept possession, they must be such that 
ordinary subjects can have them. They should not be identified with states that it is 
psychologically implausible to ascribe to ordinary thinkers, or we will make it too hard 
for them to have concepts at all.  
 Given this “psychological plausibility” constraint, we might now ask: what are 
implicit conceptions? Which of the subdoxastic states posited by our best psychological 
theories should be identified with them? For a large class of concepts, and particularly 
for natural kind ones302, implicit conceptions will arguably have to be identified with 
“folk theories”303. Following standard doctrine in contemporary cognitive science, we 
can define folk theories as sets of basic theoretical principles that we employ with 
respect to a certain domain (physical objects, biological creatures, mental states and so 
on). Such theories are usually taken to be subpersonal and not immediately accessible to 
introspection. Moreover, they are standardly taken to be domain-specific and innate, 
thus bearing strong analogies to Chomsky’s Universal Grammar rules. They are also 
active in determining our most fundamental categorization procedures: for instance, the 
child’s disposition to consider hidden properties more important than superficial ones is 
presumably grounded in his innate folk biology. Finally, it’s psychologically plausible 
to ascribe such theories to ordinary thinkers, since there is strong independent evidence 
that they do play an important role in a number of cognitive processes304. 
                                                
302 In what follows I will mostly focus on natural kind concepts; it’s an interesting issue whether my 
arguments would also generalize to other kinds of concepts, but unfortunately I cannot address it here. 
303 My overview of folk theories is largely based on Prinz (2002, ch. 8).  
304 The psychologist’s use of the notion of a “folk theory” overlaps only in part with that of Jackson 
(1998). First, Jackson simply identifies folk theories with fundamental, subpersonal principles which 
drive our categorization judgments under suitably idealized conditions. Such principles need not be 
domain-specific and innate; in fact, they presumably won’t be for a large class of concepts such as artifact 
concepts. (Jackson might also question whether the folk theories for natural kind concepts like GOLD or 
GLASS would be domain-specific and innate, but this is too vast a topic to discuss here. In any case, none 
of my arguments in what follows turns on this point). Second, and more importantly, Jackson takes “folk 
theories” to fix the reference of the concepts they individuate, in which case they will be guaranteed to be 
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In sum, it seems that, if the constraints on concept possession imposed by a dual 
theory are ones that ordinary thinkers actually satisfy, implicit conceptions will have to 
be identified with folk theories for a large number of concepts. This raises our second 
dilemma for localism. The problem, in a nutshell, is that we have good reasons to think 
that our folk theories are often wrong. For instance, Spelke has argued that the 
“Aristotelian” principle “physical objects act on each other only on contact” is part of 
our folk physics, which is therefore inconsistent with Newtonian mechanics305. And our 
folk chemistry seems to include principles yielding the incorrect judgment that glass is a 
solid and not a liquid. So: are mistaken folk-theoretical principles going to be part of 
the implicit conceptions which individuate our concepts? 
 
Theories of concepts that appeal to implicit conceptions, and dual theories more 
generally, will mostly answer this question in the negative: mistaken principles cannot 
be part of those fundamental implicit conceptions which are constitutively involved in 
our possession of the corresponding concepts306. Some passages from Peacocke do 
suggest a certain ambivalence on the topic: 
 
It is not impossible for there to be an implicit conception with an incorrect content. A thinker may 
misunderstand some word in the public language. False presuppositions about certain kinds of 
objects or events in his environment may also enter the content of his implicit conceptions (Peacocke 
1998a, p. 70).  
 
Other passages, however, make clear that implicit conceptions cannot include false 
beliefs307: 
 
An implicit conception is meant to be part of what it is, constitutively, to possess the concept 
involving that implicit conception. […] if a principle involving a concept can intelligibly and 
correctly be abandoned, it cannot be any part of the content of an implicit conception involved in 
possessing that concept (Peacocke 1998b, p. 140). 
 
It’s easy to see why a localist will only allow true beliefs to be part of our implicit 
conceptions. The alternative view would be one on which: 
 
a) All concepts are individuated by the fundamental inferences which form our implicit 
conceptions/conceptual cores. Since non-fundamental inferences are not 
individuating, many of the structured mental representations described by the 
psychologist (e.g. prototypes/exemplars) do not count as concepts.  
                                                                                                                                          
correct (v. sect. 4 infra); on the contrary, psychologists often identify folk theories with sets of false 
principles (v. next paragraph). 
305 Spelke (1990). 
306 I am not aware of anyone who explicitly takes implicit conceptions to include incorrect principles. 
307 Peacocke confirmed this in conversation. 
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b) At the same time, however, many individuating inferences are incorrect: for 
instance, GLASS → SOLID might be part of our implicit conception for GLASS.  
 
The problem with this picture is that, once we allow for incorrect inferences to be 
individuating, the restriction to fundamental inferences becomes unmotivated. Why 
couldn’t some concepts be individuated by non-fundamental sets of inferences, such as 
those included in a prototype? Clearly, the answer cannot be that, being employed under 
non-ideal conditions (limited time, information etc…), prototypes will often determine 
mistaken categorization judgments. While prototypes would indeed cause wrong 
judgments with respect to e.g. Keil’s painted raccoons, our localist has already allowed 
for incorrect inferences to be part of conceptual cores (again, cf. GLASS → SOLID). Since 
these inferences will also determine mistaken judgments, the reason for counting 
prototypes as non-individuating can’t be that they lead to bad categorization decisions.   
Nor can the rationale be that, by only including fundamental inferences, we 
guarantee that concepts will be shared in all the cases covered by publicity. Consider 
for instance a chemist, who correctly identifies glass by its structural features rather 
than its superficial properties. Clearly, his concept of glass is not involved in the same 
fundamental inferences as ours: he rejects the inference GLASS → SOLID and accepts 
instead GLASS → LIQUID. Our localist must then concede that the chemist has a different 
concept GLASS*, one which (unlike ours) is associated with a correct conception308. 
Finally, allowing for incorrect implicit conceptions would make dual theories 
unsuitable as a basis for “ambitious” conceptual analysis. Suppose we successfully 
analyze some concept C and discover the implicit conception associated with it309. Since 
that conception might well include incorrect principles, we still won’t be able to draw 
any conclusions regarding the real-world category that is picked out by the concept. For 
instance, it would certainly be incorrect to conclude that, since GLASS → SOLID is part of 
our fundamental conception of glass, then glass must be a solid! If implicit conceptions 
can be incorrect, conceptual analysis will only yield knowledge about the structure of 
our concepts, not about the philosophical kinds that those concepts pick out. (The same 
is true of any theory on which incorrect inferences are individuating, such as 
Weiskopf’s (PL). V. sect. 4 infra for more discussion). 
 
These considerations show why localists like Peacocke generally hold that implicit 
conceptions must be correct if they individuate concepts. Choosing this horn of the 
                                                
308 In fact, the restriction to fundamental inferences isn’t simply unmotivated; there are also positive 
reasons to reject it. For one, I argued that those concepts which are involved in contradictory beliefs 
should be individuated holistically (ch. 5); but, clearly, many of the connections which individuate such 
concepts will not be fundamental. Moreover, I argued (chs. 2-3) that speakers will often “provide” certain 
structured concepts in their attitude ascriptions and intentional generalizations: but I see no reason to 
think that the inferences individuating such concepts will always be fundamental ones (are all the 
inferences included in the standard Clark-ish role [CALLED “CLARK”, SHY, WEARS GLASSES…] 
fundamental?). 
309 This picture of conceptual analysis is illustrated in detail by Peacocke (1998a, 2007). 
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dilemma, however, makes it hard to respect the psychological plausibility constraint. To 
fulfill that constraint, the localist will have to identify implicit conceptions with folk 
theories, at least for a large class of concepts. As we have seen, however, this will not 
be allowed if implicit conceptions are supposed to be correct, since folk theories are 
replete with errors! 
Satisfying the correctness criterion would thus require selecting some set of correct 
individuating inferences other than folk-theoretical principles. But, of course, there is a 
trade-off between the correctness and the psychological plausibility constraints: it’s 
hard to think what this set of correct inferential dispositions might be, such that it could 
plausibly be ascribed to ordinary thinkers. Suppose for instance that the conception 
individuating GLASS is that description of the kind glass that would be offered by a 
complete ideal chemical theory. Clearly, it would be psychologically implausible to 
hold that this conception was subpersonally cognized by ordinary thinkers! The localist 
must therefore hold that ordinary thinkers have GLASS in virtue of possessing some 
other implicit conception. The problem, however, is that it’s hard to imagine what that 
conception could be, if we are not allowed to identify it with a (partially mistaken) folk 
theory. 
A first possibility would be to appeal to deference310. Even if concepts are 
individuated by correct implicit conceptions, someone might have a concept while 
having an incorrect conception of its referent. This is because, despite his imperfect 
conception, the subject might defer to the experts in his linguistic community: I can 
have ARTHRITIS by deferring to the experts, even if my conception of arthritis is 
partially wrong311. 
The appeal to deference appears problematic for several reasons, but I will focus on 
one. At least when it comes to natural kinds312, it seems uncontroversial that all the 
existing experts in a community could be (and often are) wrong about the properties of a 
certain specific kind. In this scenario, how could the experts and the folk possess the 
relevant concepts? If these two classes of thinkers do have the concepts in question, 
then ex hypothesi they both do so in virtue of having mistaken conceptions about the 
corresponding kinds. But then mistaken conceptions can be part of the possession 
conditions for concepts and we are back to the first horn of the dilemma.  
A more convincing response would be that not all components of folk theories are 
incorrect. Within each folk theory, there is a “core” subset of correct inferences 
surrounded by a periphery of mistaken principles: this core is what individuates our 
concepts of the corresponding kinds. And since cognitive science offers plenty of 
independent evidence in favor of folk theories, the psychological plausibility constraint 
is met: these are conceptions that ordinary thinkers can plausibly be taken to have.  
But why should we think that folk theories will embed correct conceptions about the 
corresponding kinds? After all, we have seen that many folk principles have been 
                                                
310 Cf. Peacocke (1992, ch. 1).  
311 Burge (1979). 
312 But v. Burge (1986) for a case involving artifact kinds. 
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empirically falsified, so the localist must provide some reason to think that this will not 
happen with all the beliefs that constitute our theories. In response, our localist could 
take the “core” conception within a folk theory to fix the reference of the corresponding 
concepts. Since core conceptions determine the conditions for something to fall under 
concept C, they will by definition be true of C’s extension. Of course, some of the 
principles that the psychologist includes in our folk theories will not be part of the 
reference-fixing core (the set of principles according to which glass is a solid 
presumably won’t be), but this is compatible with there being such a core. 
In conclusion: if folk theories include reference-fixing inferences, we can both make 
a localist theory of concept possession psychologically plausible (there is independent 
evidence that ordinary thinkers have folk theories) and take concepts to be individuated 
by correct inferences (reference-fixing inferences are guaranteed to be correct)313. This 
move would thus enable the localist to answer our dilemma; whether it can be made to 
work will be my topic in the next section. 
                                                
313 Indeed, on the first version of Peacocke’s theory, individuating inferences were explicitly taken to be 
reference-fixing and were thus guaranteed to be truth-preserving (v. Peacocke 1992, pp. 16-24). 
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4. Reference-fixing conceptions? 
 
In this section, I will focus on those versions of localism on which all the inferences 
which individuate concepts and are required for their possession are correct (truth-
preserving). This is undoubtedly the majority view among localists, and I will refer to it 
as “true localism”.  
There are several reasons behind the popularity of true localism. Notice, in 
particular, that only a true localist view will warrant an ambitious version of the 
conceptual analysis project. If the conception that individuates concept C is guaranteed 
to be correct, we will be able to draw substantive conclusions about C’s reference once 
we find out what that conception is. Having discovered through a process of conceptual 
analysis that BACHELOR is individuated by [UNMARRIED MAN], the true localist can 
validly conclude that something is a bachelor just in case it is an unmarried man. If 
individuating conceptions were often incorrect, that conclusion would be unwarranted.  
Of course, the attractive features of true localism come at a cost. As we have seen, 
the view raises a problem of psychological plausibility: what are these correct 
inferential dispositions that can be plausibly ascribed to ordinary thinkers and allow 
them to possess the corresponding concepts? We noted in the last section that, for a 
number of concepts, the localist will have to identify such dispositions with reference-
fixing conceptions embedded in our folk theories. The problem, of course, is spelling 
out what these conceptions are in a psychologically plausible way: reference-fixing 
conceptions must be such that we can reasonably take ordinary thinkers to have them. 
In this section, I will consider a cluster of related objections that any true localist 
view will have to face. I will argue that true localism cannot answer such objections, 
and more specifically that it won’t be able to do so while providing a psychologically 
plausible account of reference-fixing conceptions. My examination of localism will then 
be completed in the next section, where I will make some more general remarks about 
the various localist pictures we have examined and about my own theory of concept 
individuation/possession.  
 
My arguments in this section will target one of the best-developed true localist 
theories on the market, the “descriptivist” picture of concepts and mental content 
recently developed by Frank Jackson 314 . According to Jackson, concepts are 
individuated by reference-fixing descriptions which determine their reference. For 
natural kind concepts, these take the form of rigidified descriptions: WATER, for 
instance, might be individuated by the description [THE ACTUAL WATERY STUFF OF OUR 
ACQUAINTANCE]. Jackson’s reference-fixing descriptions are conceptions required for 
possession of the corresponding concepts: a thinker doesn’t have WATER unless he 
accepts X IS WATER ↔ X IS THE ACTUAL WATERY STUFF OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE. 
                                                
314 V. especially Jackson (1998). While I will focus on Jackson’s view, my arguments would also apply to 
other true localist theories. 
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Jackson’s view is thus an excellent example of true localism: those bodies of beliefs that 
the psychologist calls “folk theories” have a core, correct part which fixes the reference 
of the corresponding natural kind concepts and is required for their possession.  
In what follows, I will argue that true localist pictures such as Jackson’s will make 
implausible predictions about the reference of natural kind concepts in all those cases 
where someone does not accept the description which allegedly fixes the reference of 
some concept C, and yet seems able to refer to the natural kind picked out by C. An 
objection raised by Schroeter (2004) against Jackson will serve as our starting point. 
Having described Jackson’s view, Schroeter asks: what exactly will a reference-fixing 
description for natural kind concepts look like? Arguably, the description should consist 
of two elements: an actual world description and a sortal. To see why, consider again 
the toy-description [THE ACTUAL WATERY STUFF OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE], which 
Jackson identifies with our concept WATER. This description is not sufficiently specific, 
as it doesn’t specify what sortal is being employed to fix the reference. What kind of 
watery stuff are we referring to? If it was just the actual kind comprising all and only 
the liquids with watery features, Putnam’s XYZ would also fall under the concept: we 
are actually acquainted with the kind including all and only the watery substances, since 
we are actually acquainted with local samples of H2O. So what we need to get the right 
extension is something like: [WHATEVER NATURAL KIND/CHEMICAL KIND IS THE ACTUAL 
WATERY STUFF OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE].  
Unfortunately, the need for a specific sortal raises a problem: for many subjects, the 
only sortal that they can plausibly be taken to employ is not satisfied by anything in the 
actual world: 
 
Consider the four classical elements: earth, air, ﬁre and water. Aristotle took these to be four basic 
conﬁgurations of prime matter which entered into the constitution of all material bodies. […] So 
[Jackson] might be tempted to say Aristotle’s “water” concept referred to that basic conﬁguration of 
prime matter which most closely satisﬁed Aristotle’s own criteria for identifying water in the actual 
world. If that is what Aristotle had in mind, however, his “water” concept did not manage to refer to 
anything at all – or at least not anything in this world (Schroeter 2004, p. 437). 
 
The reference-fixing description that Aristotle seems to associate with his concept (call 
it WATER*)315 is something like: [THE BASIC CONFIGURATION OF PRIME MATTER WHICH IS 
THE ACTUAL WATERY STUFF OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE]. Clearly, that description does not 
pick out anything in the actual world; it picks out a non-instantiated kind water* which 
                                                
315  Notice that Aristotle’s concept is not associated with our description [WHATEVER NATURAL 
KIND/CHEMICAL KIND IS THE ACTUAL WATERY STUFF OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE], but with a different 
description. Jackson will therefore take Aristotle’s WATER* to be a different concept from our WATER. I 
think this would be an acceptable consequence of the view, as long as Aristotle’s concept and ours had 
same reference (v. sect. 5 infra for discussion of this point). 
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is not the chemical kind water (= H2O) to which our concept WATER refers. This creates 
several problems316: 
 
1) Aristotle was not thinking and talking about water, i.e. about H2O.  
 
Intuitively, it seems that Aristotle was thinking and talking about the same kind water 
as us (Schroeter 2004, p. 437). But if the reference of his WATER* was fixed by the 
description above, that concept had a different reference from our WATER. Moreover, 
since Aristotle didn’t have any other concepts whose reference could be fixed to water 
via a description close or identical to ours, he simply had no way to express 
propositions about water in thought or language; he could only think/speak about the 
non-existent water*.  
 
2) Aristotle was not disagreeing with us about water, and he was not mistaken about 
its nature.  
 
The first problem gives rise to further issues having to do with disagreement and error. 
Aristotle’s theory of water, according to which it is the basic configuration of prime 
matter which plays the watery role in the actual world, seems to be inconsistent with our 
theory of water; moreover, it would appear to be a wrong theory317. But if the 
description above was fixing the reference of Aristotle’s WATER*, his theory was true, 
only not about water but about the non-existing water*. Nor was Aristotle disagreeing 
with us about the nature of water, i.e. of H2O: he was simply talking about some other, 
non-existing kind water*. 
The localist might reply that there is a proposition which is respectively accepted 
and rejected by Aristotle and me, namely the one expressed by the following existential 
statement: 
 
(E) Ǝx (x is a sample of the basic configuration of prime matter which is the actual 
watery stuff of our acquaintance) 
 
When Aristotle asserts (the Greek equivalent of) (E), he expresses a proposition which 
is inconsistent with the one expressed by my utterance of: 
 
(En) ¬ Ǝx (x is a sample of the basic configuration of prime matter which is the 
actual watery stuff of our acquaintance) 
 
                                                
316 Objection (1) is raised by Schroeter herself. Schroeter is also worried about the problem of error in (2), 
but she does not talk about disagreement and does not consider the possible descriptivist reply discussed 
below. She also doesn’t raise (3).   
317 Schroeter (2004, p. 437). 
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Since a common propositional content is being asserted and denied, there is genuine 
disagreement. What we do not disagree about is the proposition expressed by the 
universally quantified statement: 
 
(U) ∀x (x is a sample of water just in case it is a sample of the basic configuration of 
prime matter which is the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance) 
 
Aristotle’s utterance of (U) is true: his “water” is synonymous with his reference-fixing 
description, so his utterance expresses the following proposition (P): 
 
(P) ∀x (x is a sample of the basic configuration of prime matter which is the actual 
watery stuff of our acquaintance just in case it is a sample of the basic configuration 
of prime matter which is the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance) 
 
On the other hand, my utterance of (Un) (= the negation of (U)) is also true, since my 
“water” is synonymous with a different description, one which picks out H2O318.  
A similar move is available for error. Aristotle was wrong when making the 
existential claim (E), which does express a false proposition in his mouth as well as 
ours; on the other hand, he was not wrong when asserting (U), which is indeed true of 
the kind water* that his term “water” allegedly picks out.  
This reply is not fully satisfactory. The localist position clashes with our intuition 
that Aristotle had a theory of water (i.e. of the same kind we are referring to!), and that 
his theory was refuted by later empirical discoveries showing that there is no such thing 
as prime matter. Those discoveries didn’t just show that Aristotle’s assertion of (E) was 
false, they also showed that his assertion of (U) was319; similarly, there was genuine 
disagreement between the modern chemists who made those discoveries, asserting (Un) 
as a result, and Aristotle asserting (U).  
To make the worry more vivid, suppose Aristotle learns about recent empirical 
findings regarding the chemical composition of the watery stuff on Earth and the non-
existence of prime matter. Suppose he reacts as follows (a likely reaction, in fact): “I 
                                                
318 I am ignoring issues having to do with translation from Ancient Greek into English. I also assume that 
my arguments would still go through if (E)/(U) were mental representations rather than natural language 
sentences; for instance, (E)/(U) might be sentences in Aristotle’s LoT. (Jackson (1998) seems to accept 
the assumption, which is explicitly endorsed by other “two-dimensionalists” such as Chalmers (2002, 
2006)).  
I will keep moving between the level of thought and the level of language in this section. Of course, one 
might hold that there are significant differences between linguistic and mental content: in particular, one 
could take linguistic content to be public and shared, due to its conventional nature, while taking mental 
content to be essentially private and often not shared. I don’t think this would help Jackson in Aristotle’s 
case, but this is clearly too vast a topic to be discussed here.  
319 Notice that Aristotle’s assertion of (U) is not existentially committing as to the existence of something 
which satisfies the description he associates with “water”. Therefore, the localist cannot account for error 
by claiming that (U) is false if (E) is. 
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guess I was wrong when I asserted (U); water is not a basic configuration of prime 
matter, but a chemical kind. Water does exist, of course; it’s just not what I thought it 
was”. It seems hard for the descriptivist to account for Aristotle’s reaction: assuming 
Jackson’s theory, Aristotle should simply conclude that there is no water! Moreover, we 
will now have to take Aristotle to be wrong about the content of his own assertions: if 
descriptivism is true, then Aristotle asserted a true proposition with (U), despite his 
current protests to the contrary! 
 
3) Aristotle’s WATER-thoughts and “water”-sentences are either false or lack truth-
value 
 
Suppose Aristotle asserts: “Water is drinkable” (or thinks the corresponding thought). 
Since “water” is synonymous with the definite description “the basic configuration of 
prime matter which is the actual watery stuff of our acquaintance”, Aristotle’s utterance 
will be true just in case the basic configuration of prime matter which is the actual 
watery stuff of our acquaintance is drinkable. But then, depending on your preferred 
account of definite descriptions, his utterance will be either false or neither true nor 
false, since no existing kind satisfies this description. On a Russellian analysis of 
definite descriptions, the utterance is false, since it entails the existential claim: 
 
(EC) Ǝx (x is the basic configuration of prime matter which is the actual watery stuff 
of our acquaintance) 
 
On a Fregean account, Aristotle’s utterance is neither true nor false, since (EC) is only 
presupposed by it. On both accounts, Jackson’s view yields the wrong prediction, since 
Aristotle’s utterance seems plainly true: moreover, the problem will extend to countless 
other claims/thoughts (“water is transparent”, “there is water in the glass”…). 
 
To answer (1)-(3), the localist will probably try to identify a more “fundamental” 
description which was shared by us and Aristotle and which fixed the reference of his 
WATER* to H2O. But what could that description be? Suppose we drop the problematic 
sortal [PRIME MATTER] and go instead for: [STRUCTURAL KIND WHICH IS THE ACTUAL 
WATERY STUFF OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE]. Now: 
 
Aristotle also thought earth could be explained in terms of its fundamental structural features. We 
think he was wrong. The category of earth, we think, ought to be explained in terms of the practical 
concerns of farmers and engineers. There is no unified structural kind underlying different samples of 
earth (Schroeter 2004, p. 238). 
 
Aristotle thought the four elements were exactly on a par: he took each of them to be 
individuated by its “deep, structural” features (i.e. by its being a certain configuration of 
prime matter). So, if the reference of Aristotle’s WATER* was fixed by a description 
including the sortal [STRUCTURAL KIND], the reference of his EARTH* was presumably 
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fixed by a description including the same sortal. But then the descriptivist will have to 
face objections (1)-(3) again, only with respect to EARTH* rather than WATER*. For we 
have found out empirically that there are no unifying structural features underlying the 
samples of what Aristotle would have called “earth”: earth is a superficial, functional 
kind individuated by its relations to human concerns. Therefore, Aristotle’s concept 
EARTH* will now fail to pick out any existing kind, it will have a different reference 
from our EARTH, and objections (1)-(3) will arise again.  
Maybe our conceptions of water and earth still have a sortal in common with 
Aristotle’s, since he thought of both of them as substances? But, Schroeter notes, 
Aristotle also thought fire was a substance, while we have found out empirically that it 
is a process. For any sortal which was plausibly part of Aristotle’s reference-fixing 
descriptions, we can think of some empirical discovery which showed that the sortal in 
question was not satisfied by the kind that, nonetheless, Aristotle was intuitively talking 
about. 
Schroeter stops here in her ingenious list of counterexamples, but the localist is not 
done yet. At this point, he might try to “shrink” Aristotle’s reference-fixing description 
for water to: [WHATEVER THOSE THINGS (pointing at watery samples) ARE]. The 
indexical-causal link would then connect Aristotle to the chemical kind water/H2O 
underlying the local watery samples, despite his mistaken metaphysical views about 
what underlies those samples. The problem with this suggestion is that it massively 
underdetermines reference. In his demonstration of watery samples, Aristotle was in 
causal-indexical contact with many different kinds: H2O, liquid, transparent, watery… 
Which of these constitutes the reference of his concept? To save the proposal, we would 
need to add a more specific sortal to the demonstrative in the description, but this would 
of course simply raise the original problem again. 
 
At this point, the localist might decide to employ a completely different reply. Let 
the “anti-descriptivist” (AD) be someone who denies that a concept’s reference is fixed 
by a description which is required for possession of that concept. Now, the descriptivist 
might observe, AD must propose some metasemantic theory alternative to 
descriptivism; roughly speaking, he must tell some story about how our concepts come 
to have the reference they intuitively have, a story that doesn’t appeal to reference-
fixing descriptions at any point. Of course, there are several AD theories that could be 
exploited for this purpose. According to teleological theories, for instance, my concept 
WATER picks out H2O (among all the eligible candidates) because it is its “proper 
function” to refer to H2O320; according to Fodor’s asymmetric-dependency theory, my 
concept WATER stands in a relation R of reliable covariation with H2O, and even though 
the concept also stands in analogous relations with other natural kinds, R is “special” 
since such relations would not obtain if R didn’t also obtain321.  
                                                
320 Cf. Millikan (1984, 1993). 
321 Cf. Fodor (1987, 1990). 
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Other AD theories have been defended, but what matters for our purposes is this: for 
any anti-descriptivist metasemantics, the localist can propose a corresponding 
description which incorporates that metasemantics. Let “T” be an AD theory about 
what fixes the reference of Aristotle’s WATER*. The descriptivist will then take 
Aristotle’s reference-fixing description for WATER* to be: [THE WATERY STUFF OF OUR 
ACQUAINTANCE THAT SATISFIES T]. For instance: if T is teleological, the description will 
be: [THE WATERY STUFF OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE THAT IT’S THE PROPER FUNCTION OF MY 
CONCEPT ‘WATER*’ TO REFER TO]322 (mutatis mutandis for other anti-descriptivist views).  
This move seems to show that the anti-descriptivist cannot successfully raise 
objections (1)-(3) against Jackson. Clearly, an anti-descriptivist who raises (1)-(3) will 
take them to be sound; therefore, he will also agree that, if his own metasemantic theory 
T is correct, it must entail that Aristotle’s WATER* refers to H2O (or (1)-(3) will arise). 
But if T entails that WATER* refers to H2O, a description including T will also pick out 
H2O! All the descriptivist needs, then, is to claim that, for any theory T proposed by his 
opponent, Aristotle’s reference-fixing description for WATER* will include T: WATER* 
will then refer to H2O, and (1)-(3) will not arise323.  
The move is subtle, but there are good reasons to resist it. While it is indeed possible 
to incorporate any metasemantic theory in a reference-fixing description, it is a different 
matter to show that the description was actually employed in fixing the reference. In 
particular, the move seems to blatantly violate the psychological plausibility constraint. 
The localist needs to postulate that ordinary thinkers like Aristotle routinely employ 
descriptions which incorporate precisely that meta-semantic theory T which avoids (1)-
(3). But, first, the move appears entirely ad hoc; we have no independent psychological 
evidence showing that people take the reference of their concepts to be fixed by e.g. a 
teleological or an asymmetric-dependence mechanism. Second, the metasemantic 
theory needed to avoid the objections might be so complicated that it couldn’t plausibly 
be ascribed to ordinary thinkers.  
The localist might reply that thinkers do have intuitions about possible cases 
showing what descriptions they associate with their concepts. For instance, our 
intuitions about Kripke’s Gödel–Schmidt case seem to show that the description we 
associate with the name “Gödel” (and with the corresponding singular concept) must 
                                                
322 Imagine this to be something like a metalinguistic description used by Aristotle to introduce the term 
“water” for the first time.  
323 Jackson himself suggests a similar move (v. Jackson 2007a, especially pp. 19-20). For instance, here is 
how he incorporates causal theories of reference in his descriptivist semantics for proper names: 
 
[…] we should expect the most plausible candidate for the associated description […] for a name 
“A” to be, in many cases, something like the thing of such and such a kind at the far end of an 
information-preserving causal chain ending in a certain token of “A” in a certain sentence token of, 
say, the form “A is F” (Jackson 2007b, p. 249). 
 
V. Soames (2005, p. 36) for discussion.  
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include a “causal” element324. So we do have independent evidence supporting the 
claim that Aristotle’s description for WATER* includes theory T (however we decide to 
fill “T” in). And, since our associating a certain description with a concept might be a 
subpersonal state analogous to our “cognizing” a complicated syntactic rule, T can be as 
sophisticated as needed325.  
In reply, notice that, if the localist identifies T with one of the AD metasemantic 
theories that have historically been proposed, it’s very unclear that all ordinary thinkers 
will have intuitions conforming to it. For instance, teleological theories of content 
notoriously yield counterintuitive results in certain cases, and defenders of such views 
have often decided to simply reject such intuitions as incorrect326. If on the other hand 
the localist claims that existing theories are not satisfactory, and that the metasemantic 
theory T that will be incorporated in the reference-fixing description is yet to come, then 
we just don’t know yet whether ordinary thinkers will have intuitions confirming that 
they implicitly believe the theory. Prima facie, it’s plausible to hypothesize that at least 
some people’s intuitions will not accord with this future ideal metasemantics. If this 
turns out to be the case, then the localist will either have to maintain that such subjects 
would have the intuitions under certain suitably idealized conditions, or that the 
reference of their concepts is not fixed by a description which incorporates T. If the 
localist chooses the first option, some empirical evidence must be provided to show that 
the subjects would indeed have the intuitions under ideal conditions (where the 
conditions in question should not make the theory non-falsifiable: if we idealize 
enough, everyone will have the “right” intuitions…). If he chooses the second, he’ll 
concede that these subjects don’t share reference with us, in which case objections (1)-
(3) will arise again. 
This brings us to a second problem with the descriptivist’s move. To see what’s 
wrong with that move, we don’t even need to show that actual thinkers might fail to 
accept theory T; appealing to possible thinkers will be enough. Suppose someone 
(“Aristotle*”) does not seem to take the reference of one of his natural kind concepts to 
be fixed by the description: [THE WATERY STUFF OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE THAT SATISFIES 
T] (where, recall, T is any AD metasemantic theory which would entail that WATER* 
refers to H2O). In the imagined case, Aristotle* doesn’t seem to employ the description 
at any level, be it personal or subpersonal (e.g. if T is teleological, Aristotle* will have 
intuitions about possible cases that are inconsistent with teleological theories; he will 
stick to them under ideal conditions; he will explicitly hold a non-teleological theory of 
content, etc…). The case is otherwise identical to our original scenario involving 
Aristotle: in particular, Aristotle* also identifies the referent of his “water” with a 
configuration of prime matter underlying the watery stuff of our acquaintance. Here, 
none of the options available to the localist seem at all plausible: 
 
                                                
324 V. Jackson (1998, chs. 2-3); Jackson (2007b, p. 249). 
325 Jackson (1998, pp. 34-38).  
326 Cf. Millikan (1993, p. 149) on Pietroski’s (1992) “kimu-snorf” case.  
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• The localist could deny that his prediction about the case is incorrect; we should 
treat someone like Aristotle* as referring to a non-existing kind water*. But, if 
objections (1)-(3) apply in the case of Aristotle, they should also apply in the case of 
Aristotle*, since the two scenarios appear exactly analogous. 
 
• Alternatively, the localist might try to find a reference-fixing description that can be 
plausibly ascribed to Aristotle* and picks out H2O. But all the candidates we 
examined for Aristotle failed, and the appeal to T is ruled out by hypothesis.  
 
• Finally, the localist might argue that the case is for some reason impossible, but I 
find it hard to imagine how such an argument might go. 
 
I conclude that including theory T in the reference-fixing description for Aristotle’s 
WATER* will not constitute a satisfactory reply to objections (1)-(3). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have examined different varieties of localism about concept 
individuation and possession. First, I have discussed pluralist-localist views that identify 
concepts with the locally structured representations posited by cognitive psychology 
(sect. 2.3). Such views have some interesting features in common with my own pluralist 
picture; however, they are insufficiently radical and should extend their pluralism to 
allow for holistically individuated concepts, as well as other concepts which will not be 
individuated in the way prescribed by the psychologist.  
I have then considered localist views on which not all the structured representations 
described by psychology will count as “concepts”, but only the fundamental ones that 
drive our categorization decisions under certain ideal circumstances (sect. 3). Such 
views must deal with the further dilemma of whether to allow for fundamental, but 
incorrect dispositions to individuate concepts. I considered a few reasons why localists 
seem to uniformly reject this possibility, and then noted that this creates a problem of 
psychological plausibility (sect. 3.2): if only correct inferences are individuating, we 
must find (for each concept) a corresponding correct conception that can plausibly be 
ascribed to ordinary thinkers. This is not easy, since our “folk theories” will often 
include mistaken principles.   
Presumably, the localist’s response will be that (parts of) our folk theories fix the 
reference of our concepts, so that they are guaranteed to be correct. I have then 
examined a “true localist” picture on which concepts are individuated by such 
reference-fixing conceptions (sect. 4), arguing that it will end up making mistaken 
predictions about subjects like Aristotle. These subjects have “deviant” implicit 
conceptions: therefore, if their deviant conceptions fix the reference of their concepts, 
such concepts will turn out to have different reference from ours. As we have seen, 
however, this is an unacceptable consequence, since it gives rise to objections (1)-(3). I 
have then considered and rejected some possible localist replies. In particular, I focused 
on Jackson’s suggestion that we can always include an anti-descriptivist metasemantics 
in our reference-fixing descriptions; in response, I argued that the move can’t deal with 
subjects like Aristotle*, and that in any case it will again expose the localist to a 
problem of psychological plausibility. 
 
I would like to conclude with a few additional remarks about “deviant subjects”, an 
issue which was raised at the very beginning of our discussion327. What’s the real 
problem with anomalous thinkers like Aristotle? Many defenders of concept publicity 
believe the problem is that, if a localist IRS theory was true, deviant subjects would not 
have the same concepts as us. Here is a revealing passage from Laurence and Margolis: 
 
                                                
327 V. my summary of Williamson (2007) in the general Introduction. 
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Consider the situation of someone who grows up with no exposure to lakes or oceans – maybe a 
nomad in the Sahara. If Jackson’s analysis is right, such a person should be able to know a priori that 
water fills oceans and lakes or else she lacks the concept WATER altogether328. We take it, however, 
that neither of these possibilities is at all plausible […] (Laurence and Margolis 2003, p. 262, my 
emphasis). 
 
If localism is true, subjects like the nomad or Aristotle won’t have the same concept 
WATER as us, because of their anomalous inferential dispositions. Notice, however, that 
this objection might not be particularly effective against certain localist views. An 
“untrue” localist like Weiskopf could respond that, while deviant subjects do not share 
our concept WATER, their concept WATER* still has same reference as our WATER. This 
is because, according to untrue localists, the inferences which individuate a concept do 
not fix its reference329. Therefore, the nomad or Aristotle can still have a concept 
WATER* that refers to the same chemical kind as our WATER, even though their 
inferential dispositions are radically different from ours. Our localist will then claim that 
publicity is preserved, since sameness of reference is all that’s needed to account for 
phenomena like communication, agreement/disagreement and so on330. 
In light of my arguments in previous chapters, I take a (much qualified) version of 
this response to be substantially correct. We do share some of our water-concepts with 
the nomad and Aristotle: these are those water-concepts that are individuated by their 
reference, or by a small set of inferential connections. At the same time, however, 
deviant subjects do not share all of our water-concepts: for instance, they clearly don’t 
have a concept WATER that is associated with the local inferential role [ACTUAL WATERY 
STUFF OF OUR ACQUAINTANCE]. (There will also be further concepts which are not 
shared, e.g. holistically individuated water-concepts). Luckily, on the picture of 
concepts I developed in chapter 5, sharing of the more coarse-grained concepts is all 
that’s required to account for publicity. 
Deviant subjects become much more worrying once we take reference to be fixed by 
our inferential dispositions, as on Jackson’s “true localist” picture. Because their 
inferential dispositions are so different from ours, these subjects will now refer to 
different natural kinds from us331. For instance, Aristotle will not only have a different 
concept WATER*: more worryingly, that concept will also have different reference from 
our WATER, since the associated inferences will pick out the non-instantiated kind 
water*. This, in turn, will give rise to objections (1)-(3). Notice, in particular, that there 
is now no level where the theory can account for phenomena like 
                                                
328 (In Jackson’s reference-fixing description for WATER, [WATERY] is glossed as including [FILLS OCEANS 
AND LAKES] as well as the other standard watery features).  
329 Recall, for instance, that Weiskopf takes reference to be fixed by “externalist” mechanisms like causal 
chains or deference (sect. 2.3). Block (1993, p. 56) makes the same move.  
330 This is the line of Prinz and Clark (2004) and Block (1993).  
331 This problem might not arise with Laurence and Margolis’ nomad: his concept could still pick out 
water/H2O, but through a description that is partially different from ours. 
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agreement/disagreement or communication with Aristotle: concepts are not shared, but 
reference is not shared either.  
Deviant subjects might well fail to have some of our concepts, as long as we can 
still think and talk about the same objects and properties. If the inferences which 
individuate a concept also fix its reference, however, neither of these desiderata will be 
met. For this reason, it’s an important part of my picture that reference must not be 
inferentially fixed332. Of course, this creates a dialectical obligation: I have to provide a 
non-inferentialist metasemantics alternative to Jackson’s and show that this 
metasemantics will make correct predictions about subjects like Aristotle. This, 
however, must be a topic for some other time. 
                                                
332 Because conceptual structure is not reference-fixing, I’m also skeptical about “ambitious” versions of 
the conceptual analysis project: an analysis of the structure of our concepts will not yield any knowledge 
about the nature of the philosophical kinds picked out by those concepts (v. supra for more details about 
ambitious/non ambitious conceptual analysis). 
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Appendix A 
 
Chapter 1: List of numbered sentences 
 
 
1) Superman can fly. 
2) Clark Kent can fly. 
2n) Clark Kent cannot fly. 
 
3) Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly. 
4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly. 
4n) Lois Lane doesn’t believe that Clark Kent can fly. 
 
5) Lois Lane believes the proposition that Superman/Clark Kent can fly under the guise 
of the sentence “Superman can fly”. 
6) Lois Lane believes the proposition that Superman/Clark Kent can fly under the guise 
of the sentence “Clark Kent can fly”. 
 
7) Lois Lane believes that Superman, the mighty superhero, can fly. 
8) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent, the milquetoast reporter, can fly. 
 
9) Superman is Clark Kent. 
 
10) The sentences “Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly” and “Lois Lane believes 
that Clark Kent can fly” express different propositions.  
 
11) If Lois Lane is rational, reflective, and attentive, and she believes that Clark Kent 
cannot fly, then she doesn’t also believe that Clark Kent can fly. 
 
12) If a person wants Twain to autograph her book, and she believes that if she waves 
then Twain will autograph her book, then, other things being equal, she will wave. 
 
13) If a person wants Twain to autograph her book, believes that if she waves then 
Clemens will autograph her book, and doesn’t believe that Twain is Clemens, then, 
other things being equal, she will not wave. 
 
14) If a person wants Twain to autograph her book, believes that if she waves then 
Clemens will autograph her book, and wants and believes these propositions in 
mismatching ways, then, other things being equal, she will not wave. 
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Appendix B 
 
Chapters 2-3: List of numbered sentences  
 
 
G) If a subject S wants P and believes that if she performs action a then P, then other 
things being equal S will perform action a. 
 
G1) If a subject S wants to get water, then other things being equal S will look for 
water. 
 
G2) If a subject S wants to get water and believes that if she opens the fridge she will 
get water, then other things being equal S will open the fridge. 
 
G3) If a subject S wants to get orange juice and believes that if she opens the fridge she 
will get orange juice, then other things being equal S will open the fridge. 
 
G4) If a subject S wants to annoy x and believes that if she opens the fridge she will 
annoy x, then other things being equal S will open the fridge. 
 
G5) If a subject S believes that Clark can fly and believes that Clark just jumped off a 
skyscraper, then other things being equal S will not be worried. 
 
G6) If a subject S believes that Superman is nearby and believes that Lex Luthor is 
nearby, then other things being equal S will run towards Superman. 
 
G7) If a subject S does not believe that Superman is nearby and believes that Lex 
Luthor is nearby, then other things being equal S will run away. 
 
(L) Lois believes that Clark can fly. 
 
(Ls) S believes that Clark can fly. 
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